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Introduction 
When the first units of the International Brigades marched 
through the wind-swept and sparsely peopled streets of besieged Ma-
drid in the early morning hours of November 8, 1936, a myth was 
born. This myth focused on the appealing idea that the men of those 
first International contingents, and the thousands who were to follow 
them into the whirlwind of civil war in Spain, represented the re-
sponse of world democracy to the threat of fascism. These Interna-
tional volunteers were, so the theme ran, a band of modem Lafayettes 
and Garibaldis, the "cream of the progressive youth of the age" and 
"premature antifascists" who embarked on a "great crusade" to make 
the world safe for democracy. 
The facts fail to support the myth. But since this myth meshed so 
neatly into the larger one that cast the Spanish Civil War as a clear-cut 
struggle between "democracy" and "fascism," so widely held at the 
time, it has exhibited remarkable staying power. Actually the Spanish 
conflict was, as many have shown, anything but a simple and straight-
forward contest between democracy and fascism. Both sides in the 
civil war represented a varied amalgam of mutually incompatible 
ideologies. To say that all who fought for the Loyalists were demo-
crats is to stretch that term beyond meaningful definition. To say that 
all who fought for the Nationalists were fascists is to do the same. 
Once this is understood it becomes unnecessary to hold-as the myth 
within a myth would have it-that the foreigners who fought for the 
Loyalists were, by definition, fighting for democracy. 
In fact, when civil war and revolution exploded simultaneously in 
Spain in July 1936, the explosion was the result of long-brewing and 
uniquely Spanish developments and had its roots deep in that dis-
tracted country's past. But because of the ideological power struggles 
then smoldering in Europe the Spanish conflict quickly assumed an 
international significance out of all proportion to its intrinsic impor-
tance outside of Spain itself. Spain had the misfortune to suffer a civil 
war at a time when it suited powerful states and fanatical ideological 
forces to use that war for their own purposes. Thus Spain, a land 
usually self-contained and remote from the dynamic forces of history 
north of the Pyrenees, became the arena in which the violent political 
passions of the time came to grips. 
Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union intervened actively in the 
war, using Spain not only as a pawn in their game of power politics 
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but as a proving ground for their respective military and political 
techniques. The Soviet Union and its international apparatus, the 
Comintern, pursued a policy in Spain of organizing, unifying, and 
directing the Loyalist forces, both militarily and politically, while at 
the same time seeking to enlist the sympathy and support of a broad 
spectrum of world opinion for what they called the "defense of 
democracy" and "antifascism." That the Soviet-Comintern leader-
ship saw fit to involve itself in the Spanish affair as it did resulted from 
a unique confluence of the stream of Spanish history with the larger 
currents swirling about Europe and the world in the tumultuous 
decade of the 1930s. It was that confluence also which spawned the 
International Brigades and accounted for a Comintern army fighting 
in a Spanish civil war. 
The fame of the Brigades stems primarily from their military ex-
ploits, exploits certainly of significance and deserving of the recogni-
tion they have received. The Brigades were among the most effective 
military units on their side of the barricades and quite possibly made 
the difference between survival and defeat for Loyalist Spain during 
the critical winter of 1936-1937. But the Brigades were much more 
than simply a military force. They were a significant political, ideolog-
ical, and propaganda instrument which could be-and was-used by 
the Comintern for its own purposes, not only inside Spain but on the 
larger world stage. No realistic understanding of the significance of 
the Brigades is possible without an appreciation of their intrinsically 
political nature and role, nor of the fact that they were, from begin-
ning to end, an integral part of that interlocking directorate which was 
the Soviet-Comintern apparatus in Spain. 
1 Spanish Politics 
and Comintern Strategy 
On July 17, 1936, elements of the Spanish army raised the 
banner of revolt against the government of the Republic. The pronun-
ciamiento, however, was not a complete success. Had it been so, the 
ministry would have resigned and a military junta would have as-
sumed governmental powers. 1 What happened instead was the deto-
nation of dual revolutions and a full-scale civil war in which each side 
sought not only the destruction of the other but the destruction of the 
Spanish Republic and the abortive experiment in "bourgeois democ-
racy" which it represented. 
The government against which the Spanish army rebelled was de-
pendent upon the Frente Popular, an electoral coalition of leftist 
parties which had narrowly won the elections of February 1936. The 
cabinets that had held the executive power of the state since the 
Popular Front's victory in February had been composed entirely of 
left republicans because both the Socialist and the Communist parties 
refused to participate in a "bourgeois government." This reflected the 
fact that the "bourgeois republican" regime was supported only 
grudgingly, if at all, by those very proletarian political forces that 
accounted for the bulk of the Popular Front's electoral strength. Thus 
the left republican governments had been forced to walk a tightrope 
while performing a political juggling act in a frantic effort to keep their 
erstwhile political allies from pursuing a too blatantly revolutionary 
program while at the same time attempting to keep these same forces 
in harness behind the regime. Success in the former would jeopardize 
the latter. But failure in the latter would mean the political bank-
ruptcy of a bourgeois republic dependent on the support of Marxist 
Socialists, Communists, and Anarchists. 2 
Perhaps the most immediate and obvious manifestation of the es-
sential frailty of the Popular Front coalition as a base upon which to 
govern the Republic was the precipitous and vociferous radicalization 
of the Socialist party of Spain, the party that was the essential key-
stone of the coalition. The left wing of the party, led by the then-styled 
"Spanish Lenin," Francisco Largo Caballero, was demanding the 
Bolshevization of the party and the revolutionary road to the "dicta-
torship of the proletariat." Largo Caballero and his supporters had 
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made it clear from the beginning that their adherence to the Popular 
Front was simply a matter of electoral expediency and implied no 
commitment to support the bourgeois republic. "With the Republic 
established, our duty is to bring about Socialism," said Largo Cabal-
lero. "I speak of Marxist Socialism ... of revolutionary Socialism .... 
Our aspiration is the conquest of political power. Method? That 
which we are able to use. It [the Popular Front] is a circumstantial 
coalition, for which a program is being produced that is certainly not 
going to satisfy us. " 3 
One of Largo Caballero's chief intellectual lieutenants, Julio Al-
varez del Vayo, put it bluntly. The Popular Front, he said, was "an 
intermediate stage of common labor, in which the republicans dissolve 
the Fascist centres and purge the armed forces, so that the Socialists 
may soon install the dictatorship of the proletariat." In a speech in 
February 1936, Luis Araquistain, another of the Socialist intellectu-
als, poignantly pointed out the similarity between the revolutionary 
situation of Spain in 1936 and that of Russia in 1917. The weakness 
of the Republic, he concluded, set the proper condition for Spain to 
become the second country "where the proletarian revolution tri-
umphs."4 Presumably Manuel Azalia, the president of the Republic, 
was cast to play Kerensky to Largo Caballero's Lenin. 
In April1936 Largo Caballero said: "The present regime cannot 
continue,"5 and, indeed, it would have been hard for anyone even 
remotely aware of the realities to argue with him on that. The govern-
ment seemed incapable of governing the country or, indeed worse, of 
even trying. The most ominous result of the government's dependence 
on the sufferance of the proletarian parties was its reluctance to antag-
onize them by enforcing the law with vigor. Thus the period from 
February to July 1936 saw a breakdown in public order which was 
extreme even for Spain. 6 Speaking out bravely and honestly against 
the wave of political strikes, violent demonstrations, church burnings, 
and assassinations, Indalecio Prieto, a moderate Socialist, said: "What 
no country can endure is the constant bloodletting of public disorder 
... what no nation can bear is the attrition of its public authority and 
its own economic vitality through the continuance of uneasiness, 
anxiety and restlessness ... that way does not lead to Socialism, it 
leads to an utterly hopeless anarchy."7 
If an astute and dedicated Socialist felt compelled to speak out 
against Spain's decline into chaos, it was hardly surprising that mod-
erate and conservative forces were agitated and alarmed. In a strange 
way the words of Jose Maria Gil Robles, a leading conservative 
spokesman, seemed to echo those of Prieto: "A country can survive 
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as a monarchy or as a Republic, with a parliamentary system or with 
a presidential system, with Sovietism or with fascism; however, the 
one way it does not survive is in anarchy, and Spain today, unhappily, 
is living in anarchy."8 
Against this background of governments that did not govern, stri-
dent revolutionary rhetoric and a rapid slide into chaos, action by the 
army, and support of or acquiesence in that action by a wide spectrum 
of Spanish opinion was hardly unexpected. When it came, the essen-
tial hollowness of the left republican regime became immediately 
apparent. Its already tenuous and feeble authority collapsed as the 
bulk of the forces of order normally at the disposal of any government 
-the army, the police apparatus, the bureaucracy-went over to the 
insurgents. "The state fell and the Republic remained without an 
army, without a police force," recalled a leading Spanish Socialist.9 
An astute foreign observer, Pietro Nenni, chief of the Italian Socialist 
party and an early participant in the Spanish Civil War, wrote: "The 
phenomenon most characteristic of the first phase of the Civil War 
was the absence of power, of a central direction .... The state did not 
exist, authority had collapsed."10 
Within a few days after the pronunciamiento, the ephemeral Repub-
lican cabinets (there were three within as many days), faced with the 
collapse of the state apparatus, gave in to the demands of the proletar-
ian parties for arms. From that moment the writ of the "government" 
ceased to count for much. Real power in Republican Spain passed into 
the hands of the proletarian parties-parties with frankly revolution-
ary aims. 11 The president of the Republic himself later testified to the 
utter collapse of governmental authority and the reality of revolution 
in Popular Front Spain: "The revolutionary excess [of the masses of 
Republican Spain] spread itself before the eyes of the astonished 
ministers. In view of this violent revolution, the cabinet was not able 
to choose between methods designed to halt or suppress the criminal 
agitation. The Government lacked the forces necessary to do it. And 
if it had disposed of some ... their employment would only have run 
the risk of provoking a second Civil War."12 From the beginning then, 
the bulk of the elements actively opposing the pronunciamiento were 
essentially revolutionary forces motivated not by any desire to defend 
"bourgeois democracy," the "Republic," and the status quo ante July 
17, 1936, but to "make the revolution." 
While the facade of a regularly constituted Republican government 
remained in existence in Madrid, because it served the purposes of the 
proletarian parties to allow it to do so, 13 the reality of power lay in 
the regime of political committees which sprang into being through-
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out Popular Front Spain, committees dominated by the proletarian 
revolutionary parties. Despite the calculated denials of Popular Front 
propaganda, 14 the fact of revolution was starkly clear to anyone inside 
the Popular Front zone of Spain. Entering Barcelona in August 1936, 
Franz Borkenau felt as if he had "landed on a continent different from 
anything I had seen before." Later that year George Orwell wrote: 
"When one came straight from England the aspect of Barcelona was 
something startling and overwhelming. It was the first time that I had 
ever been in a town where the working class was in the saddle. 
Practically every building of any size had been seized by the workers 
and was draped with red flags or with the red and black flag of the 
Anarchists; every wall was scrawled with the hammer and sickle and 
with the initials of revolutionary parties; almost every church has been 
gutted and its images burnt."15 The Cambridge-educated British 
Communist John Cornford felt awestruck and delighted at what he 
saw. "In Barcelona," he wrote, "one can understand physically what 
the dictatorship of the proletariat means. . . . Everywhere in the 
streets are armed workers and militiamen, and sitting in the cafes 
which used to belong to the bourgeoisie .... It's as if in London the 
armed workers were dominating the streets."16 
Madrid made much the same impact. The government appeared 
little in evidence. The proletarian political parties and trade unions, 
acting with complete autonomy, dominated the city. Each wore its 
own insignia and maintained its own armed militia units and strongly 
fortified headquarters. 17 This Spain then, caught up in the throes of 
revolution and civil war, distracted, divided, and desperate, created 
one of the preconditions for the emergence of the International Bri-
gades on the stage of history. 
But in another and more critical sense the specifically Spanish 
issues were not the crux of the matter. To the men who brought the 
Brigades into existence and to the vast majority of those foreigners 
who fought in the Brigades, the issue was not really Spain and the 
Spaniards but the larger international and ideological forces of the day 
which simply found a convenient arena for combat in Spain. In this 
sense the International Brigades were both a by-product and ~ in-
strument of a Soviet-Comintern strategy of worldwide scope. 
That strategy had been launched as early as 1934 and was a direct 
result of the fact that the view from the Kremlin had changed both 
rapidly and menacingly in the years immediately preceding. The 
threat posed to the Soviet Union by a resurgent Germany and an 
aggressive Japan had forced the men in Moscow to alter radically both 
the traditional Soviet foreign policy and the party line of the Commu-
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nist International. The new Soviet foreign policy called for rapproche-
ment and, if possible, alliance with any power that did, or might in 
the future, oppose German and/or Japanese expansionism. This, in 
effect, meant those traditional targets of Communist hostility, the 
nations of the "bourgeois imperialist" west. It also led to the Soviet 
Union's adherence to the previously despised League of Nations 
where its delegation immediately became the most vocal advocate of 
collective security. By 1935 the Soviet Union had concluded alliances 
with both France and Czechoslovakia and had apparently reversed 
her traditionally revisionist foreign policy to become a staunch de-
fender of the status quo. 
A second and complementary phase of the new Kremlin strategy 
was the Popular Front. The goal of the Popular Front policy was to 
secure as wide a spectrum of support as possible within the bourgeois 
democracies for foreign policies that would, in effect, support those 
of the USSR. Even with this new approach the Soviet leaders well 
knew that the vast majority of people and governments of the world 
would be little concerned with threats to the security of the USSR as 
such. Thus, a fundamental thrust of the Popular Front stratagem was 
directed toward making the threat to the Soviet Union appear to be 
only part of a general threat to all. 18 To do this the Soviet-Comintern 
interpretation of the world situation read that an international Fascist 
conspiracy, led by Germany and Japan, threatened the peace and 
security of the entire world. As the Soviet commissar for foreign 
affairs, Maxim Litvinov, put it: "The flame of war lighted by the 
aggressors on two continents threatens to set fire to Europe and then 
to the whole world. As always ... it was the Soviet Union which was 
the first to raise its voice to the whole world . . . proclaiming the 
source of the danger ... and pointing out the ways and means neces-
sary to struggle against this bloody disaster into which fascism is 
ready to plunge humanity."19 
Prior to the adoption of the Popular Front program the Communist 
line had stressed that the greatest enemies of the working class were 
the non-Communist proletarian parties: "The Fascist beasts were 
Fascist beasts," wrote Arthur Koestler, a member of the German 
Communist party at the time, "but our [the Communists] main preoc-
cupation was the Trotskyite heretics and socialist schismatics."20 On 
February 6, 1934, a leading French Communist, Andre Marty, wrote 
in L 'Humanite, "It is impossible to struggle against fascism without 
struggling against social democracy." In that same year the Commu-
nist party of Spain took advantage of an abortive insurrection of 
Asturian workers to tell the working class that "the Socialist Party 
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is the full manifestation of the impotence of social-democracy." The 
Communist's aim, wrote a leading member of the Spanish Communist 
party, was "to destroy the Socialist party."21 
The new Popular Front policy began with a cessation of the more 
violent forms of abuse against the various socialist and democratic 
parties followed by efforts at seeking alliances with them. The slogan 
used to attract support for the Popular Front idea, by evoking an 
ideological image appealing to the widest possible audience, was "an-
tifascism." Armed with the new ideological shibboleth, the Comin-
tern undertook the task of making the Popular Front a reality. All talk 
of "social fascists" ended abruptly as did any hint that Communists 
were revolutionaries. "The notion that we [the Communists] had ever 
advocated violence was to be ridiculed as a bogey, refuted as a slander 
spread by reactionary war-mongers," wrote Koestler. "We no longer 
referred to ourselves as Bolsheviks, nor even as Communist ... we 
were just simple, honest, peaceloving anti-Fascists and defenders of 
democracy." American Communist party chief Earl Browder was 
simply parroting the Popular Front line when he later righteously 
declared. "The war in Spain is a part of the world-wide offensive 
against fascism of all peace loving and democratic peoples." Bour-
geois democracy, which, as Koestler recalled, had a month or two 
earlier been castigated as "fascism in disguise," was now "praised as 
a guarantee of freedom." All revolutionary slogans were eliminated 
from the Communist vocabulary and replaced by the slogans of "free-
dom, peace and national unity."22 An example of this was the adop-
tion of the slogan "Socialist students, the most active upholders of 
peace, democracy and civilization," by the Communist-dominated 
Socialist Club at Cambridge University.23 
A close reading of the Popular Front program as officially enun-
ciated at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International of 
August 1936 showed that the Communists had not by any means 
given up their ultimate objectives of world revolution and the dicta-
torship of the proletariat. They were merely adopting a temporary 
tactic to meet the immediate threat posed by the rise of powerful 
enemies of the Soviet Union.24 In clarification of the Popular Front 
line, Georgi Dimitroff, chief of the Comintern and the man most 
closely identified with that policy, wrote: "The flexible Bolshevik 
tactics, which are the application of the general tactical line of the 
Seventh Congress of the Communist International to a specific ques-
tion arise of necessity from the whole present-day international situa-
tion." In his explanation Dimitroff made it clear that the real purpose 
of the Popular Front was the defense of the USSR. So also did the 
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German Comintern spokesman Walter Ulbricht. "No one can really 
fight fascism," he said, "so long as he does not contribute to the 
strengthening of its most important bulwark in this struggle, the 
Soviet Union."25 
That a clear understanding of the true nature and purpose of the 
Popular Front policy was well understood by the various branches of 
the Comintern was demonstrated by an article signed by Jose Diaz, 
the top Spanish Communist, just prior to the Spanish elections of 
February 1936. "Our [Communist Party] struggle is for the dictator-
ship of the proletariat, for Soviets, we ... do not give up our aims. 
But ... the immediate task now is not the struggle for the dictatorship 
of the proletariat but the development of the anti-fascist struggle." 
Ulbricht, in a speech to the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern 
at which the new line was pronounced said: "In the struggle for Soviet 
power, it is possible-during a political crisis-to establish an anti-
fascist popular front, so long as the masses are still not ready for a 
Soviet government. Later on, when conditions have improved, we can 
continue the struggle for a proletarian dictatorship .... the goal of our 
fight is a Soviet Germany." Explaining the new tactic, he said, "We 
Communists fight for democratic freedom because it gives greater 
mobility to the working class and its organization [the Communist 
party], and permits them to prepare the masses for the battle for 
Soviet power."26 The temporary and tactical nature of the new policy 
was not stressed outside the confines of the party itself. 
Success for the Popular Front required a massive enlargement of 
the numbers of people who could be influenced by the Communist 
party. This was a task preeminently of propanganda which, to be most 
effective, must appear to be in large part of non-Communist origin. 
The Comintern had within its ranks a man who was something of a 
genius in just the type of work needed. Among the German political 
exiles living in Paris after 1933 was Willi Munzenberg, Comintern 
chief of agitprop (agitation and propaganda) for western Europe and 
Germany. Arthur Koestler, who worked with Munzenberg and knew 
him intimately, called him the "Red Eminence of the international 
anti-fascist movement." Munzenberg had been extremely successful 
since the 1920s in founding, editing, and marketing numerous maga-
zines and newpapers which sought to popularize the Soviet Union and 
the Communist party in Germany. He invented and made use of the 
"fellow traveller," a new species which was to have a significant 
future, especially during the Popular Front period. He developed the 
organizational technique for making use of the "fellow traveller" as 
well as thousands of unwitting dupes in the ubiquitous front organiza-
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tions clandestinely conducted by the party and designed to mobilize 
and direct public opinion in support of virtually any program or point 
of view. Of Munzenberg's multifarious propaganda activities, Koes-
tler wrote: "He produced International Committees, Congresses and 
movements as a conjurer produces rabbits out of his hat."27 As an-
other ex-Communist put it, "The success with which the Communist 
line was propagated among Social Democrats and liberals during 
these years, . . . the thousands of painters, writers and doctors and 
lawyers and debutantes chanting a diluted version of the Stanlinist 
line" vividly demonstrated the effectiveness of Munzenberg's 
efforts.28 
Under the impact of one of the greatest propaganda barrages ever 
laid down, the new policy achieved rapid and widespread successes. 
Most apparent were those in France and Spain where Popular Front 
electoral coalitions with Communist participation put governments 
into power in 1936. But in England and the United States, too, the 
Communists had never been so popular or so successful. 29 The 
American Communists suddenly adopted and loudly supported the 
New Deal which just a short time before they had as loudly excoriated 
as "semi-fascist"30 and Earl Browder, secretary of the party in the 
United States, posed as a great patriot, adopting the slogan "Commu-
nism is the Americanism of the twentieth century." In France the 
Communists attempted to widen the spectrum of the Popular Front 
far beyond the range of the political left. L 'Humanite editorially 
called for the inclusion of the National Volunteers, a right-wing veter-
ans organization, and the Catholic parties in the "anti-fascist front." 
All this seemingly strange benevolence toward those whom the Com-
munists had formerly anathematized followed faithfully the policy 
laid down in the Kremlin. Stalin told the French ambassador that 
confidentially he did not care what a country's internal regime was so 
long as its foreign policy was anti-German.31 
Against this background the eruption of civil war and proletarian 
revolution in Spain was highly unwelcome to Soviet policymakers. It 
exposed the contradiction in their new policy between the attempt to 
convince bourgeois democratic governments that the Soviet Union 
was no longer interested in exporting revolution on the one hand and 
their desire to continue to pose as the champion ofthe world proletar-
iat on the other.32 If the pre-Popular Front policy had been still in 
effect the Communists could logically have either favored proletarian 
revolution in Spain unreservedly or taken a hands-off, plague-on-
both-your-houses, attitude since the whole conflict could have been 
written off as one between bourgeois capitalist factions or Fascists. 33 
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But in the complicated world of July 1936 no such simple solution was 
possible. 
At this difficult time the dual nature of the International Commu-
nist movement proved to be of value. While the Soviet Union's regular 
governmental apparatus remained, overtly at least, quiet and correct 
on the Spanish affair, 34 even to the extent of signing a British-spon-
sored nonintervention agreement designed to isolate the war in 
Spain, 35 the Comintern moved quickly and noisily into action. The 
immediate interpretation of events in Spain by the Comintern was that 
the pronunciamiento of the Spanish army was part of the worldwide 
fascist plot. The statement "Hitler is in direct control of the general 
staff of the [Spanish] Putschists" summed up this attitude as expressed 
in the first issues of the Comintern's official organ after the fighting 
broke out. 36 The first official Comintern reaction to the pronun-
ciamiento apparently came at a meeting in Moscow of representatives 
of the Comintern and Profintern (the Communist labor organization). 
There the idea of aid to the Popular Front forces in Spain was agreed 
to in principle. Another joint Comintern-Profintern meeting was held 
on July 26 in Prague under the chairmanship of Gaston Monmous-
seau, Chief of the European office of the Profintern. There a program 
of financial aid to the Spanish Popular Front was adopted. 37 
At the same time Communist parties throughout the world quickly 
launched full-scale propaganda campaigns in support of Popular 
Front Spain. As early as July 26 Harry Pollitt, chief of the Communist 
party of Great Britain, declared to a rally in Trafalgar Square: "We 
must compel the national government [of Great Britain] to render 
every assistance to the Spanish peoples' front government ... let us 
organize a mighty united movement of solidarity ... organize meet-
ings, demonstrations everywhere. " 38 The Comintern also sought to 
use the Popular Front momentum to get united action from the 
Second International and other proletarian, labor, and liberal orga-
nizations on the Spanish question. 39 
Meanwhile Munzenberg's propaganda machine turned its full at-
tention to Spain. A European Conference for the Defense of the 
Spanish Republic, called by the World Committee against War and 
Fascism, one of Munzenberg's front organizations, met in Paris on 
August 13, 1936, to mobilize opinion behind the Comintern's inter-
pretation of the Spanish affair. That conference established an Inter-
national Coordination and Information Commission in Support of the 
Spanish Republic, one of the first of the multitude of such commis-
sions and committees organized and clandestinely controlled by the 
Comintern in relation to its policy in Spain. 40 On August 31 a meeting 
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of the directorate of Secours Rouge, another of the Comintern's front 
organizations, convened in Paris. From that meeting emerged the 
Comite International de !'aide du Peuple Espagnol. A multitude of 
similar organizations for aid to Republican Spain mushroomed into 
being. Communist activists were ordered to "proliferate Spanish De-
fense Committees."41 Most of these committees were directed by 
party functionaries who controlled them unobtrusively behind impos-
ing lists of sponsors whose often well-known and respected names 
graced the organizations' letterheads and lent weight to their appeals 
for funds and support for their cause. 42 
On another front in the propaganda war Munzenberg dispatched 
party writers like Koestler to Spain to produce firsthand accounts of 
the situation there, all, of course, from a strictly defined point of view. 
Munzenberg relied on Otto Katz, alias Andre Simon, as his chief 
lieutenant for Spain. Katz, a longtime Comintern functionary, orga-
nized the Spanish Relief Committee, directed the Spanish News 
Agency, and dispensed Loyalist government propaganda funds to 
French newspapers and politicians. As Munzenberg's roving ambas-
sador, Katz made trips to England and Hollywood to collect funds 
and organize antifascist committees. 43 
The Comintern also lost no time in intensifying its activity inside 
Spain, assigning Palmiro Togliatti, chief of the Italian Communist 
party, to the Spanish front. 44 Togliatti worked behind the scenes in 
Spain using the aliases Ercoli and Alfredo and played a key role in 
the direction of the Spanish Communist Party.45 
At about the same time a full-scale Soviet diplomatic and military 
mission arrived in Spain. On August 27 the experienced diplomat 
Marcel Rosenberg presented his credentials in Madrid as Soviet am-
bassador. He was accompanied by a formidable staff, among whom 
was General Berzin, previously head of Soviet military intelligence. 
Berzin, along with General Goriev, commanded the staff of Soviet 
military advisers who virtually took over direction of the military 
operations of the Popular Front forces.46 During the month of Sep-
tember additional Soviet personnel arrived in Spain. Among them was 
Michael Koltsov, Pravdajo leading foreign correspondent and a man 
who clearly had more important duties than journalism. 47 About this 
time Alexander Orlov arrived with instructions to set up a branch of 
the NKVD in Spain. 48 Thus by the middle of September 1936 the 
Soviet Union and Comintern had a high-powered contingent in Spain 
covering all spheres of political and military operations. 
Meanwhile, in an operation that demonstrated the meshing of offi-
cial Soviet military intelligence apparatus with that of the Comintern, 
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Red army general Walter Krivitsky, then chief of Soviet military 
intelligence in Western Europe, received orders from Moscow on 
August 30: "Extend your operations immediately to cover the Spanish 
War. Mobilize all available agents and facilities for prompt creation 
of a system to purchase and transport arms to Spain." Krivitsky 
immediately began setting up "paper companies" in various countries 
of Europe for the procurement of arms for Popular Front Spain. 49 His 
orders stipulated that the operation must remain highly secret. The 
furnishing of military supplies for Popular Front Spain was to be a 
clandestine affair which could not be traced back to the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet-Comintern machine thus became progressively more 
deeply committed to the Popular Front cause in Spain. As yet, how-
ever, the Soviet Union's involvement remained limited, overtly at 
least, to diplomatic and propagandistic support. Comintern opera-
tions in Spain were not acknowledged as being sponsored or con-
trolled by the Soviet government and Krivitsky's clandestine 
arms-buying did not officially exist. 
Swiftly moving political and military developments in Spain soon 
brought more direct and overt Soviet intervention. In early September 
a new cabinet headed by the Socialist Largo Caballero had assumed 
governmental power in Madrid. On specific instructions from Mos-
cow the Spanish Communist party officially participated in the new 
government, more clearly than ever tying Communist prestige to the 
Spanish Popular Front cause. 50 The Communists were thus in an 
increasingly strong position to push their own policies and viewpoints 
on the nature of the war and the methods, both political and military, 
by which it should be conducted. They sought to control the situation 
in Popular Front Spain in such a way that their intervention there 
would not wreck their larger policy of rapprochement with the bour-
geois democracies. As the best way to achieve that end, the Commu-
nists adopted the position that the war in Spain (and thus their role 
there) was simply the defense of the democratic Republic against 
fascism and that it had nothing to do with revolution. An article, 
"Spain's Struggle against Fascism," which appeared in the official 
Comintern organ, succinctly summed up this position while at the 
same time making clear to the initiated the strictly tactical nature of 
it. 
Present task of the Communist Party is to crush the fascist 
revolt and save the republic .... The slogan of the defense of the 
democratic republic makes it possible to bring the widest masses 
of the people ... into the struggle ... creates a very wide basis 
14 COMINTERN ARMY 
for the struggle . . . assists its formation of a wide democratic 
front around the struggle ... throughout the world. The strug-
gle ... in Spain ... is meeting with the sympathy of tremendous 
sections of the population in all the capitalist countries .... The 
party understands that this growing wave of sympathy ... is a 
strong weapon which the workers organizations [Communist 
parties] of all countries must use . . . therefore the party is 
against all irresponsible statements, against frivolous chatter as 
to projects for the future "reorganization of society" which in 
the present international situation can only serve to complicate 
the struggle. 51 
This stance by the Communists accounted for the paradoxical fact 
that they found themselves on the right of the political spectrum of 
Popular Front Spain and that many Socialists and virtually all Anar-
chosyndicalists and POUMists regarded the Communist role as coun-
terrevolutionary. So also did many non-Spanish leftists. 52 
Despite everything that the new Popular Front government, the 
Spanish militias, and the Communists could do, the Popular Front's 
military position continued to deteriorate rapidly. Nationalist forces 
moving steadily toward Madrid from the south seemed unstoppable. 
The Soviet staff in Madrid, as well as most other foreign observers, 
concluded that unless substantial outside aid arrived quickly the Na-
tionalists would take the city. Ambassador Rosenberg, General Ber-
zin, and the influential Koltzov were all convinced that without rapid 
Soviet intervention the end could not be far off. 
In addition to the urgent need for military materiel numerous 
observers stressed the need for a more effective fighting force than the 
Popular Front militias were affording. Ambassador Rosenberg re-
ported that view to Moscow and, in addition, on September 22 Mau-
rice Thorez, chief of the French Communist Party, flew to Moscow 
where he recommended that Soviet aid in the form of military supplies 
and equipment be dispatched to Spain immediately and that the Com-
intern undertake the organization of a military unit to be made up 
of foreign volunteers and directed by a Comintern political and mili-
tary staff. 5 3 Under the pressure of these events and convinced that the 
Popular Front regime could not survive without significant military 
aid, Moscow made the decision to intervene more directly and deci-
sively in the Spanish imbroglio, a decision that led to the appearance 
of Soviet tanks and planes on Spanish battlefronts in October 1936 
and to the arrival of the first of the volunteers recruited by the Comin-
tern for the International Brigades in the same month. 54 Thus the 
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origins of the International Brigades are to be found in the working 
out of a Soviet-Comintern policy of worldwide scope and not, as some 
would have it, in the spontaneous response of world democracy to the 
threat of fascism in Spain. To put it differently, without the Soviet-
Comintern decision to intervene directly in the Spanish War and, as 
part of that intervention, create a foreign volunteer force for use in 
Spain, the International Brigades would never have come into exis-
tence. 
2 Popular Front Militias 
Since the bulk of the army and heavy police forces of Spain 
either sided with the military revolt of July 1936 or were swamped in 
the proletarian revolution that followed hard on its heels, the only 
effective armed opposition to the pronunciamiento came from militia 
units that were organized and controlled by the various Popular Front 
political parties and labor unions. The Socialist and Communist par-
ties had in fact been organizing workers and peasant militias for some 
time prior to 1936. Enrique Lister, after a three-year sojourn in the 
Soviet Union where he attended both the Lenin Institute and a Red 
army military school, undertook the task of building up units of the 
Communist MAOC (workers and peasants antifascist militia) as early 
as 1935.1 The Italian Comintern agent Vittorio Vidali, who was to 
play a leading role during the civil war, arrived in Spain in May 1936 
with orders to build the party militia into "the organizational basis 
for the future worker-peasant Red Army."2 The Socialist party organ, 
Claridad, declared in headlines in April 1936, "The people's militia 
... must be organized in every village in Spain."3 And Jesus Her-
nandez, a high-ranking member of the Spanish Communist party 
wrote just prior to the outbreak of hostilities, "The militia exists 
throughout the country."4 The speed with which the more-or-less 
organized militia units of the Popular Front entered the fray against 
the insurgent forces in July 1936 could no doubt be attributed to the 
prior existence of such paramilitary organizations. 5 But the outbreak 
of fighting in July saw a rapid and widespread proliferation of militia 
forces. 
The militia columns varied greatly from one another, forming as 
they did not parts of a single army but independent groups of armed 
men controlled by autonomous political factions. The Anarchosyndi-
calists recruited, organized, armed, fed, equipped, and commanded 
their militia columns while the Communists, Socialists, POUMists, 6 
and others did the same for theirs. Indeed in the early stages of the 
conflict the militia units came and went as they or their party leader-
ship saw fit without any direction by the impotent government in 
Madrid at all. 7 Even after a government more truly representative of 
the forces of the Popular Front was formed in September 1936, with 
the Socialist Largo Caballero as premier and minister of war, its 
authority over the militias was almost nil. Largo Caballero himself 
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admitted privately that he had no control over the various political 
forces supporting the Popular Front cause. 8 
These militia columns were not motivated so much by a desire to 
defend the democratic-parliamentary republic of the previous period 
as to "make the revolution." As George Orwell, who was there, put 
it: "The fact is that the Spanish working class did not, as we might 
conceivably do in England, resist Franco in the name of 'democracy' 
and the status quo; their resistance was accompanied by-one might 
almost say it consisted of-a definite revolutionary outbreak."9 When 
the Ascaso column, an Anarchist unit, left Barcelona for the front 
near Huesca on August 19, it was, according to a foreign participant, 
not an army but "an armed rabble," which, so far as the people in it 
were concerned, was "an armed demonstration for carrying the revo-
lution to Saragozza.'010 A Dutch Communist who joined the militia 
and fought on the front south of Madrid echoed the same general 
impression. "Our regiments," he wrote, "are nothing but armed party 
groups."11 
Three of the most militant and active forces on the Popular Front 
side of the barricades-the Anarchosyndicalists, the POUMists, and 
the left-wing Socialists-openly avowed their revolutionary aims and 
aspirations. For example, Claridad, the organ of the left-wing Social-
ists, declared in August: "The people are no longer fighting for the 
Spain of July 16 [the Republic] .... The most powerful support for 
the war lies in the total uprooting of fascism, economically and in 
every other way. That is, in revolution."12 The Anarchosyndicalist 
attitude was succinctly voiced to Franz Borkenau by an Anarchist 
militiaman who told him they were fighting "not for the legal govern-
ment but in order to move swiftly toward the abolition of the state.'013 
Not only were these groups positively oriented toward taking advan-
tage of the collapse of state authority to "make the revolution" but 
they saw the militias as the vanguard and guarantee of that process. 
On the issue of retaining the militia forces or of trying to organize a 
regular People's Army under government control, Claridad declared 
on August 20: "Our army must be an army that is in keeping with 
the revolution .... To think of replacing the present combatants [mili-
tia] with another type of army which, to a certain extent, would 
control their revolutionary action is to think in a counterrevolution-
ary way.'' Eventually the Socialists came around to supporting the 
creation of a unified People's Army but only later and under the 
pressures of both the realization of its practical necessity for fighting 
the war and of the Communists' insistence that a unified army be 
created. The Anarchosyndicalists and POUMists never really ac-
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cepted the change. The right-wing Socialists and the Communists 
usually claimed to be defending the Republic but for tactical reasons 
that concealed long-run revolutionary goals. Even though the Com-
munists were normally the staunchest proponents, in public, of the 
defense-of-the-Republic posture, even they occasionally dropped the 
pose. For example, Dolores Ibarruri (La Pasionaria), a member of the 
Politburo of the CPS, said, speaking of the People's Army, that it 
must be like the Red army, not just the army of a nation but the 
"advance guard of shock troops of the world revolution."14 Only the 
small and weak Republican groups could truly be said to be defending 
the Republic. 
Each militia column represented a replica in microcosm of its 
particular ideological vision of the classless society and reflected the 
very different concepts held by the various ideologies to be found 
within the Popular Front spectrum of what constituted revolutionary 
organization and behavior. The Anarchist and POUM units were 
highly equalitarian and democratic organizations, at least in theory. 
Everyone from commander to private drew the same pay, ate the same 
food, wore the same clothes, and mingled on terms of complete equal-
ity. Frequently the troops elected their military commanders and no 
one considered it strange for a private to slap the commander on the 
back and ask for a cigarette or even to insist upon comradely discus-
sion of commands and decisions. 15 
The POUM militia column in which George Orwell served was 
fairly typical of the general situation in the units in Catalonia. He 
joined the column at the Lenin barracks outside Barcelona and stayed 
there for about a week while a new unit was being formed. There were 
a thousand or so men and a few militia women at the barracks 
as well as a number of militiamen's wives who did the cooking. The 
Spanish recruits were mostly boys of seventeen or eighteen, utterly 
ignorant of matters military. Discipline did not exist. Chaos reigned. 
Uniforms and equipment were doled out piecemeal and the result was 
anything but uniform. After a few days the column was "still a rabble 
by any ordinary standard," but by Spanish militia standards it was 
considered fit to be seen in public. "Any public school O.T.C. in 
England is far more like a modem army," wrote Orwell. 16 The militia 
units were, as one would expect, hardly military in appearance or 
disciplined in action. They were rather, depending on one's point of 
view, an armed rabble interested primarily in murder, pillage, and the 
destruction of the social order or the heroic and picturesque advance 
guard of the revolution. 17 Regardless of how the militias were viewed, 
most observers agreed that they left much to be desired as effective 
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military forces. Only the Communists had no philosophical qualms 
about demanding strict military discipline and obedience to orders in 
their militia units and, true to Bolshevik doctrine, did so. Even so, 
only in a very relative sense, and with much effort by their command-
ers and political commissars, did even their much-vaunted Fifth Regi-
ment seem an example of military efficiency. 
While the militia units were able to offer a certain amount of 
resistance to the forces of the pronunciamiento when they could fight 
from stationary defensive positions, a village or town, they could not 
stand in the open field against trained and disciplined troops. The 
rapid advance of the numerically weak Nationalist forces from the 
south during the early months of the war was a repeated story of 
sporadic tenacious defense by militia, an outflanking movement by the 
Nationalists, and panic and retreat by the militia. 18 One reason for 
this lack of effectiveness was that the military officers of the militia 
units acted only as technical advisers, all powers of decision being 
reserved to the party political leadership, often in the form of a 
committee. In the POUM unit in which Orwell served, the technical 
military command was exercised by a Belgian ex-officer, George 
Kopp, who was called "commandante," and a Polish Jew, Benjamin 
Levinski. Real authority in the column was exercised by the political 
chiefs of the POUM. The Englishman John Comford wrote of the 
militia column with which he served for a time that the column's 
leader was an "admirable revolutionary" but had "no conception of 
the job of warfare." He also said that there was rivalry between the 
leader and his military adviser, a common state of affairs. 19 This was 
true even in the more disciplined communist Fifth Regiment where 
ultimate authority was exercised by the political commissars. Of 
course the problem was less apparent in the Communist militia be-
cause the military officers were almost always also party members and 
thus subject to the same political authority as the commissars. 
In some cases Spanish officers from the old army or police forces 
acted as military officers in militia columns. But they were inevitably 
distrusted by the militiamen and in fact exercised no real authority. 
A report to the ministry of defense in September 1936 by a regular 
officer assigned to command a militia column called Tierra y Libertad 
showed the nature of the problem. The unit, he wrote, had fought on 
the preceding day with some success. "But today they left the posi-
tions which they were supposed to occupy, saying that they were not 
going to defend the socialists." The commander tried to oppose the 
retirement of the column, but the troops answered that they "did not 
obey any orders except those coming from their Committee. "20 In 
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another such report a regular army officer, one Colonel Salafranca, 
gave vent to his frustration with the militia supposedly under his 
command. Their retreat, "or more correctly this cowardly flight, was 
not due to the thrust of the enemy, but to the absolute lack of spirit 
and morale of these forces," he said. The colonel protested to his 
commanding officer about having been given a command in "these 
extraordinary conditions of indiscipline."21 
The militias even more obviously lacked effectiveness as offensive 
or assault troops, a weakness vividly demonstrated by the failure to 
break the resistance of the few hundred defenders of the alcazar at 
Toledo. Likewise in Catalonia the militia streamed out from Bar-
celona toward Huesca and Saragossa from the first days of the fighting 
with the objective of taking those important cities for the revolution. 
But these cities remained untaken throughout the war. Nowhere did 
militia units demonstrate any offensive prowess.22 
Even in combat zones the militia units usually operated as com-
pletely autonomous units. Each held its own position at the front and 
took care of all its own replacements, administration, and logistics. The 
autonomous and highly political nature of the militia units, as well as 
the very real consciousness of ideological differences and distrust 
between the various proletarian parties, accounted for their occupa-
tion of separate positions and the incessant political discussions which 
seemed to be the chief pastime of the militiamen. Orwell wrote that 
from his unit's position at the front he could identify the various 
points held by the Popular Front units by the political flags each 
displayed. He was puzzled when, on reaching the front, the POUM 
militiamen pointed out the positions nearby. "Those are the Social-
ists," they said, meaning the PSUC. "Aren't we all Socialists?" asked 
Orwell. His attitude was, "Why can't we stop all the political non-
sense and get on with the war?" This, as he said, was the "correct 
anti-fascist" attitude which "had been carefully disseminated by the 
English newspapers, largely in order to prevent people from grasping 
the real nature of the struggle." It was an attitude, he wrote, which 
no one could or did keep in Spain for very long. "No event in it [the 
war in Spain], at any rate during the first year, is intelligible unless 
one has some grasp of the interparty struggle that was going on behind 
the government lines." On the Madrid front conditions were much the 
same. "The spirit was bad," wrote Louis Fischer. "The soldiers played 
at war, and lay around discussing politics but not digging trench-
es. . . . The antagonism between the Communists and the Anar-
chists was growing. The Communists blamed the F AI (Anarchist 
Federation of Iberia) for the loss of Toledo and called them 'Fai-
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scists.' " The Communists declared that not a single rifle should be 
given the Catalans because they might fall into the hands of the 
Anarchists. 23 
By far the most effective of the Popular Front militia units was the 
so-called Fifth Regiment organized by the Communists. A notable 
exception to the egalitarianism and indiscipline of the militia in gen-
eral, the Fifth Regiment, true to Communist doctrine, stressed iron 
discipline and unquestioning obedience to orders. As early as July 22, 
1936, the party organ, Mundo Obrero, was demanding "Discipline, 
Hierarchy and Organization." And in a manifesto of the central 
committee of the party dated August 18, 1936, the party demanded 
"that every act, that every rifle responds always to an organized plan, 
to a necessity of the war. If in all organization discipline is the funda-
mental base of power and strength, in the army discipline ... for high 
and for low, for the units and for the command, and only in the 
measure to which this discipline exists will it be possible to conquer 
an organized and disciplined enemy."24 In the tradition of Bolshevik 
dictums on discipline in organizing the Red army, commanders and 
political commissars of the Fifth Regiment demanded "a discipline of 
iron" and at times exercised draconian measures to maintain it. 25 
The Communist militia became active in Madrid on the very day 
the pronunciamiento took place and from the beginning provided a 
vivid example of the meshing of the various elements of the Commu-
nist apparatus as it operated in Spain. On July 18 two of the party's 
carefully cultivated adherents among the officer corps of the Spanish 
army presented themselves for duty at party headquarters in Ma-
drid. 26 On the same day the party functionary Enrique Castro Del-
gado assumed direction of the militia, and very shortly the Italian 
Comintem agent Vittorio Vidali, using the nom de guerre "Carlos 
Contreras" in Spain, assumed overall authority as chief political com-
missar. Both Vidali and his wife, Maria Modetti, were old Comintem 
functionaries who, like others of their kind, had been assigned to work 
in Spain even prior to the outbreak of hostilities. As chief political 
commissar and the acknowledged representative of the Comintem, 
Contreras exercised supreme authority within the Fifth Regiment. 
Indeed he was untouchable even by members of the politburo of the 
Spanish party.27 
The Spanish Communists had the further advantage of the services 
of a number of cadres who had attended one of the Red army's 
training schools in the Soviet Union, including Enrique Lister, later 
among the most successful of the Communist's military commanders. 
They also enjoyed the services of a corps of non-Spanish Comintem 
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functionaries who had military and/ or political training and experi-
ence and, finally, they benefited from the expertise of the Soviet mili-
tary mission in Spain. 28 
These trained leadership cadres gave the Communists' militia a 
tremendous qualitative advantage over any other element on the Pop-
ular Front side. The Fifth Regiment soon became a complete army 
in microcosm. All necessary branches, all essential functions-logis-
tics, transport, commissary, quartermaster, medical--developed rap-
idly under the direction and guidance of the Regiment's military and 
political staff. The Regiment also proved to be by far the most success-
ful and productive recruiting and training center on the Loyalist side, 
claiming some 60,000 to 70,000 men by January 1937.29 
In addition to its important military function, the Fifth Regiment 
served Communist purposes in a number of political ways. Among the 
most important of these was as a spokesman for the party line on 
various important military and political issues such as the imposition 
of military discipline on the militia, the creation of a centrally con-
trolled People's Army organized on a regular military basis, the insti-
tution of a political commissar system within that army, and various 
other concems.30 The Communist' position on most of the above 
issues ultimately prevailed in part at least because the Fifth Regiment 
provided the nucleus for the People's Army of Popular Front Spain. 
Indeed the first brigades of that army were simply the old Fifth 
Regiment under a new name. This, of course, gave the Communists 
the important political advantage of supplying the new army with 
Communist officers and political commissars. Neither the speakers 
nor the words spoken at the propaganda rally staged to celebrate the 
conversion of the Fifth Regiment into the first units of the Popular 
Army left much to the imagination as to whose army the Regiment 
was. The major speakers were "Carlos Contreras," Jose Diaz, the 
chief of the Communist party of Spain, Dolores Ibarruri (La Pasio-
naria), a member of the politburo of the CPS and most effective of 
party speakers, and Gustav Regier, a German Communist then serv-
ing as a political commissar in the International Brigades. Among 
other things these spokesmen stated that "the Fifth Regiment was 
organized at the orders and decisions of the Communist party." La 
Pasionaria added the thought that the newly conceived Popular Army 
must be like the Red army, not just the army of a nation but the 
"advance guard of shock troops of the world revolution."31 
From the first days of the war a sprinkling of foreigners fought in 
the ranks of various Popular Front militia columns. One of the more 
appealing myths that has been perpetuated about those early volun-
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teers is that they were the progenitors of the International Brigades. 
A second is that they were fighting to defend the Spanish Republic. 
Neither of these common and much-repeated assumptions is valid. 
There was no connection between foreigners in the militia and the 
International Brigades. The fact that some of the foreign militiamen 
were ultimately incorporated into the Brigades demonstrates rather 
that the Brigades were a new, different, and essentially unconnected 
development. Nor were those foreign militiamen fighting to defend 
the Republic. The overwhelming majority of them were adherents of 
some specifically proletarian revolutionary ideology and, as such, 
were fighting not for the "bourgeois republic" but for "the revolu-
tion." 
That a significant number of foreigners were available and anxious 
to join the Spanish militia was due, in large part, to the extreme 
political polarization in Europe at that time. This resulted in a reser-
voir of men frustrated by the bitter life of exile who could see in the 
Spanish conflict a chance to strike a blow for their side or perhaps to 
find in a victory for the revolution in Spain a first step toward a similar 
victory in their own countries. 32 Such an attitude toward the Spanish 
conflict found clear expression in the words of many of those drawn 
to Spain. The Italian Carlo Rosselli, leader of the Giustizia e Liberto 
movement and a longtime political exile, coined the slogan "Oggi in 
Spagna, domani in Italia," a phrase that clearly indicated his hope 
that victory in Spain might prove a first step toward Rome. "Think, 
my dear wife," he wrote from Spain in August 1936, "of the great joy 
of your husband in being able to pass from a theoretical position to 
a practical position. Spain today, Italy tomorrow." Another Italian, 
Randolfo Pacciardi, leader of the Italian Republican party in exile, 
echoed Rosselli's thoughts. Of the Spanish struggle he wrote, "Easily, 
very easily, this could be the march on Rome and Berlin." Likewise, 
Hans Beimler, a member of the central committee of the German 
Communist party in exile, told a fellow German Communist, Gustav 
Regier, when they met in Spain, "The only way we can get back to 
Germany is through Madrid."33 
The first foreigners to fight in the Spanish conflict came from among 
those living in Spain when the fighting broke out in July 1936. This 
included a number of political exiles who had found the atmosphere 
of Popular Front Spain to their liking. It also included, by a strange 
coincidence, a number of "red athletes" who were participating in the 
so-called Workers' Olympiad then being held in Barcelona.34 Anum-
ber of these visiting athletes and others associated with the event 
immediately entered the fray in Barcelona and subsequently joined 
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one of the militia columns. 35 Barcelona became the principal focal 
point for men entering Spain from the outside who wanted to fight and 
by early September foreigners of diverse nationalities and political 
persuasions could be found scattered among Popular Front militia 
columns on numerous fronts. 36 Indeed, in several cases foreigners 
actually commanded militia units. The Italian Socialist Fernando de 
Rosa led a Socialist unit on the Guadarrama front north of Madrid 
until he was killed in September 1936. The Italian Communist Bassi, 
who went under the nom de guerre Nino Nanetti, entered Spain 
immediately after the outbreak of fighting and organized and led a 
Spanish unit. In addition, foreign Communists were heavily involved 
in the organization and direction of the Fifth Regiment. 37 
While it is true that by August-September 1936 an occasional for-
eigner might be found in almost any militia unit, the three main 
concentrations of foreigners were in the Anarchist, the POUM, and 
the PSUC (Communist party of Catalonia) militia columns operating 
out of Barcelona. The partisan political nature of the various militia 
found expression from the beginning in the way in which foreigners 
wanting to join a given unit found themselves welcomed or refused 
admission on the basis of their political credentials. Those foreigners 
living in Spain prior to the revolution and those who came into the 
country armed with the proper political papers and recommendations 
reported to the party headquarters suitable to their respective brands 
of proletarian ideology. In Barcelona the Communists and those So-
cialists who were ready to accept Communist discipline found a wel-
come at PSUC headquarters at the Hotel Col6n and the Karl Marx 
barracks. Anarchists, and others who preferred their credo, presented 
themselves at the Anarchist militia headquarters at the Pedrales bar-
racks outside Barcelona, and the POUM operated from the Lenin 
barracks. In the Madrid area foreign Communists joined the Fifth 
Regiment, while others could find a number of Spanish Socialist 
militia units ready to welcome them. 38 The POUM and Anarchists 
were not so exclusive in their political screening as the Communists. 
Both accepted Communists into their columns, while the PSUC was 
more demanding of proof of orthodoxy. John Comford, an English-
man who was in fact an English Communist party member but had 
no credentials to prove it, was denied entry into a PSUC column and 
had to settle for a POUM unit. 39 Orwell ended up in a POUM column 
because he "happened to arrive in Barcelona with ILP papers." Both 
the ILP (Independent Labor party of England) and the POUM were 
among those dissident Marxist parties that were opposed to the ortho-
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dox Stalinist line. As such they were anathema to the Communists in 
Spain. 
Politics influenced not only the type of militia column a given 
foreigner would likely join but also the way in which he interpreted 
or rationalized what he was trying to achieve in Spain. All were, of 
course, "fighting fascism." But within that broad explanation many 
different attitudes and approaches existed. While there were isolated 
individuals among the foreign combatants, such as Rosselli and Pac-
ciardi, who were not affiliated with any of the specifically proletarian 
revolutionary ideologies, the overwhelming majority of them were 
Communists, revolutionary Socialists, Anarchists, or adherents of 
various splinter Marxist groups which were in fact much more revolu-
tionary than the orthodox Communist line was at that time. For 
example, a German militiaman wrote: "We are socialists and because 
we know that we have to achieve socialism from the struggle we are 
revolutionaries .... We speak different languages but common to all 
of us is the language of the revolution. The workers of the world look 
to Spain not for the republic, nor even for democracy .... The interna-
tional comrades [foreign militiamen]---ofwhatever party fight for the 
victory of the Spanish proletariat . . . for the total victory of the 
proletarian revolution. [They are] the pioneers of the world revolu-
tion. " 40 John Cornford recorded in his diary and in letters to friends 
his conversation with a number of Germans in the same unit. Most 
of these men, he found, had left the Communist party not because it 
was too revolutionary but because "they genuinely believe the CI 
[Comintern] has deserted the revolution." Of these men Cornford 
wrote, "If anything is revolutionary, it is these comrades."41 
Although practically every European nationality was represented 
among the militia volunteers, the bulk of them were French, Italian, 
and German. Widespread sympathy for Popular Front Spain existed 
among Frenchmen of leftist persuasions, and French sympathizers 
found it especially easy to cross the border and join the fighting in the 
northern area around Irun and San Sebastian. There a number of 
French ex-army officers, many with experience from the World War, 
played an important part in organizing the defenses. 42 In August, 
Nationalist troops reported finding the bodies of some thirty French-
men following one battle. 43 When the fight for lrun and San Sebastian 
was lost, those who wanted to go on fighting simply crossed the border 
into France, boarded trains that took them to the French-Catalan 
frontier, recrossed into Spain, and joined the PSUC militia in Bar-
celona.44 
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French Popular Front organizations began encouraging men to 
fight in Spain at an early date. 45 The prime mover behind this effort 
was the French Communist party.46 On August 7 the party organ, 
L 'Humanite, proclaimed, mistakenly, that "the French government 
authorizes the formation of volunteers to help the Spanish work-
ers."47 The French contigent under PSUC control in Barcelona, com-
posed primarily of Communist party members, styled themselves the 
Commune de Paris centuria. Jules Dumont, an ex-French army officer 
and longtime Communist stalwart commanded the unit. In September 
the PSUC ordered the French centuria, along with other PSUC units, 
to Madrid where they came under Fifth Regiment control.46 
The Italians were a more mixed lot, including assorted Socialists, 
a strong Anarchist contingent, a few Republicans, and the Commu-
nists. The Republican Randolfo Pacciardi represented one tendency 
among the Italians. He wanted to organize an Italian legion that 
would be nonpolitical, that is, at the disposal of the Popular Front 
government and not affiliated with any particular political party or 
ideology. Through the good offices of his compatriots, the Socialist 
Pietro Nenni and the Communist Luigi Longo, Pacciardi received a 
hearing from Largo Caballero in early September, but Largo Cabal-
lero was uninterested in Pacciardi's proposal.49 Significantly, Largo 
Caballero did not change his mind on the idea of a foreign military 
unit until the Comintern decided to foster the organization of one in 
mid-October. Pacciardi later commanded the Italian battalion of the 
International Brigades, but this turned out to be not quite the nonpo-
litical legion he had originally sought. 
In fact, the two major concentrations ofltalians prior to the forma-
tion of the International Brigades were those who served with the 
Anarchist Ascaso column in Aragon and those with the Communist 
militia. A leading figure among the first of these groups was Carlo 
Rosselli. This group, composed primarily of Socialists and Anar-
chists, increased to some 250 Italians by October and remained with 
the Anarchist militia even when asked to coalesce with the Italian 
battalion of the International Brigade when that unit was organized 
in early November. The refusal of Rosselli and others among the 
Ascaso group to join with the International Brigades stemmed from 
their reluctance to put themselves under Communist authority.50 
The second important Italian unit, the Gastone-Sozzi centuria111 
under PSUC direction in Barcelona, included combatants from sev-
eral sources. One group had first fought in the northern sector. With 
the fall of Irun to Nationalist forces they, like their French counter-
parts, simply crossed the frontier into France, moved down the 
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French side of the border, and reentered Spain through Catalonia. 
Arriving in Barcelona, they placed themselves at the orders of the 
PSUC. Another small group came fresh from an abortive attempt by 
a largely Catalan force to capture Mallorca. 52 In addition, a number 
of Italians came directly from France where they had been recruited 
by the Italian Comintern functionary Giuseppe de Vittorio. Upon 
their arrival in Barcelona they reported to PSUC headquarters at the 
Hotel Colon and were quartered, along with other PSUC units, at the 
Karl Marx barracks. 53 In early September the PSUC ordered the 
Gastone-Sozzi centuria, along with other PSUC units, both foreign 
and Spanish, to Madrid where they came under the authority of the 
Fifth Regiment. 54 They remained at the Regiment's barracks in the 
capital for a few days during which time they were greeted by Nenni 
and Longo. The leaders of the centuria were all Communist stalwarts. 
The centuria paraded behind the red banner of the Communist party 
of Italy and their battle cry was "Italian Communists forward!"55 
The Germans who joined Spanish militia came, like the Italians, 
from among the political exiles living in Spain, France, Switzerland, 
or elsewhere. They were primarily either orthodox Communists or 
Marxists who found the Stalinist line too restrictive and anti-revolu-
tionary. The orthodox Communists naturally went into the PSUC 
militia where they formed the Thaelmann centuria of some 100 men 
and fought with PSUC forces in Aragon from August to October. 
Hans Beimler, onetime Communist Reichstag deputy and political 
chief of all German Communists in Spain, acted as the centuria's 
political mentor. 56 
In early October Ludwig Renn, a German Communist who had 
been living in exile in Switzerland, received the party's permission to 
go to Spain. Indeed, according to Renn, the German party actively 
encouraged its members who had military experience to offer their 
services to the Spanish Popular Front forces. On his arrival in Bar-
celona, Renn reported to PSUC headquarters. There he met Beimler 
whom Renn, as a disciplined party member, accepted as his immedi-
ate superior in Spain. Beimler took Renn with him next day to visit 
the Thaelmann centuria at the front. Renn recognized several mem-
bers of the centuria as acquaintances made in pre-1933 Berlin, mostly 
through mutual Communist activities and organizations. The cen-
turia was operating as a component part of a larger PSUC column. 
Renn, a former officer of the German army with World War experi-
ence, felt concern at the poor military disposition of the unit. The 
column commander, a Spanish trade-union leader with no military 
training, had all his troops in the line. When Renn asked him about 
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his reserve, the commander seemed not to understand what he was 
talking about. Later Renn expressed his misgivings to Beimler about 
the military situation in the sector and his frustration at not being able 
to do anything about it. Beimler told him, in effect, not to worry about 
the situation in Aragon where nothing of a serious military nature 
seemed likely to occur anyway but to go to Madrid where his military 
knowledge would be of more value. But, cautioned Beimler, Renn 
should not accept any post less than that of battalion commander. 
Renn saw no more of the Thaelmann centuria until early November 
1936, when the remnants of that unit transferred to Albacete to be 
absorbed into the International Brigades. 57 
The second major group of Germans in Spain, for the most part 
anti-Stalinist Marxists, found a more compatible atmosphere in the 
ultrarevolutionary POUM. John Cornford reported a number of Ger-
mans among the unit, as did Franz Borkenau. By December there 
were, according to Orwell, several hundred Germans in the POUM 
militia and they remained with that unit until it was broken up as a 
result of the internecine political struggle within Popular Front Spain 
in the summer of 1937.58 
A relatively smaller contingent of Englishmen were to be found in 
the Spanish militia. Here too, the main concentrations were in the 
PSUC and the POUM. A group of English and Irish with the PSUC 
militia in Barcelona called themselves the Tom Mann centuria. 59 This 
group, which numbered only some twelve men, consisted almost en-
tirely of Communist party members, the most dominant of whom was 
Lorrimer Birch, Cambridge graduate and Communist true believer. 
One of the Englishmen who joined this contingent, Keith Scott Wat-
son, arrived in Barcelona in late September 1936. He came into Spain 
by train with some fifty French and German recruits from Paris. On 
their arrival in Barcelona the group reported to PSUC headquarters 
in the Hotel Colon. There, after enjoying a substantial meal in a dining 
room filled with militiamen, an officer took them upstairs to an office 
marked Department des Etrangers. There each man underwent a 
searching interrogation which included questions on their political 
affiliations and background. Next day Watson joined his fellow Brit-
ishers at the PSUC barracks at Sarrai, a village several Iniles out of 
Barcelona. Personality clashes within the English group finally led to 
a number of its members becoming so disillusioned with their political 
commissar, Nat Levy, that they sought to depose him. After drawing 
up an indictment of Levy's shortcomings and misdeeds, the malcon-
tents sent it to party headquarters in Barcelona with the request that 
Levy be replaced. After a lapse of time and a second request for action, 
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Ralph Bates, the representative of the Communist party of Great 
Britain in Barcelona, arrived at Sarria. His authority to deal with the 
matter was accepted by all and he settled it by removing Levy and 
replacing him with Birch. 60 The other English group in Spain was 
affiliated with the POUM militia. It numbered between twenty and 
thirty men, most of whom were affiliated with the ILP, the English 
Marxist revolutionary, but anti-Stalinist, party. 61 
In addition to the French, Italians, Germans, and English, a num-
ber of other nationalities formed small units. The Poles, for example, 
most of whom had been living in France, formed the Dombrowsky 
centuria in the PSUC militia.62 A few Czechs, Yugoslavs, and others 
were also present in these PSUC units. 63 
Despite the seeming ubiquity of the foreign elements in the ranks 
of the Spanish militias, they remained very few. Even the larger 
centurias, the Gastone-Sozzi, Commune de Paris, and Thaelmann, 
never numbered more than one or two hundred men each. The for-
eigners scattered through other Spanish militia units also amounted 
to only a few hundred. The total number of foreign combatants prior 
to the formation of the International Brigades was probably not more 
than one thousand. 64 Given the paucity of their numbers and the fact 
that they were scattered out singly or in small groups, the military 
significance of these foreigners was of necessity minimal. While it is 
true that in a few cases foreigners with previous military training and 
experience provided leadership for militia units, nowhere did foreign 
combatants, singly or in groups, achieve any important military re-
sults. Not until the entry of the International Brigades into the conflict 
in November 1936 did foreign combatants have a significant military 
impact on the war. 
Of the thousand or so foreigners in Spanish militias prior to the 
organization of the International Brigades, there were probably more 
who were affiliated with Anarchist and POUM units than with Com-
munist ones, and they remained with those columns long after the 
International Brigades were organized. 65 Indeed, as late as June 1937, 
the Popular Front government issued a decree dealing with this mat-
ter. It directed that all foreigners be incorporated into the Interna-
tional Brigades "except where in some other unit there exists a large 
nucleus of foreigners forming a unit, in which case the chief of the unit 
might ask for their continuance."66 
Only those foreign units already under Communist control, the 
PSUC and Fifth Regiment centurias, were incorporated into the In-
ternational Brigades when the Brigades were formed in late October-
early November 1936.67 The numbers involved in those centurias 
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which did adhere to the International Brigades were insignificant in 
comparison to the influx of volunteers into Spain as a result of the 
system set up by the Comintern to recruit men for the Brigades. The 
first contingents of recruits for the International Brigades entered 
Spain in mid-October. By the end of that month some 3,000 to 4,000 
men had arrived and by mid-November, probably between 7,000 and 
8,000. 68 In contrast, the centurias that were assimilated into these 
Brigades amounted to only a few hundred men. 69 In fact only the 
French Commune de Paris centuria of about one hundred men was 
even included in the first (XI) International Brigade. The Thaelmann 
and Gastone-Sozzi groups were subsequently incorporated into the 
XII Brigade. When the numerical paucity of the contribution of the 
pre-International Brigade centurias is considered, the orthodox inter-
pretation that they formed the nucleus or origins of the Brigades can 
hardly be maintained. 70 Although the veterans of the centurias fur-
nished a number of experienced cadres, the International Brigades 
were in no meaningful way an outgrowth of those early foreign 
groups. To the contrary, the International Brigades, with their sub-
stantial numbers and their separate military and political structure, 
came into existence only with the decision of the Comintern to spon-
sor such a unit. It is therefore misleading and incorrect to say, as the 
myth has it, that those early foreigners in Spain were the originators, 
nucleus, or vanguard of the International Brigades, thus implying 
some direct connection or organic development. It is also misleading 
and erroneous to say, as the myth goes, that these early foreigners 
were fighting to defend "the Republic" or "for democracy" unless it 
is clearly understood that the definition of these terms was "proletar-
ian revolution," "Socialism," "Anarchism," or "Communism." 
3 The Comintern 
Raises an Army 
In conformity with the Kremlin's decisions on its Spanish 
policy in September 1936, the Comintern launched a full-scale drive 
to recruit an international army to fight in Spain. Within the frame-
work of the Comintern the major direct responsibility and role in the 
operation went to the Communist party of France. France's contigu-
ous border with Spain, as well as the convenient fact that France had, 
at that time, a sympathetic Popular Front government and a large 
Communist party with members sitting in the Chamber of Deputies 
made that country the obvious choice for the concentration of recruits 
and their transportation into Spain. 
Paris quickly became the focal point for a large Comintern delega-
tion representing most of the nationalities of Europe. The well-known 
French Communist Andre Marty, a member of both his country's 
Chamber of Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Comintern, 
assumed direct control over the operation. He was ably assisted by the 
Italian Communist stalwart Luigi Longo ("Gallo" in Spain), an effi-
cient operator who arrived in Paris directly from Spain in late Septem-
ber with party orders to help organize the recruitment of volunteers 
and a system for transporting them into Spain. In addition to Marty 
and Longo, the Italian Giuseppe de Vittorio, the Czech Clement Gott-
wald, the Yugoslav Joseph Broz (later called "Tito"), and numerous 
lesser-known Comintern figures directed their efforts toward develop-
ing methods for funneling men from various parts of Europe into 
France. 1 
Communist party offices and local branches of party-affiliated labor 
unions in France served as recruitment and processing centers, the 
central office being installed in the maison des syndicats on the Rue 
Mathurin-Moreau in Paris. The directors of the enterprise quickly 
established concentration points at Marseilles for those men slated to 
be sent to Spain by sea, and at Perpignan, a town in the southeast 
corner of France near the Spanish border, for those going in by land. 
Longo soon returned to Spain where, with the help and political 
support of the PSUC, he established a receiving center in the Spanish 
border town of Figueras for the recruits as they crossed the frontier 
from France. 2 
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The Comintern assigned recruitment quotas to the various national 
Communist parties on the basis of their membership and sympathizer 
potential, and Communist parties throughout the world began using 
and expanding their existing organizational networks for recruitment 
and transportation purposes. The quotas tended to be higher than 
each party could reasonably hope to attain, but the party leaders made 
the most strenuous efforts to meet them, assigning party functionaries 
to the task of recruitment and impressing on them that successful 
performance was a party responsibility of the highest priority. Earl 
Browder, for example, emphatically stressed to United States party 
functionaries the necessity of providing "a constant stream of rein-
forcements and replacements" to the American contingent of the 
Brigade, and Harry Pollitt, Browder's British counterpart said, "We 
pledge ourselves" that the 750 British men in the Brigades will soon 
"become a thousand." The British Communist Charlotte Haldane, 
who became intimately involved in the recruitment process both in 
Britain and France, later wrote that the British party "had to make 
terrific efforts to raise their volunteers for Spain," and that although 
party leader Pollitt was reluctant to recruit young boys and married 
men he had no choice but to do so. "His quota had to be filled. " 3 
During the first months after recruitment began, the Communists 
staunchly denied having any part in it. The party line propagated for 
public consumption ran that the Brigades represented a spontaneous 
movement of individual volunteers. As the British party writer and 
sometimes political commissar in Spain William Rust somewhat am-
biguously put it in his book Britons in Spain, "The International 
Brigades arose spontaneously in the minds of men .... from the spon-
taneous movement of the volunteers there naturally arose the decision 
to form the International Brigade. " 4 The explanation of spontaneity 
continued to be widely propagated to the general public long after the 
United States Daily Worker had openly adinitted, as early as Septem-
ber 14, 1937, that the party was in the recruitment business, and after 
Browder stated publicly in December of that year that the party was 
recruiting men for Spain.5 As late as April 20, 1938, for example, 
Time magazine reported: "European observers incline to believe that 
the Communist International and its section, the American Commu-
nist Party, were instrumental in creating the Abraham Lincoln-
Washington outfit, but according to its members it arose 
spontaneously in Leftist Spain on Christmas Day, 1936. Around a 
campfire were some 90 U.S. Leftists who had simply gone to Spain 
as individuals and they formed the nucleus of the battalion." 
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Indeed the Communists (and others) have continued to put forth 
the spontaneity line when it suits their purpose to romanticize the 
Brigades or to picture them as a great ground swell of antifascist 
solidarity. A recent version of this approach by a Czech writer went: 
"The solidarity of all the workers, of the progressive and democratic 
men of all the world, found its highest expression in the formation of 
the International Brigades. . . . From all points of the globe men 
arrived in Spain to place themselves spontaneously at the service of 
the Spanish Republican Army."6 
The Communists had good reasons for concealing their role as 
creator of the Brigades. For one thing, the operation entailed numer-
ous possible risks for the party. No one could be sure how the venture 
would work out, or if it would work out at all. The military and 
political situation in Spain made it highly problematical that, even 
with Soviet aid and an influx of foreign fighters, the Popular Front 
regime would long survive. The Comintern thus sought to play a 
cautious role, just as the Soviet Union was doing in its direct interven-
tion in Spain, in staking its prestige too openly on such a shaky 
venture. For another thing, the Communists wanted to camouflage 
their efforts at raising an army to fight in Spain in the subdued and 
chameleon tones of the Popular Front rather than the bright reds of 
International Communism. This meshed the enterprise smoothly into 
their general strategy of the time, as well as their specifically Spanish 
policy. Earl Browder was simply echoing the broad Popular Front, 
antifascist, theme of the party's efforts when he said, "the war in Spain 
is a part of the world-wide offensive against fascism of all peaceloving 
and democratic people. " 7 
The Comintern hoped also to attract not only Communists into 
their army but a broad spectrum of antifascists. Thus they needed to 
cast a wider ideological net than Communism alone would provide. 
As one American party writer (and sometime political commissar in 
Spain) put it, "By the initiative of our Party we must draw in every 
anti-fascist to the movement ... must draw the Socialist Party into 
the movement ... must become the initiators of a new flow of men 
into Spain." Here too the Comintern's reasons were several. One 
stemmed from the desire to use the Brigades as an instrument for 
broadening and strengthening the Popular Front. Indeed the Ameri-
can journalist and active Loyalist sympathizer Louis Fischer was told 
by Georgi Dimitroff, then chief of the Comintern, that the party was 
anxious to recruit non-Communists in the United States into the 
Brigades as a way of strengthening the Popular Front. Yet another, 
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and quite practical, reason for wanting to recruit non-Communists 
was that the party did not want to see its own ranks decimated by 
sending too many of its cadres to Spain. And, finally, party leaders 
stressed the value of getting nonparty men into the Brigades as a 
method of "politically educating" them into the party.8 
As time went on and the successful defense of Madrid made the 
International Brigades a well-known and prestigious military unit, the 
Communists found it impossible to completely restrain themselves 
from taking their due credit. By the summer of 1937 tributes to the 
Comintern and its titular chieftain, Georgi Dimitroff, for their role as 
founders of the Brigades began to appear occasionally in the party 
press. For example, "Comrade Dimitroff mobilized the Communist 
party sections throughout the world so that it was possible for the 
International Brigades to come to Spain," said the Brigade's own 
Boletfn de Informacion on August 7, 1937. And, in 1938, the official 
Comintern organ carried the statement: "The International Brigades 
are selected units formed ... in reply to the call of the Communist 
International. " 9 
Even then the party's stance remained ambiguous. ·The Commu-
nists tried to have it both ways: credit for the Brigades and their 
glorious exploits and, at the same time, the Brigades as a spontaneous 
effusion of antifascist solidarity. The approach actually taken at any 
given time depended on the audience being addressed. To an amazing 
degree the Communists succeeded in making the most of both worlds. 
In their efforts both to broaden their appeal beyond the ranks of the 
party itself and to conduct the recruitment enterprise clandestinely, 
the Communists sometimes used various front organizations, con-
trolled by the party but ostensibly unconnected with it. The Friends 
of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, for example, a party front organiza-
tion designed to alford propagandistic and financial support for the 
American contingent of the Brigades, served the additional purpose 
of recruitment agency. The party in the United States also set up the 
American Society for Technical Aid to Spain, a front organization 
designed primarily for recruitment purposes. The Society operated 
branches in various cities around the country which printed leaflets 
and ran advertisements in newspapers for men to go to Spain to "take 
the place of skilled workers who had gone to the front." A number 
of men were apparently recruited and sent to Spain, ostensibly to do 
skilled jobs, only to find themselves in the Brigades. 10 
The Communists also extended their recruitment efforts into the 
potentially productive areas of the universities and labor unions. Ac-
cording to one American who went to Spain, "The Communist Party 
Comintern Raises an Army 35 
has units ... in all the colleges and universities in the United States, 
and these and other Communist organizations have been very active 
in getting volunteers for the Spanish Army [the Brigades]." He stated, 
however, that "the Communist Party is careful to do nothing offi-
cially, but operates through agents who pretend to be acting entirely 
upon their own responsibility as individuals, and not in connection 
with any organization of any kind."11 
The experiences of individuals going through the Comintern's re-
cruitment and processing system naturally varied in detail, but the 
general pattern proved much the same. If the potential recruit was a 
party member he had to secure the approval of his party superiors. 
In the case of rank-and-file members such approval was usually read-
ily granted. Indeed the party put great pressure on members to volun-
teer and in the case of functionaries sometimes ordered them to do 
so. 12 Despite the efforts to attract non-Communists, the majority of 
those who volunteered were party members. 13 As British party 
worker Haldane commented, "The vanguard were Communist Party 
members under discipline to show an example to their fellow proletar-
ians."14 In some cases the party ordered members to join the Brigade 
as a "control task," a disciplinary measure by which those in bad 
grace with the party could prove their loyalty and achieve forgiveness 
for their shortcomings.15 On the other hand, party functionaries were 
sometimes denied permission to go to Spain because the party felt they 
could not be spared from their activities at home. 16 For example, an 
American Communist who had been assigned to party work in the 
waterfront section of New York City approached party hierarch, Fred 
Brown, and told him he wanted to volunteer for the Brigades. Brown 
replied that as a disciplined party member he would go only where 
he was sent and that he should return to his assignment on the 
waterfront. Later this same man was told by Brown that the party had 
decided the time had come for him to go to Spain, and he did. 17 
Nonparty men interested in joining the Brigades had, as a first step, 
to establish contact with a party recruiter. The recruiter directed the 
prospect to one of the party's clandestine enlistment offices where he 
was questioned by one or more party agents as to his reasons for 
wanting to join, his background, his politics, and so forth. In England, 
a "dour member of the Party leadership known as 'Robbie' " per-
formed this task. He interviewed each would-be volunteer and "tried 
to weed out obvious adventurers, fascists, and spies ... he was also 
the contact man with the C.I. [Comintern] organization in Paris, to 
which all volunteers were sent."18 The party investigated the political 
background of each prospective volunteer following this first inter-
36 COMINTERN ARMY 
view. If approved, the recruit was sent for a physical examination 
from a "politically reliable" physician. If found satisfactory, he re-
ceived instructions for proceeding to the next link in the chain which 
would lead eventually to Spain.19 
The procedures and techniques for moving the recruits to the 
Comintern's central concentration point in Paris varied, depending on 
the different areas from which they were drawn. For example, Nick 
Gillain, a Belgian of no particular political persuasion, heard, in the 
fall of 1936, that foreign volunteers were being solicited to fight in 
Spain. Assuming that the Loyalist government was doing the recruit-
ing and that the logical place to apply would be a Spanish consulate, 
Gillain crossed into France and presented himself to the Spanish 
consul in Lille. The consul received him courteously but informed him 
that the Loyalist government was not involved and that he knew 
nothing officially about the business of foreign volunteers. As Gillain 
walked toward the door on his way out, however, the Spaniard said 
quietly, "Go to the maison des syndicats. You will get what you want 
there." At the maison des syndicats Gillain found a scene of lively 
activity. "You want to go to Spain?" asked a "Comrade Burneton." 
Gillain answered affirmatively and, after a brief questioning, was 
assigned to a group of about twenty men and sent to Paris. On 
reaching Paris the group went to the central recruitment center, the 
maison des syndicates in Rue Mathurin-Moreau. He and his group 
quickly went through the induction process and soon left Paris with 
a contingent of some five hundred men bound for Perpignan, the last 
stop in France for those going into Spain by land. In Perpignan he and 
his fellow volunteers received identity documents covered with official 
looking stamps and Spanish names. "If they [the French border 
guards] ask you why you don't speak Spanish," a functionary told 
him, "say you left the country when you were a baby." That proved 
to be an unnecessary precaution, for Gillain's contingent crossed the 
frontier with no questions asked. 20 
Those men recruited in central and Eastern Europe, most of whom 
had no passports and whose movements were thus illegal, had to be 
smuggled into France via the underground-railway systems estab-
lished for that purpose by the Comintern. The future Yugoslav 
strongman, Joseph Broz (Tito), was instrumental in creating the 
apparatus for transporting his compatriots and other Balkan nationals 
into France. Brotz himself seems to have been among the Comintern 
delegation in Paris, while direct responsibility for the system in Yugo-
slavia fell to Blagoye Parovic, a member of the Central Committee 
of the Yugoslav Communist party and subsequently a political com-
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missar in the International Brigades.21 Similarly, an "underground" 
route for moving volunteers from Poland to France via Czechoslo-
vakia was directed by Leon Chajn. 22 
In most of the western nations Communist parties existed legally 
and, although the parties were careful not to admit officially that they 
were involved in the recruitment enterprise, at least in the beginning, 
they carried on the operation more or less openly. In Great Britain 
the party established its central processing center in an office in King 
Street, London. Recruits underwent an interrogation and investiga-
tion there and, having been accepted, waited until a new contingent 
had been collected and the party was ready to send them across the 
channel. The movement of the British into France presented a few 
problems. Passports were unnecessary since with the purchase of a 
forty-eight-hour return-trip excursion ticket British citizens could 
enter France freely. Each contingent traveled under the authority of 
a party-designated leader who, in most cases, returned to London 
after turning over his charges to party functionaries in France. 23 
Among the early volunteers from Britain, Peter Elstob and John 
Sommerfield later recorded their recollections of the Spanish adven-
ture. Elstob went through a complicated and highly conspiratorial 
process in England, being shuflled from place to place and from 
person to person. First names only were used, usually preceded by 
"Comrade." After being questioned by numerous comrades in tum, 
Elstob finally received a letter of recommendation and the address of 
a bookshop in the Gare du Nord in Paris. There, as instructed, he 
asked for a "Comrade LeGros," who subsequently questioned him 
and told him to sign some papers. The Englishman was then directed 
to yet another Paris address where, after presenting his credentials, 
he entered a large cellar room in which he joined some two hundred 
closely packed men whom he later described as "the choicest selection 
of Parisian sewer dregs that I had ever seen." A man stood on a table 
haranguing the audience. He finished with a "magnificent gesture, 
pointing upstairs," and "they all tore up the ladder ... singing the 
'Intemationale.' " At that time Elstob signed yet more documents and 
received fifty francs and instructions to report to the train station at 
ten o'clock.24 
John Sommerfield, a young Communist, reported to the recruit-
ment office in Paris with a small group sent over from England. They 
found a room filled with men talking in a Babel of languages. The 
majority seemed to be Frenchmen and Poles and some were, thought 
Sommerfield, "pretty tough." At one end of the room two harassed-
looking men sat behind a table strewn with forms printed in French 
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and Spanish. Sommerfield and the others filled out a number of ques-
tionnaires stating their ages and military experience, their jobs, and 
their politics. Then he and some friends went out and purchased small 
pistols, which, said Sommerfield, were "good for the morale." They 
left Paris for Spain within the week. 25 
In the United States the concentration point for the volunteers was 
New York City. Men recruited in various parts of the country re-
ceived money or tickets for their transportation to New York and 
instructions on where to report upon arrival there. 26 The party used 
the quarters of various front organizations such as the Hungarian 
Workers Club as meeting centers where party functionaries, occasion-
ally including Earl Browder himself and visiting Communist celebri-
ties such as the Englishman Ralph Bates (fresh from Spain), en-
tertained the recruits with political speeches and a perfunctory sort 
of military drill while they awaited their departure for Europe. 27 
While in New York the Americans procured passports and bought 
clothing and other items that they were to take with them to Spain. 
Arrangements for the voyage to France were made by the party 
through Intourist, the Soviet travel agency. 
The first group of American volunteers left New York aboard the 
S.S. Normandie on December 26, 1936. Typical of the recruiting 
procedures in the United States was the experience of a member of 
that first contingent, William Herrick. A member of the Communist 
party in New York, he offered his services to the section organizer at 
party headquarters in lower Manhattan. Mter an interview the sec-
tion organizer told Herrick that he would be contacted. A short time 
later he had a second interview, this time in the presence of Paul 
Brown, a Comintem agent.28 The section organizer vouched for Her-
rick's reliability, and Herrick began reporting regularly to a hall in 
Manhattan where, along with a growing group of recruits, he engaged 
in a perfunctory sort of drill and heard numerous addresses from 
party luminaries. 29 
Other members of the first American contingent were Robert Glad-
nick and Morris Maken. Gladnick, a member of the Young Commu-
nist League, was working at the time for the party on the New York 
waterfront. He applied directly to Paul Brown for permission to go 
to Spain. After being accepted he, like Herrick, attended drills and 
listened to speeches at the hall. When party member Morris Maken 
approached his section organizer about going to Spain the section 
organizer directed him to Bill Lawrence, a party functionary active 
in the recruitment operation in New York. Mter being cleared by the 
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party Maken too attended drills and training sessions which he later 
characterized as "a joke."30 
Others went by a somewhat more circuitous route. On a night in 
March 1937, the wife of William Ryan brought home a leaflet issued 
by the American Society for Technical Aid to Spain. Ryan, a Commu-
nist, "recognized the party's style in the leaflet" even though it men-
tioned neither the party nor fighting in Spain. The following day Ryan 
called at the offices of the Society in Milwaukee. When asked for 
references Ryan gave the name of a lawyer who was a member of his 
party section. When asked about political affiliation, Ryan said he was 
a member of the Communist party. The representative then asked if 
Ryan's skills included "an ability to handle a rifle?" Ryan said, "This 
is, of course, for the army, isn't it?" The answer was yes. Ryan 
returned to the office a few days later and the Society's representative 
directed him to a physician for a medical examination. The doctor 
gave him a "very cursory" check and said, "Well, comrade, you will 
go into the trenches." Having cleared the preliminary hurdles, Ryan 
received instructions to come to a "little send-off party" at which 
some "fellow travelers and liberals would be present." The party 
functionary warned him and his fellow volunteers not to use "radical 
phrases" but to talk only about fighting fascism. The party proved a 
success. Ryan and other recruits made short speeches and a collection 
netted part of the money needed to "get the boys to Spain." Next day 
Ryan's group took the bus for New York. There they reported to a 
hall where they saw "a couple of hundred men from all over the 
country, and Canada, Mexico and Puerto Rico." They left New York 
on the S.S. Manhattan under the orders of a student from the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin who gave them tickets and distributed the fifteen 
dollars per man necessary to enter France. Later during the same 
month William McCuiston sailed for France with another contingent. 
McCuiston, once a Communist, had become disenchanted with the 
party and sometime in 1935 had dropped out. He wanted to go to 
Spain, however, so he contacted the party section organizer in New 
York City. Three or four weeks elapsed before he learned that he was 
to be allowed to go.31 
By July 1937 the party in the United States was apparently finding 
it difficult to find enough recruits. During that month John Seacat, an 
agent of the Friends of Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Milwaukee, 
approached William Harris, a non-Communist, asking if he would be 
interested in going to Spain. Seacat informed Harris that a dire need 
existed for volunteers. Harris accepted the idea and Seacat gave him 
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money for transportation from Milwaukee to New York. After going 
through the usual procedure in New York, Harris sailed on the S.S. 
Washington within the month. At about the same time party member 
Edward Horan approached a section organizer for the party in 
Chicago about the possibility of going to Spain. The section organizer 
welcomed Horan's offer to volunteer and told him to "recruit as many 
men as possible to go to Spain who were not Communist Z' He empha-
sized to Horan that the party wanted to recruit as many nonparty 
members as possible for the Brigades. Horan himself, as a party 
member, had to get the party's approval before being allowed to go. 
He reported first to Eugene Berchtold, the party organizer for Illinois 
(and also Chicago secretary of the newly organized front organiza-
tion, the Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade). Berchtold sent 
Horan to see Irving Herman, a party organizer in Chicago who was 
handling the recruitment operation there. Herman told Horan that 
since he, Horan, was already doing important party work in the Food 
Workers Union, the matter would have to be checked out with party 
leaders to see if Horan could be spared. Later Horan received the 
word that the Cook County party leaders had decided that he should 
go to Spain. Herman then arranged for Horan's physical examination 
and gave him money to obtain a passport and to travel to New York 
where he was to report to a party official at the Hungarian Workers 
Club. He sailed for France on the S.S. Laconia in late September 1937 
with a group of eighteen men. 32 
The aura of secrecy surrounding the entire enterprise no doubt 
added to the sense of adventure of the men involved, but its effective-
ness may be doubted. In both England and the United States the 
police authorities were well aware of what was going on. Although 
both countries had statues against recruitment for, or enlistment in, 
foreign armies within their sovereign jurisdictions, the laws were not, 
in the case of the Spanish affair, enforced. It would have been difficult 
to make a case that would stand up in court since no official enlistment 
documents existed. And, perhaps more important, the strong passions 
aroused by the Spanish war would have made any serious attempt at 
suppressing the recruitment operation unrewarding politically. At 
any rate, no serious efforts were made to halt the operation and no 
prosecutions were attempted against those who fought in Spain. 33 
Nevertheless, the clandestine nature of the enterprise continued to be 
emphasized by the party functionaries in control. On the voyage from 
New York to France group leaders ordered the men to maintain 
complete secrecy as to their destination, to avoid contact with the 
other passengers, and to try to act like tourists. At the time of disem-
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barkation onto French soil the effectiveness of the conspiratorial tone 
of the enterprise seemed dubious to some. Maken, for example, had 
his first doubts about the "much vaunted efficiency of the Communist 
party" when he noticed that "every single man carried precisely the 
same ... kind of imitation leather suitcase. Ninety of us pretending 
not to know each other .... going [according to their passports] to 
Austria . . . Poland . . . and all the four comers of the earth with 
identical baggage." That situation evoked comment also by the 
American volunteer John Gates who arrived late in February 1937. 
"The French customs inspectors took one look at our suitcases and 
our fleece-lined coats and congratulated us," he said. Identical bag-
gage was still in style a full year later when Alvah Bessie arrived in 
France.34 
In France all volunteers came under the jurisdiction and authority 
of the French party. Numerous representatives of other national 
Communist parties worked within the apparatus in France and exer-
cised a special responsibility for the men coming in from their own 
countries. One such person was the Englishwoman Charlotte Hal-
dane. Her ability to speak French, a rarity within the ranks of the 
British party, led to her being asked to work in Paris to handle the 
contingents that arrived from England. On her arrival in Paris she 
reported to an address in the heart of what she called the "red" 
working-class district. This, as it turned out, was the headquarters of 
some of the French labor unions. On entering the designated room she 
saw several men seated around a table. Asking for Comrade Max as 
instructed, she was told to wait outside. After a time Comrade Max 
approached her. He came from Prague, was "a prominent member of 
the Czech C.P. and branch of the C.l.," spoke fluent French with a 
strong Eastern European accent, and was acting as "the chief respon-
sible comrade for the LB. [International Brigade] organization in 
Paris, under the general direction ofthe French Party."35 After satis-
fying himself that her party credentials were valid, Max told her that 
he hoped she would stay in Paris indefinitely to help with the English. 
"We've asked London again and again, but all the comrades they've 
sent have been quite unsuitable," he said. "If they're any good they 
can't be spared from London, and those they can spare are useless. 
And none of them know French." Haldane agreed to stay. On their 
way to a restaurant Max complained of the difficulties they were 
having keeping the recruits out of the many drinking dives and broth-
els in the district, especially the English and Americans who usually 
arrived with more money than the others. At a large working-class 
restaurant, Max led her upstairs where she saw many men seated at 
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long dining tables. The men were all recruits for the Brigades and 
spoke "every European language ... from Finnish and Latvian to 
Dutch and Walloon." Max led her into a smaller room at the rear 
which, as he told her, was reserved for the "responsibles." Entering 
the room, Max introduced her to a number of men, among whom 
were a German, a Belgian, a Pole, and an Italian. All were introduced 
by first names only, the three Americans being Jack, Eric, and Lee. 
Later Max informed her that she would be paid 300 francs a month 
from the coffers of her own party. When she later tried to refuse the 
money, which she did not need, her party superior insisted that she 
take it. "It's not a matter of who gets it," he said. "That's what we 
pay, and you earn it." 
Settling rapidly into her work, Haldane became well acquainted 
with the Americans on the staff. She described Jack36 as "a profes-
sional Communist, a Marxist missionary ... a trusted lieutenant of 
the American leaders, Earl Browder and Robert Minor." He had been 
"among the first chosen to go to Spain" and had led one of the first 
contingents of Americans to France. He had been bitterly disap-
pointed when the party ordered him to remain in France rather than 
go on into Spain. Party orders, however, were to be obeyed unques-
tioningly and he had remained to head the American delegation in 
Paris. Jack told her of the difficulties he had had with the French party 
bureaucrats. Apparently all was not proletarian brotherhood and 
international solidarity between the French Communists in charge of 
the operation and the various other nationalities, especially the 
Americans. The French, according to Jack, had bullied the Ameri-
cans, as they did all the others, until Jack arrived on the scene. He 
had had several heated arguments and had "put the French in their 
place," always making sure to "base all his arguments with them 
strictly on the Party line." In the final analysis, however, there could 
be no question but that ultimate control lay with "the dogmatic edicts 
of the French Party Executive," which had been delegated final au-
thority by the Comintern. Haldane summarized her observations and 
feelings on this subject by writing of the "positive hatred felt by all 
the foreign internationals for the French Party bureaucrats under 
whose domination they were obliged to work."37 
Haldane's work entailed receiving the English contingents as they 
arrived in Paris, seeing to their lodging (in "shabby unobtrusive hotels 
in the quarter whose owners' discretion and loyalty could be relied 
on"), and in general overseeing them during their usually brief so-
journ in France. Specifically this included lecturing the recruits on the 
dangers of drunkenness, brawling, or visiting the brothels. So that 
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none of these temptations would become overwhelming to the En-
glish, the party leaders decreed that the recruits' money should be 
confiscated and that each man should be given ten francs a day, 
enough only for a pack of cigarettes and a beer or two. Her duties also 
included giving the recruits a "political peptalk," speaking with each 
one individually and then reporting to Max on their "political and 
personal reliability." Finally she acted as interpreter for them when 
the guides, who were to take them through France and into Spain, 
gave them instructions concerning the trip. 
Among the most controversial and unpopular rulings of the Comin-
tern directorate of the recruitment enterprise was the policy of confis-
cating passports. Many of the volunteers had no passports to begin 
with. But among those who, like the Americans, did have passports, 
the demand that they be surrendered caused much dismay and dis-
cord. Haldane wrote that in the cases where British passports were 
taken she made sure they were returned to England via a British party 
functionary. Whether in fact the passports ever got back to England 
she had no way of knowing. She recounted an episode in which she 
accidentally took an attache case belonging to Max and found it filled 
with passports taken from Czech volunteers. The Soviet intelligence 
officer Krivitsky said that the policy on passports came from the 
NKVD who took advantage of the opportunity to acquire legal pass-
ports which, with a little expert doctoring, would serve their needs in 
moving agents in and out of the countries involved, and that many of 
them were actually used in this way. 38 
The NKVD also apparently exercised a direct role in the policing 
of the recruiting process. The Comintern apparatus clearly attempted, 
through interviews, interrogations, questionnaires, and investigations, 
to screen out what from its point of view were undesirable or unreli-
able individuals. According to some who were in a position to know, 
including General Krivitsky and the onetime German Communist 
hierarch Ruth Fischer, this operation fell under the purview of the 
NKVD. 39 That various interviews, interrogations, and checks were 
made on the volunteers in their own countries, in France, and in Spain 
was amply borne out by the experiences and testimony of many who 
went through the system. The American volunteer Hecht, for exam-
ple, after having been screened by a party review board in the United 
States went through another interrogation by a committee that in-
cluded two Americans at recruitment headquarters in Paris. The same 
procedure applied to the American volunteer Horan, a party function-
ary who had been appointed leader of his contingent while en route 
from the United States to France. He was questioned in Paris by a 
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panel that included an American called Jack (probably the same Jack 
reported by Haldane) as to the political reliability of the men in his 
contingent. And, on arrival in Figueras, he was questioned once more 
by Tony De Maio, an American later reputed to have been an NKVD 
agent in Spain. 40 
While most of those who left records of their experiences in going 
through the recruitment process mention the various interviews and 
interrogations involved, they have not mentioned anything about the 
NKVD. This would be as expected. Few, if any, of the rank-and-file 
volunteers would have had any reason to know that they were under 
the watchful eye of the Soviet secret police. The interrogations were 
usually conducted by ordinary party functionaries, sometimes even 
under the camouflage of one of the party's front organizations. Indeed 
a few of the recruits, at least among the non-Communist ones, seem 
never to have realized that they were dealing with a Comintem ap-
paratus, much less one under NKVD surveillance. 41 Highly placed 
party functionaries who may well have been aware of the NKVD's 
role would not have mentioned it publicly. British party writer Rust, 
for example, brushed all this off lightly by saying simply, "After a 
political and medical examination in London, recruits went on to 
Paris, where they were again examined." Those less highly placed, 
even when they were part of the recruitment system, quite probably 
never knew of the NKVD role. Charlotte Haldane, for example, had 
among her various responsibilities in Paris the task of reporting to her 
superiors on the "political and personal reliability" of the recruits who 
arrived from Britain but apparently had no idea of NKVD involve-
ment.42 
If we consider the all-pervasiveness and the virtual omnipotence of 
the NKVD in Communist affairs during the period of the Spanish war 
(the great purges were under way in Russia and the NKVD was 
certainly active in Spain), it would be stranger to think it was not 
involved in the Comintem's recruitment activities than the contrary 
--especially since the Communists were particularly affected during 
this period with a hypersuspiciousness regarding any type of "left 
deviationism." They were also very worried about persons with these 
opinions slipping into and corrupting their army in Spain. An obvious 
step would have been to try to eliminate such persons before they ever 
got in the Brigades at all, and for an operation ofthat type, what better 
instrument than the NKVD. 
The actual movement of men from France into Spain proved rela-
tively simple. By December 1936 the Comintem apparatus was put-
ting several hundred men per day into the country by the overland 
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route. Train number seventy-seven, which left the Quai d'Orsay sta-
tion in Paris in the evening and arrived at Perpignan the following 
morning, became widely known as the "train of the volunteers," or 
the "red express," because of the large numbers of volunteers it regu-
larly carried.43 • 
Elstob's journey from Paris to Figueras was fairly typical. He left 
Paris with a contingent of some two hundred volunteers whom he 
characterized as "one hundred and ninety-seven Apaches, two Ger-
man doctors and I. " 44 During the train ride through France, the 
Frenchmen sang wildly and waved to the people along the way, many 
of whom returned the clenched fist salute, 45 making it clear that they 
knew who the men on the train were and where they were going. The 
party functionaries who met them upon their arrival in Perpignan 
stressed the necessity of secrecy and instructed the men to stroll 
casually, in groups of twos and threes, to the buses waiting to take 
them across the border into Spain. That advice, however, was ignored 
by numbers of the Frenchmen, some of whom had brought their own 
supply of liquid refreshment along and were in high spirits. Fifty or 
so formed up in a column and marched down the street with clenched 
fists held high and singing the Internationale at the top of their voices. 
The leader of the marchers, a huge Frenchman called Jean, who had 
been "pleasantly pie-eyed since leaving Paris," scorned the idea of 
secrecy. He seemed to want all southern France to know where they 
were going. As it turned out the stress on secrecy proved unnecessary. 
The local gendarme carefully turned his back on the whole affair.46 
The buses carrying them to Figueras on the Spanish side of the 
border pulled out of Perpignan that evening. When they approached 
the frontier the driver turned out the lights inside the bus and the men 
became quiet. The French border guard carried out a perfunctory 
inspection and asked no embarrassing questions. Indeed, as the bus 
rolled past, he smiled and gave the clenched fist salute. 47 On their 
arrival at Figueras they were welcomed by what Elstob called a "lively 
little man" who mounted a large stone in the courtyard of the Castello 
de San Fernando where they were to be quartered, raised his clenched 
fist in the familiar salute, and shouted, "Camaradas, Salud!"48 Pan-
demonium followed. Then the little man who, it seemed, was the 
commander of the fortress, gave a short speech of welcome, conclud-
ing with the announcement that they would soon be fed. After eating, 
the men settled down in their sleeping quarters in the fortress which 
proved to be so filthy and vermin-invested that Elstob ended by sleep-
ing outside on the grass. The Castello de San Fernando was an ancient 
fortress with massive walls enclosing numerous buildings and anum-
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ber of courtyards of various sizes. During the five or six days they 
remained there, the men had no duties assigned and their favorite 
pastime quickly became drinking in the cafe in the village of Figueras 
and admiring the charms of the waitress, Rosita. 49 
The second route into Spain, by sea, led from Marseilles to a 
Spanish Mediterranean port, usually Valencia or Alicante. The En-
glish volunteer Sommerfield left Paris with a contingent of several 
hundred men, among whom were French, Polish, German, and Ital-
ian. Their train arrived at Marseilles the next morning and the recruits 
spent the day hidden in the back rooms of cafes and cellars in the 
working-class district. That night taxi cabs picked them up and took 
them to the waterfront where they boarded a Spanish ship. The ship, 
carrying some 800 men, steamed out of Marseilles that same night. 
The next morning they passed Barcelona, faintly visible along the 
horizon, and continued down the Spanish coast. On the following day 
they made port at Alicante in southern Spain. The recruits disem-
barked and marched, singing the Internationale, through cheering 
crowds. 5° 
Another Englishman, Esmond Romilly, also went to Spain via the 
sea route, having signed up for the Brigades in Marseilles. He em-
barked on the Spanish ship Mar Caspio, along with some six hundred 
other recruits, mostly German and French. The group included a 
number of what Romilly called "very tough guy~x-foreign legion-
naires." The ship put in at Valencia where the recruits marched, also 
singing the Internationale, to a barracks where they assembled in a 
courtyard and listened to a welcoming speech from Andre Marty, the 
political chief of the International Brigades. Marty told them that 
they would soon depart by train to join the International Column. 5 1 
Later, in February 1937, the French government officially closed 
the frontier with Spain in compliance with the nonintervention agree-
ment. From that time, moving men into Spain became more difficult. 
Now they had to slip across the border through rugged Pyrenees 
trails, often at night, to elude French border patrols and some landed 
in French jails when apprehended trying to cross illegally. 52 The 
official closing of the frontier, however, proved no insurmountable 
obstacle to the Comintern in moving men into Spain. Except for 
sporadic outbursts of efficiency the French police and border patrols 
showed a general lack of interest in stringent enforcement. Indeed, 
through its hastily improvised but steadily improved apparatus, the 
Comintern moved some 6,000 to 8,000 men into Spain by the end of 
November 1936 and between 25,000 and 30,000 by mid-February 
1937.53 
4 The Defense of Madrid 
The inexorable advance of the Nationalist columns toward 
Madrid throughout the month of October created widespread pessi-
mism among Loyalist supporters. The fight seemed to have gone from 
the militia. Most observers agreed with Pravda correspondent Kolt-
sov who lamented to his diary, "How is it possible with such troops, 
and with such commanders ... to defend Madrid." 1 
And yet, not all the advantages lay with the Nationalists. Their 
military position was, in fact, extremely vulnerable. Not only were 
they numerically weak and physically exhausted from the rigors of 
their long campaign from the south, but their long and exposed flanks 
presented a constant threat. 2 The Loyalist forces, on the other hand, 
were not only more numerous but had the advantages of occupying 
the ready~made fortress afforded by the city itself. What they needed 
to make these advantages effective was firm direction, determined 
will, professional military expertise, and modem technology. Beneath 
the surface of continued defeat and spreading pessimism, these re-
quirements were gradually being supplied by the Soviet Union and its 
Comintem apparatus. 
The Soviet decision to intervene, in late September, had brought a 
widely publicized message from Stalin to the prime minister, Largo 
Caballero, which contained the much quoted phrase, "The cause of 
Spain is the cause of all advanced and progressive mankind." More 
important, the decision had brought Soviet tanks and planes, a corps 
of Red army advisers and technicians, and, ultimately, the Interna-
tional Brigades. 3 
During that period, too, preparation of the defense of Madrid 
became the chief business of the formidable Comintem contingent in 
the capital and its faithful servant, the Communist party of Spain. 4 
Fifth Regiment headquarters became a beehive of activity, the focal 
point for the party's campaign to defend the capital. Propaganda 
designed to stir resistance poured forth. Instructions, slogans, com-
mands, exhortations bombarded the people of Madrid through the 
party press, colorful wall posters, loudspeakers, mass meetings, and 
street comer harangues. 5 As early as October 10 Comandante Carlos 
(Vidali), chief political commissar of the Fifth Regiment, declared: 
"We give the guarantee that Madrid is unconquerable .... Madrid 
will not be taken by the enemy come what may."6 The regiment's 
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propaganda stressed that city street fighting was a different thing 
entirely from fighting in the open country and that if every house were 
turned into a fortress, every window were a gun port, the city could 
not be taken. 7 The Communist party hierarchs, Ibarruri, Diaz, and 
Checa, made the grand gesture of personally helping to build fortifica-
tions so as to inspire the people of Madrid to emulate them. On a more 
practical level the party functionary Enrique Castro Delgado orga-
nized special squads to terrorize and suppress, through nightly arrests 
and liquidations, any potential fifth-column activity in Madrid. Mean-
while the party issued manifestos exhorting the people of the city to 
"Make Madrid the tomb of Fascism," and while Andre Marty wrote 
of"Madrid-The Verdun ofDemocracy," the slogan "No Pasaran" 
became the watchword of a good part of the world. 8 
Despite all that, however, the Nationalist columns continued to 
drive relentlessly forward. By the first days of November they were 
within five miles of the center of the city and the end seemed im-
minent. Indeed so desperate did the prospects appear that, on No-
vember 6, the Loyalist government fled to Valencia, leaving the 
fate of the capital in the hands of a hastily composed Junta de 
Defensa. 
When the Largo Caballero cabinet left Madrid it did so with little 
hope that the city could be held. An episode reported by the Commu~ 
nist commander Lister indicated that the Loyalist high command had 
decided to abandon Madrid to the Nationalists and that it was the 
Communists who determined otherwise. On November 6 Lister re-
ceived orders from General Pozas, recently appointed commander of 
the central zone (which included Madrid). According to Lister these 
orders were pursuant to the decision of the Loyalist government to 
withdraw its forces from Madrid. Lister refused to carry out the order 
and reported the situation to Communist party headquarters in Ma-
drid. Jose Diaz, general secretary of the party, countermanded the 
order of Pozas and told Lister that the party was assuming responsi-
bility for defending Madrid on its own authority. Lister then pro-
ceeded to ignore the commands of his military superior and to act on 
the orders of the Communist party.9 
As for the Junta de Defensa, virtually all observers agree that it was 
thoroughly dominated by the Communist apparatus in Madrid. 10 The 
Communists, after all, had the organization, the discipline, the will, 
and the determination to defend the city to the last drop of Spanish 
blood. Moreover, they had control of most of the effective military 
power at the disposal of the capital's defenders, the Fifth Regiment, 
the Soviet tanks and planes and guns, the technical proficiency of the 
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Red army advisers, and, finally, the International Brigades. The old 
Spanish general in nominal command of the Junta, Jose Miaja, pro-
vided a convenient figurehead for the Communists. Their propaganda 
cast him as a hero, the doughty old defender of the Republic. This 
myth served their purpose at the time, but they have since been less 
kind, as have others, in their evaluation of the old general. The still 
loyal Communist Lister, writing in the 1960s, agreed with defector 
Castro Delgado in this, if in nothing else. 11 The military command 
in the Madrid sector devolved, in fact, almost entirely on the Soviet 
staff headed by General Goriev. 12 
It was against this background of chaos and confusion that the first 
of the International Brigades entered the Spanish war as combatants. 
Just who was responsible for ordering the Internationals into action 
has remained obscure, as has much else about the defense of Madrid 
during that chaotic period. But the evidence clearly points to the 
Communist apparatus which was in de facto control of the capital. 
Brigade hierarch Luigi Longo did not say from whom the order came. 
Rather he said that "the comrades of the Spanish Communist Party 
made an urgent appeal to the International volunteers to come to the 
aid of imperiled Madrid." The Spanish Communist Castro Delgado 
also recalled that it was the Communist party (and more specifically 
himself and Vittorio Vidali) who were responsible for the Internation-
als coming to Madrid's defense. 13 
Others have held that it was General Goriev, the Soviet officer 
directing the military defense of the city, who ordered the Brigade to 
Madrid. 14 This conclusion seems most reasonable, considering the 
real relationship between Goriev and Miaja and the real relationship 
between Goriev (representing Soviet authority) and the Brigade com-
mand. The organization and command of the International Brigades 
dovetailed neatly into the larger Soviet-Comintern machinery in 
Spain. Also, it is quite reasonable, assuming that the decision did 
come from Goriev, that his orders to the Brigade command would be 
accompanied by an appeal from the Spanish Communist party as a 
convenient smokescreen for the somewhat dubious procedure of a 
Soviet general issuing orders against the directives of the government 
that he was supposed to be serving as an adviser. Regardless of the 
source of the order to commit the Internationals to combat, the 
Brigade directorate did move the first contingent of its troops (the XI 
International Brigade) into the Madrid area immediately. That such 
troops existed and were available for use resulted from the strenuous 
efforts of the Comintern apparatus in general and of the Brigade 
hierarchy in particular over the preceding few weeks. 
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As soon as the Comintern recruitment and transportation systems 
had been set in motion in France, Luigi Longo returned to Spain. 
There, in early October, through the influence and efforts of various 
components of the Communist apparatus, he rapidly put together the 
essential necessities for receiving, feeding, quartering, and clothing 
the first contingents of volunteers coming in from France. Working 
through the Communist party in Catalonia (PSUC), Longo received 
permission to use the fortress at Figueras as the concentration point 
for the men coming into Spain by land. Then he hurried on to the 
Spanish capital where he conferred with leading Communist party 
figures. Jose Diaz, chief of the Spanish party, assured Longo that he 
and the other Communist members of the Popular Front cabinet 
would use their influence to see to it that the needs of the Internation-
als would be met. Diaz also suggested that Longo go directly to see 
the prime minister, Largo Caballero, in order to offer officially to the 
government the services of the arriving volunteers. Longo, however, 
thought it would be better to put that off until later, when he could 
lead a delegation for that purpose. 15 
The first and most pressing requirement facing Longo at that point 
was to find a satisfactory location for a base of operations for the 
Internationals. The Comintern had no intention of seeing its army 
based in Catalonia and Aragon, strongholds of Anarchosyndicalism 
and Catalan separatism. Madrid was the focus and fulcrum of Com-
munist strength in Spain and the Comintern was determined to estab-
lish their Brigades in that zone of operations. Longo solved his 
problem with the aid and advice of Enrique Lister and Vittorio Vidali, 
commander and chief political commissar respectively of the Fifth 
Regiment. The regiment had a base in the town of Albacete, a location 
well situated to the Brigades' needs along the main railroad line 
between Madrid and Valencia. Lister and Vidali offered to make their 
organization there available to Longo and the Internationals. With 
that problem solved and a letter of introduction to the Fifth Regiment 
commander in Albacete, Longo left Madrid and arrived at Albacete 
on October 12. The chiefs of the Fifth Regiment in Albacete, includ-
ing one Barneto, a Comintern functionary whom Longo had known 
previously in Moscow, cooperated fully in placing their facilities and 
personnel at Longo's disposal. 18 This personnel included a number of 
non-Spanish Comintern men who had been active in the organization 
and direction of the Fifth Regiment and who now transferred part or 
all of their activities to the Brigades. 17 It also included several Red 
army officers who, while maintaining a low profile, directed their 
expertise toward the Brigades. 18 
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Meanwhile, the Comintern organization in France had performed 
its function successfully and the first contingents of volunteers were 
on their way to Spain. The Spanish ship Ciudad de Barcelona landed 
the first of the volunteers who came via the sea route from Marseilles 
at the Spanish Mediterranean port of Alicante on October 13. That 
group, some 500 strong, entrained for Albacete that night and arrived 
there on the following day. On October 15 the first contingents from 
Figueras marched into Albacete and new groups of from 200 to 300 
each came in almost daily thereafter. 19 
With the arrival of the Internationals in Albacete, a Comintern 
political directorate took control. Chief among these party stalwarts 
was Andre Marty. Marty, a charter member of the Communist party 
of France, had, as a young seaman, played a role in the mutiny of the 
French fleet operating against the Bolshevik regime in the Black Sea 
in 1919. By that action, for which he served four and one-half years 
in prison, he established himself with the Bolshevik leaders and 
became a Communist folk hero. He had lived for a period in the Soviet 
Union where he had been lionized and a number of Soviet factories 
were named for him. A devout Stalinist, he never showed the least 
inclination to deviate from the party line as laid down in Moscow and 
he seems to have been one of the few non-Russian Communists in 
whom Stalin had any confidence. An official biographical sketch of 
Marty, which appeared in the party press in December 1936, stressed 
the fact that Marty had always been a "staunch Leninist" and had 
never shown either "Right opportunism" nor "Left deviationism." As 
a member of the executive committee of the Comintern, it continued, 
Marty was "taking part in the leadership of the whole world Commu-
nist movement" and was among the first to "organize aid for his 
Spanish brothers."20 
By the 1930s Marty had become a leading member ofthe Commu-
nist party of France, a member of the executive committee of the 
Comintern, a member of the French Chamber of Deputies, and a 
Comintern agent working for the Soviet military intelligence ap-
paratus.21 Placed in direct political control of the International Bri-
gades by the Comintern, Marty became one of the most hated men 
in Spain. He cowered in the presence of Soviet military and political 
representatives but played the iron-fisted autocrat in his dealings with 
subordinates and colleagues. He was suspicious of virtually everyone 
and highly sensitive about any imagined threat to his position or his 
absolute authority in the Brigades.22 His reputation as a brutal disci-
plinarian and his proclivity for having International Brigade men shot 
for "political dissidence," an offense categorically labeled "Trotsky-
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ism" by orthodox Communists during that period of the great purges 
in the Soviet Union, won him the unhappy sobriquet "Le Boucher de 
Albacete."23 He demanded the same kind of public adulation within 
the Brigades that Stalin was receiving in the Soviet Union and the 
Brigade press missed few opportunities to praise Comrade Marty. For 
example, the organ of the mainly French XIV International Brigade 
declared, "In the sorrowful history of the people the name of Andre 
Marty will always be remembered, the friend and the organizer of the 
International Brigades." And another Brigade journal pointed out 
that "from the first moments our great comrade Andre Marty was the 
founder, the organizer and motive force of our glorious International 
Brigades. " 24 
With Marty came a high powered contingent of leading Comintern 
functionaries, or, as Longo referred to them, "professional revolu-
tionaries."25 An interesting recent listing of the organizers of the 
Brigades by a Communist writer included Marty, Fran~;ois Billoux, 
Longo, de Vittorio, Swierczewski, Copic, Zeisser, Beimler, Stern-
Kleber, Mate Zalka, Togliatti, Dahlem, Codovilla, Stefano, Nenni, 
and "other militants of the international workers movement."26 Sig-
nificantly, of this list only Nenni was not a Comintern stalwart, and 
the fact is that Nenni had only an indirect connection with the Bri-
gades. 
The most important of these "professional revolutionaries" in di-
rect relation to the International Brigades was Longo. The leading 
politico in the Brigades from start to finish (except for Marty himself), 
Longo ultimately assumed the title of inspector general of the Bri-
gades. As the Brigade press itself put it, "next to [Marty] Comrade 
Luigi Gallo (Longo's nom de guerre in Spain], secretary general of the 
Italian Communist Party, Inspector of the International Brigades in 
Spain, was able to channel the entire movement of solidarity which 
flowed to our nation, being an exemplary commissar."27 
Among the Gen;nan contingent of Comintern stalwarts who played 
a part in the political apparatus of the Brigades were Walter Ulbricht, 
Franz Dahlem, and Heinz Neumann. While Ulbricht's role in Spain 
remains somewhat obscure, 28 Dahlem became the chief political com-
missar for the Germans in the Brigades and a leading member of the 
political commissariat. Neumann, another seasoned Comintern agent, 
was apparently involved in the NKVD-controlled police apparatus in 
Spain which dealt in part at least with maintaining the political purity 
of the International Brigades. 29 
A Communist municipal counselor from Paris and trusted lieuten-
ant of Marty's by the name of Gayman ("Vidal" in Spain) acted as 
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the first military commandant of the base at Albacete. 30 Vidal, who 
had been an officer in the French army in the World War and a reserve 
officer since, impressed some as a man of organizational ability and 
military knowledge.31 Vidal remained base commandant until re-
placed by the Bulgarian Colonel Bielov in July 1937.32 In direct 
charge of the first arrivals at Albacete was an old French noncommis-
sioned officer who had long military service behind him. Known as 
Commander Jean Marie, he demonstrated proficiency in the rough 
language of the barracks and loudly announced to all that they would 
"crush the fascists" in a couple of weeks. 33 
The basic problems of organization, supply, discipline, and training 
challenged the abilities of the leaders, who set to work with deter-
mined zeal. They immediately requisitioned numerous buildings 
which they converted into offices, barracks, supply depots, and train-
ing rooms and set up an improvised system for processing the recruits 
as they arrived from France. After mustering each group of new 
arrivals a clerk read off the list of names and asked if there were 
officers, noncoms, cooks, stenographers, artillerymen, or machine 
gunners among the contingent. That the great majority of the recruits 
had some previous military training and, in many cases, combat expe-
rience was a great help in all this. Eventually each man reported to 
the office of the political commissariat where he was once more inter-
rogated regarding his name, age, political party affiliation, and reasons 
for coming to Spain. The answer to the last question was easy, recalled 
one volunteer. "The poster on the wall answered it: 'To Smash Fas-
cism.'" 34 
The quartermaster service operated, in the early period at least, in 
an extremely erratic way. The American journalist Louis Fischer, 
who claimed to be the first American to enroll in the International 
Brigade, filled the post of quartermaster for a brief period in early 
November 1936. It was not long, however, until he quarreled with 
Marty and left the Brigade (a privilege the rank-and-file brigader did 
not enjoy) to resume his journalistic activities.35 
The recruits usually received uniforms and equipment on their 
arrival in Albacete. The uniforms, supplied in the beginning mainly 
by French Communist sources, consisted of heavy khaki coats, full-
cut brown corduroy trousers that strapped around the ankles, boots, 
a black or brown beret, a helmet, a mess kit, and a blanket. In many 
cases during the early period, however, the men received no weapons 
until virtually the time of departure for the front. The arrival and 
distribution of rifles was an event provoking an almost mystical excite-
ment for some. John Sommerfield, a young and fervent Communist, 
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recalled the emotions fired in himself on that day. "We were in a state 
of tremendous impatience; we wanted to see them, to handle them, 
to know what type they were; we wanted ours, to hold it and test the 
sights and the bolt and the trigger action. And when my tum came, 
I experienced a pang of delight." The rifles delivered to Sommerfield's 
unit were American-made Remingtons, model1914, still coated with 
the grease in which they had been stored and shipped. They were good 
rifles, probably as good as any and better than most to be found in 
the Spanish war at that time. 36 
The task of quickly transforming a multinational group of diverse 
individuals into an effective military unit or, as one participant put it, 
"to transform militant revolutionaries into obedient soldiers"37 was 
not easy. It was especially difficult to establish the kind of automatic 
obedience to officers essential to military efficiency when the officers 
themselves were improvised, often without experience and always 
without that authority supplied by custom, tradition, and habit so 
much a part of the pattern of discipline of a normal army. 
In those early days of the Brigades there was much talk among the 
rank and file of a "democratic army." The illusion that a Communist 
army was a democratic organization ended quickly, however, as the 
Comintern hierarchy established firm control. The necessity of abso-
lute discipline, "revolutionary discipline," and the appointment of 
military and political officers from above, quickly became the order 
of the day in Brigades and, even as in "bourgeois" armies, fatigue 
duties and the guardhouse punished slackness and indiscipline. 38 
In fact, Communist party discipline provided the otherwise missing 
ingredient and thus the basic sinews of authority within the Brigades. 
Party discipline worked effectively because, as Brigade hierarch Franz 
Dahlem put it, these first contingents were "almost exclusively Com-
munists, mainly party functionaries and Red Front Fighters."39 
From the very beginning political commissars, almost invariably 
selected from among tried and true party stalwarts, played a key role 
in the life of the Brigades, and political propaganda quickly became 
a regular feature of life at Albacete. On the walls of the barracks the 
political commissars pinned each morning a copy of Mundo Obrero, 
the official organ of the Communist party of Spain, and, often, transla-
tions of articles from Soviet newspapers. The first German contin-
gents at Albacete posted a placard that proclaimed, "Discipline, We 
Exalt Discipline," while a French poster exhorted the comrades not 
to render themselves unfit for service by contracting diseases in the 
brothels. 40 
Defense of Madrid 55 
Meanwhile all roads led to Albacete for the foreign recruits who 
continued to pour in at the rate of several hundred a day. Albacete 
itself was what one volunteer called "one of Spain's most unpleasant 
towns." A dirty little railroad and manufacturing center and the 
capital of the province of Albacete situated on the windswept plateau 
of Don Quixote's La Mancha, the town sat astride the railroad line 
between Madrid and the important Mediterranean port cities of Va-
lencia and Alicante. Thus it had undoubted advantages as a base of 
operations for the Brigades. Devoid of charm, the town boasted two 
main industries-the manufacture of knives and a thriving brothel 
district-to the latter of which the men of the Brigades brought 
booming prosperity. The climate, typical of La Mancha, produced 
burning, hot, dry summers and cold, wet winters during which Al-
bacete's unpaved streets became rivers of mud. Others retained some-
what fonder recollections of Albacete. A devout young English 
Communist found deeply moving such evidences of the revolution as 
the gaily painted and initialed automobiles which sped wildly about, 
the ubiquity of working-class dress, and the atmosphere of excitement 
and "slightly hysterical gaiety."41 
By early November the town presented a strange spectacle, filled 
as it was with men from all over Europe speaking a babel oflanguages. 
The Brigades even boasted a few Russians, exiles from their homeland 
since the revolution, who were attempting to demonstrate their good 
faith toward the new regime in Russia and thus win their eventual 
return home by fighting for the Comintern in Spain. Those unfortu-
nate people (who, needless to say, never achieved their goal) were the 
only Russians in the International Brigades. Indeed the one European 
nationality most significantly not represented among the Brigades was 
the Soviet. 42 
With the continued influx of recruits (3,000 to 4,000 by the end of 
October),43 Albacete became overcrowded. To cope with this, the 
Brigade chiefs ordered the organization of four battalions, based as 
nearly as possible on linguistic lines, and their dispersal into training 
quarters in the outlying villages. The first official document issued by 
authority of the International Brigades was an order for the concen-
tration of troops in the towns of Mahora and Tarazona de la Mancha 
on October 29, 1936. The document, typewritten in French, was 
signed by Commander Jean Marie and base commander Vidal. The 
Italians went to Madrigueras, the Poles and other Slavs to Tarazona 
de la Mancha, the French to La Roda, and the Germans to Mahora.44 
In the countryside around their cantonments the newly formed 
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squads, companies, and battalions stood morning parades, marched 
over the dusty roads, and carried out elementary maneuvers in the 
surrounding fields. Through the desperate efforts of officers and politi-
cal commissars, the rudiments of a military organization began to 
emerge. As an article published in the Brigade press on the first 
anniversary of the formation of the Brigades put it, "Under the reso-
lute direction of our great Comrade Andre Marty ... and ... Com-
rade Vidal ... Albacete became a hub of seething activity, the 
birthplace of the International Brigades."45 
Despite all the efforts of the Albacete directorate, their forces were 
far from ready for entry into action when the order (or appeal) came 
from Madrid. Although four battalions had been formed, they had 
had little time to organize or train. Further, no higher military com-
mand structure had as yet been created. Nevertheless, faced with the 
call to commit their troops to battle, Albacete put together a neces-
sarily weak and incomplete Brigade structure within which three of 
the four available battalions would operate. 46 
The first battalion of the newly founded XI International Brigade 
was a predoininantly German unit which called itself the Edgar An-
dre battalion in honor of the well-known ex-chief of the Roten Front 
Kii.mpfer Bund, the Communist party's paramilitary organization in 
Germany (the Red equivalent of the Nazi SA). News of Andre's 
execution by the Nazi regime reached the Germans in Spain just as 
the battalion was forming. 47 Appointed to command the Andre bat-
talion was Hans Kahle. An ex-German army officer with combat 
experience in the World War, a longtime member of the German 
Communist party and the Roten Front Kampfer Bund, 48 Kahle was 
a big tough man who in his bearing retained much of the appearance 
and manner of the Prussian officer. Although he was a thorough 
Communist and disciplined party member who obeyed orders without 
question, Kahle concealed beneath a rough exterior certain human 
characteristics which expressed themselves in an ironic sense of hu-
mor and periodic flings in Madrid during which he indulged himself 
with large doses of wine, women, and song. He spoke fluent Spanish 
and was one of Hemingway's favorite characters in Spain. 49 
The Andre battalion consisted almost entirely of devout German 
Communists, most of whom, prior to volunteering for the Brigade, 
had been living as political emigres in France. The battalion included 
a large number of World War veterans and, like Kahle and th~ 
battalion political commissar Arthur Dorf, most were party activists 
who had a long history of political, military, and/or revolutionary 
activity behind them. They had all experienced the frustration of 
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seeing their party, their friends and associates, and their aspirations 
crushed in their fatherland since 1933. They were, as militants in a 
party forged in the heat of struggle, a highly disciplined group. And, 
as embittered losers in their struggle at home, they proved to be 
fanatical combatants in Spain. A very high percentage of those who 
marched through the streets of Madrid on Sunday, November 8, 1936, 
died before the year was out. 50 
The French battalion of the XI Brigade adopted the name of the 
Commune de Paris centuria, which had recently joined the French 
recruits at La Roda. 51 The battalion commander, Jules Dumont, was 
an ex-captain in the French army and veteran of Verdun where, a 
widely circulated story went, he had faced Hans Kahle across no-
man's-land. A longtime Communist stalwart and one of the earliest 
of the foreign combatants in Spain, Dumont had fought at !run in July 
and August. As the commander of the Commune de Paris centuria 
when it arrived at La Roda and as one who combined military experi-
ence and political reliability, he was the obvious choice to command 
the French battalion. 52 Pierre Rebiere, a member of the central com-
mittee of the French Communist party53 and a member of Longo's 
delegation to the Largo Caballero government, filled the post of bat-
talion political commissar. The battalion consisted chiefly of those 
Frenchmen and French-speaking Belgians who had been among the 
first volunteers to come into Spain through the Comintern recruiting 
system. They, like their German comrades in the Andre battalion, 
were predominantly Communists. 54 While perhaps less anxious to die 
than their German counterparts, having lost less and having, there-
fore, more to lose, they too were to die in large numbers in the days 
and nights of November and December 1936. 
The third battalion of the XI Brigade called itself the Dombrowski. 
It was made up predominantly of Polish Communists, most of whom 
had been living as political emigres in France and Belgium. The 
commander of the Dombrowski battalion was Bolek Ulanovski and 
its political commissar, a Comrade Matuczacz. Both men had fought 
with the Polish Dombrowski or General Woblewski centuria along-
side the Italian Gastone-Sozzi with the Fifth Regiment prior to the 
formation of the International Brigade. 55 Small South Slavic groups 
were attached to both the Andre and Dombrowski battalions and 
some twenty Englishmen, mostly ofthe old Tom Mann centuria, were 
assigned to the Commune de Paris battalion. 56 
The XI Brigade, composed of these three battalions, was com-
manded by the Soviet army officer who passed in Spain under the nom 
de guerre "General Emilio Kleber." Kleber, a vigorous man of some 
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forty years of age whose ruggedly handsome face was topped by a full 
shock of iron-gray hair, was to gain worldwide fame as the "Savior 
of Madrid" for his role as commander of the International Column 
during the defense of the capital in November and December 1936.57 
The propagandists presented him to the world as a soldier of fortune, 
a naturalized Canadian, a man of Austrian birth who had been taken 
prisoner in the World War by Russian armies and had subsequently 
been converted to Bolshevism. 58 Geoffrey Cox, a British Communist 
journalist, embellished the story further by saying that Kleber's fam-
ily had taken him to Canada as a child and that he was a naturalized 
British citizen whose English showed "only the faintest traces of 
foreign accent in addition to its Canadian tone." Cox further wrote 
that Kleber originally went to Russia as a member of a Canadian army 
of intervention in 1919. From there he made his way across Siberia 
to Moscow and joined the Red army with which he served throughout 
the Russian civil war. "After that was over he went to Hamburg 
(Germany) where he organized Communist shock troops. In 1927 he 
was in China, leading one group of the Red armies against Chiang 
Kai-Shek. From there Kleber went north to Manchuko and played his 
part there. He had been a revolutionary since 1914. The Spanish civil 
war is the third in which he has fought." 59 
That picture, according to Krivitsky, who was well acquainted with 
Kleber, was fabricated by the NKVD which supplied Kleber with a 
Canadian passport and complete biography. In fact, Kleber had never 
lived in Canada. The elaborate fiction, laced as it was with vagueness 
and mystery, served simply as a smokescreen for covering the fact that 
Kleber was an officer in the Soviet army. It provided a plausible 
background for his sudden emergence as the commander of the 
"spontaneous" troops of the International Column. Kleber remained 
a mystery man even to many in important positions in the Interna-
tional Brigades. On meeting him for the first time and being informed 
that he was the general in command of the International Brigades at 
Madrid, Pacciardi asked rhetorically, "Who is this General Kleber? 
They say Canadian yet he speaks Russian. But he is not Russian. Who 
has made him a general?"80 
Actually, the mysterious General Kleber was General Lazar Stem, 
a native of Bukovina, a territory that prior to the World War was 
within Austria-Hungary but was after the war in Rumania. Stem-
Kleber, an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army during the Great 
War, was captured by the Russian army and interned in a prisoner 
of war camp. Mter the revolution in Russia he joined the Red army 
and fought throughout the civil wars. Later he attended the Soviet 
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military academy, graduating in 1924. In 1927 Kleber became a mem-
ber of the Red army intelligence department and was assigned to the 
military section of the Comintern. 61 In that capacity he performed 
numerous assignments in various parts of the world, including China, 
Germany, and the United States. 62 By assigning Kleber, and men of 
similar status and background, to the military command of the Inter-
national Brigades, the Soviet Union was able to use a reservoir of 
trained and experienced military technicians completely under Soviet 
control without at the same time compromising the USSR's officially 
neutral status in the Spanish war. 63 Acting alongside Kleber as politi-
cal commissar of the XI Brigade was the Italian Communist Giuseppe 
de Vittorio ("Nicoletti"), the third-ranking Comintern politico in the 
International Brigade directorate. 64 
The sudden order for the departure of the Internationals from their 
training bases produced both high excitement and barely controlled 
chaos. In the morning the troops remained confined to barracks with 
kits packed, a situation that led, inevitably, to a rash of rumor and 
speculation as to when and where they were going. Some struggled 
with pocket dictionaries to decipher three-day-old Madrid newspa-
pers for a clue to the situation. A member of the Commune de Paris 
battalion recalled the departure as "a kind of rout. " 65 In the afternoon 
the troops formed ranks on the parade field while trucks rolled in 
loaded with crates of ammunition. Each man received two or three 
cloth slings containing fifty rounds each. Then they marched to the 
La Roda station and boarded a waiting train which soon began mak-
ing its slow way across the quiet, night-shrouded, countryside. The 
train carried them as far as the village of Alcazar where the troops 
transferred to Russian-built trucks. The trucks bounced over rough 
roads through the night, arriving the next morning at Vallecas, a town 
some ten miles east-southeast of Madrid. That night the men slept in 
the fields around Vallecas and heard the far-off rumble of artillery fire 
for the first time. It rained and turned cold and the men shivered as 
they stood two-hour stints on guard. 66 
The next morning as the men of the Commune de Paris battalion 
were eating breakfast, the Andre battalion marched past singing a 
German Communist marching song and waving a big red banner at 
the head of the column. "It was a brave sight," recalled a member of 
the British machine-gun section of the French battalion. "All the 
glamour and excitement that governments can use to make men 
forsake their homes and die on foreign soil for foreign markets, but 
it was ours, it was our army, and the glamour was real."67 The men 
of the French battalion stood saluting with clenched fists raised as the 
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Andre battalion marched past. Later that morning the French battal-
ion held a brief commemorative ceremony in honor of the nineteenth 
anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. Short speeches in French, 
Spanish, and English were followed by singing of the Internationale 
in several languages. Not long thereafter they entrained for Madrid 
and the celebrated march through the streets of the beleaguered capi-
tal. That march saw the birth of the legend of the Internationals. The 
march itself inevitably was seen in sometimes startlingly different 
ways by different observers and described in even more startlingly 
different ways by some who observed it not at all. 
Geoffrey Cox, the British Communist acting as correspondent for 
the London News Chronicle in Madrid, wrote of it: 
Up the street from the direction of the Ministry of War came 
a long column of marching men. They wore a kind of corduroy 
uniform, and loose brown Glengarry caps like those of the 
British tank corps. 
They were marching in excellent formation. The tramp, 
tramp of their boots sounded in perfect unison. Over their shoul-
ders were slung rifles of obviously modem design. Many had 
scarred tin helmets hanging from their belts. Some were young; 
others carried themselves like trained, experienced soldiers. 
Each section had its officers, some carrying swords and re-
volvers. Behind rolled a small convoy of lorries stacked high 
with machine guns and equipment. At the rear trotted a squad-
ron of about fifty cavalry. 
The few people who were about lined the roadway, shouting 
almost hysterically, "Salud! Salud!" holding up their fists 
clenched in salute, or clapping vigorously. 68 
The book La Quatorzieme, published by the commissariat of the 
International Brigades in 1937, said ofthe Commune de Paris battal-
ion on that march: "By the word battalion one imagines some hun-
dreds of men dressed and armed uniformly. These men did not 
resemble that image. One was in a military blouse, the other in civil-
ian, a third in khaki trousers, the fourth a beret, the fifth a forage cap. 
The rifles were Remington, Mausers, surplus of the Swiss Army."69 
Arturo Barea, a Spanish Socialist, working at the time for the 
government press bureau in Madrid wrote: "On that Sunday a forma-
tion of foreigners in uniform, equipped with modem arms, paraded 
through the center of town: The legendary International Column 
which had been training in Albacete had come to the help of Madrid. 
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After the nights of the 6th, and 7th, when Madrid had been utterly 
alone in its resistance, the arrival of those anti-fascists from abroad 
was an incredible relief. Before the Sunday was over, stories went 
round of the bravery of the International Battalions in the Casa de 
Campo."70 And John Sommerfield, one of the marchers, recalled it 
this way: "Ours was no triumphant entry; we were a last desperate 
hope and, as tired out, ill equipped, and hungry, we marched through 
the wind-swept streets .... I thought that the hurrying people on the 
pavements looked at us as if we were too late and had come only in 
time to die.'m Some of the Brigade units went directly into the lines 
with the Spanish militia troops in the Casa de Campo, a large park 
in the southwestern outskirts of Madrid. 72 There they set to work 
digging trenches and making use of natural cover, elementary military 
techniques of which the Spanish militia troops were either unaware 
or disdained to practice as beneath the dignity of brave men. The 
military efficiency exhibited by the Internationals, which by Spanish 
militia standards was phenomenal, was seen by many as one of their 
most important contributions to the defense of the city. "The militia-
man learned. He acquired the habits of a soldier. Each international 
converted himself, without thinking of it, into a teacher.''73 The Inter-
nationals had not come to Madrid to teach, however, but to fight. And 
in the days and nights that followed their entry into Madrid they were 
to have ample opportunity to do so. 
On November 9, as the troops of the XI Brigade were experiencing 
their first taste of combat, the Madrid command called on the Al-
bacete directorate for the immediate commitment of all troops still 
available to it. The result was wild improvisation and an even more 
chaotic situation than had been the case with the XI Brigade's depar-
ture several days earlier. For Albacete had only one organized battal-
ion, a few barely formed companies of diverse nationalities, and the 
merest outline of a Brigade structure available. The directorate's 
efforts to organize a military unit and simultaneously to move it into 
combat produced, as Marty put it, "what the bourgeoisie calls a 
miracle." He credited that miracle to the "highly qualified military 
cadres" and the "antifascist consciousness of the rank and file of 
worker soldiers, above all the Socialists and Communists.''74 
The one organized battalion available to the Albacete directorate 
at that moment, the Italian Garibaldi, had been among . the first 
formed, along with the Andre, Dombrowski, and Commune de Paris. 
But it had been held out of the XI Brigade to serve as a nucleus for 
the organization of a second Brigade. Its commander, Randolfo Pac-
ciardi, had arrived at Albacete and taken effective command of the 
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Italian contingent on November 3. On the following day the Garibal-
dis, who had recently been issued uniforms and rifles, moved to the 
village of Madrigueras where they established a base and began seri-
ous training. On November 6 Ludwig Renn, an ex-officer in the· 
German army, observed the Italian battalion holding a mock attack 
on a hill outside Madrigueras and came away favorably impressed. 
Here, thought Renn, were the troops who might really accomplish 
something. 75 
The Garibaldi battalion stood out in a number of ways as unique 
among the units of the International Brigade. For one thing, its first 
commander, Pacciardi, was not a Communist but the leader of the 
Italian Republican party. Although Pacciardi and his party had ad-
hered to the Popular Front in 1935 along with the Italian Socialists 
and Communists, he saw the Spanish conflict chiefly in terms of the 
Italian situation, feeling that a defeat for the Right in Spain would be 
a defeat for fascism in Italy. He felt, as did numerous other antifascist 
Italians, that Italian participation in a victorious struggle in Spain 
would be an important step on the road to Rome. Pacciardi thus 
favored the formation of a specifically Italian combat unit in Spain 
which, he felt, would serve as a living example to the Italian people. 
Italians, he wrote, should form a combat "legion" in Spain which 
would be a symbol of the vitality of the antifascist cause to Italians, 
a legion that would "be honored with sacrifice" and pass from "the 
era of martyrs to the era of heroes." Such a force would forge in the 
fire of combat the cadres of the revolution and move the Italian people 
with their "strong deeds."76 
The Italian legion visualized by Pacciardi would be nonpolitical, 
not tied to nor directed by any particular political party but at the 
service of the Spanish government and general staff. While interested 
in aiding the Popular Front forces in Spain, Pacciardi saw his legion 
above all as a demonstration to the Italian people that they could fight 
and die for their own liberty. He felt that the knowledge that Italian 
democracy in exile was fighting in Spain would rouse the Italians at 
home and rally them to "the tradition of Garibaldi."77 
Pacciardi's earlier attempts to interest the Largo Caballero govern-
ment in his Italian legion had proved unsuccessful. But he continued 
to work for the idea through the Italian Popular Front committee 
made up of representatives of the Communist, Socialist, and Republi-
can parties of Italy and headquartered in Paris. That committee, 
dominated by the Communists (since Pietro Nenni, secretary of the 
Italian Socialist party, consistently followed the Communist lead), 78 
had not favored Pacciardi's plan for creating an Italian military unit. 
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But that attitude changed abruptly following the Soviet-Comintern 
decision to organize an international military force for service in 
Spain, and the Italian committee's endorsement of Pacciardi's plan 
followed quickly. The parties represented on the committee formal-
ized their agreement to create an Italian legion in a document that set 
forth the juridical basis of the legion and named Pacciardi as its 
commander. 79 
The reasons for a Communist-dominated committee appointing a 
man from outside the party's ranks as commander were several. Pac-
ciardi had, for one thing, better qualifications from a military stand-
point than most. He had been an officer in the Italian army in the 
World War and had been decorated several times for valor. Politi-
cally, his antifascist credentials were impeccable. An early and consis-
tent opponent of Mussolini and the Fascists, he had gone into exile 
in 1926 and had remained active in anti-Mussolini politics ever 
since. 80 As leader of the small but influential Italian Republican party 
and as one who supported the Popular Front program he seemed 
eminently fitted, from the Communist point of view, to represent a 
Popular Front organization. Longo explained it by saying that the 
Communists wanted to show the spirit of unity and not take all the 
command positions just because they were in the majority. His fellow 
International Brigader and Italian party comrade Giacomo Calan-
drone agreed, saying that in order to emphasize the unitary, broad 
antifascist, as opposed to narrowly party, character of the Garibaldi 
battalion they had a Republican commander and a Communist and 
a Socialist political commissar. 81 While there is an element of truth 
in both statements, both are also after-the-fact rationalizations. The 
Communists were content to have a known nonparty member in a 
conspicuous position in the Brigades so long as he remained com-
pletely amenable to their control. But if he showed any signs of 
political unreliability, they spared no effort in getting rid of him as, 
in fact, they did with Pacciardi later. 
The contractual document creating the legion, dated October 27, 
1936, was clearly executed not only after the Comintern decision to 
form an international army in Spain but subsequent to the concentra-
tion of a large number of foreign recruits at Albacete. The agreement 
made no mention of the fact that the legion was to be part of a larger 
international organization, and Pacciardi did not know anything 
about the International Brigade until he arrived at Albacete on No-
vember 1 to find, to his surprise, not only Italians but men from most 
of the countries of Europe. Longo later claimed that none of the 
people on the Paris committee knew of the prior formation of the 
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International Brigades. 82 This seems extremely doubtful so far as the 
Communist members were concerned and certainly Longo himself 
knew all about it. At any rate, Pacciardi's efforts to bring his legion 
into being proved successful only after those efforts came to coincide 
with the policy of the Comintern, and, in fact, the legion was incorpo-
rated into the Comintern-controlled International Brigades from the 
beginning. The Italian legion, which became the Garibaldi battalion 
at birth, provided a good illustration of the fact that the Popular Front 
only operated with any real effect when following the lead of the 
Comintern. 
When Pacciardi found that the Italians were to constitute part of 
a larger international army, he said: "We Italians had no interest in 
a mysterious and unavowed legion. We wanted on the contrary to 
popularize it in our country, as an example to the sleeping and a 
reprimand to the cowards. We did not want to be lost in the 
anomymity of internationalism." The Brigade directorate reassured 
him, however, that the Italians would be organized in a specifically 
Italian unit to be called the Garibaldi. 83 
By early November the Italian contingent at Madrigueras num-
bered· some five to six hundred men. Although composed predomi-
nantly of Communists, including the remnants of the Gastone-Sozzi 
centuria, the Garibaldi battalion contained a larger percentage of 
non-Communists than any other unit in the Brigades at that time, a 
fact recognized symbolically by having two political commissars, An-
tonio Roasio, a Communist, and Arnaldo Azzi, a Socialist. 84 The 
Italian volunteers were largely middle-aged men, many over forty, a 
fact attributable to the long tenure of Fascism in Italy and the early 
date of the effective purging of the country of active antifascist ele-
ments. In organizing the battalion and nominating officers, Pacciardi 
took the previous military experience of each one into account. The 
commanding officers of companies were all men with military experi-
ence, either as officers or noncommissioned officers. Most of the origi-
nal Garibaldinis were veterans of the World War. Pacciardi proved 
to be not only a capable military commander but a successful and 
respected leader of men. 85 His only fault was that he would not render 
unquestioning obedience to the Brigades' Comintern political chief-
tains and for that he would eventually pay. 
The second battalion incorporated into the new XII Brigade took 
the name Thaelmann, in honor of the chief of the German Communist 
party. Its commander, the German writer Arnold Vieth von Golss-
enau, who used his pseudonym, Ludwig Renn, in Spain, had served 
as an officer in the German army in the World War. During the 1920s 
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he had joined the German Communist party and had been a member, 
along with Hans Khale, ofthe Roten Front Kampfer Bund. Renn had 
been imprisoned in 1933-1934 by the Nazi regime and on his release 
from prison his party superiors ordered him to leave the country. He 
crossed the border into Switzerland where he joined the growing 
ranks of the German Communist party in exile. 86 
When the Spanish war broke out Renn contacted KPD headquar-
ters in Paris for recommendations and papers to allow him to enter 
Spain. Arriving in Barcelona in early October 1936, he reported to 
PSUC headquarters where he met an old acquaintance, Hans Beimler, 
who was a member of the central committee of the German Commu-
nist party and political chief of the German Communists in Spain. 87 
The next day Renn visited the Thaelmann centuria on the Huesca 
front with Beimler and requested that he be allowed to join a military 
unit. Beimler told him to go to Madrid where his military experience 
would be put to better use. When Renn reported to party headquar-
ters in Madrid both the Spanish Communists and a representative of 
the German party's central committee assured him that they would 
find a suitable military post for him. He remained in Madrid, however, 
still without a command, as late as November 6, when he left the 
capital for Valencia with a group of foreign journalists. When that 
group went through Albacete on November 6 Renn learned for the 
first time of the existence of the International Brigades and offered his 
services to the Albacete directorate. 88 That an available party member 
with Reno's military background should have been ignored, as it 
seems, by the Comintern directorate in Spain was an example of the 
way in which the Comintern generally tended to ignore the party's 
intellectuals in its plans for staffing the International Brigades. Both 
Renn and Gustav Regier, another German Communist intellectual, 
came to Spain, according to their reports, without any particular 
assignment from the party and only by coincidence or accident 
became affiliated with the Brigades. This bears out the general disdain, 
contempt, and distrust in which the intellectuals were held by the 
party hierarchy in general. The intellectuals, most of whom were 
renegades from bourgeois backgrounds, were considered unreliable. 
While the party astutely used the intellectuals for its own ends, and 
especially in appealing to the bourgeois liberals of western Europe and 
America as part of the Popular Front policy, they never really fully 
trusted them. 89 
Renn's chance arrival at Albacete almost simultaneously with the 
urgent mobilization order from Madrid, coupled with the severe 
shortage of trained officers available to the Albacete staff, led to his 
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being offered command of a new battalion (the future Thaelmann) 
then in the process of formation. Renn accepted and plunged into the 
chaos engendered by the attempt to organize a multilingual mass of 
individuals (Germans, Slavs, Hungarians, British, and more) into a 
military unit. 
The political commissar of the battalion, Fritz Vehlov ("Louis 
Schuster" in Spain), a German Communist who had previously 
fought with the Thaelmann centuria and who had arrived in Albacete 
with the remnants of that unit a few days prior to Renn's arrival, 
explained to Renn that disorganization reigned supreme. Not a single 
company had been organized, and the harried Schuster, desperately 
trying to bring some order out ofthe chaos, could not (since he spoke 
only German) even communicate with many of those assigned to the 
battalion. Renn and Schuster called on each of the nationality groups 
to pick a political delegate, if possible one who could speak German 
or Russian, and in some cases this linguistic factor became the crite-
rion by which unit commanders were chosen. The thirteen men of the 
English-speaking group attached to the battalion, for example, sent 
forth their only German-speaking member, Arnold Jeans, as its politi-
cal delegate. Having gotten this group together, Renn, who spoke 
Russian as a result of having lived in the Soviet Union for several years 
where he wrote propaganda for the Comintem, could communicate 
with each of the delegates either in German or Russian. Each group, 
Renn informed them, would have to organize itself as best it could for 
the time being. The battalion would be going into battle before its 
officers had a chance to know one another. 90 
The battalion, as roughly organized, consisted of a German com-
pany, a German-English company, a Polish company, and a polyglot 
company composed of Bulgarians, Yugoslavs, Hungarians, and oth-
ers. The last of those companies had as yet neither a commander nor 
a political commissar since no one could be found among them who 
spoke Slavic and Magyar as well as German or Russian. A representa-
tive finally came forward who could communicate with Renn in a 
half-German, half-Russian patois. The companies were divided into 
"zugs" of thirty men each and the zugs into groups of ten. The 
English, now numbering some twenty men, made up, along with a few 
Flemings and Germans, the third zug of the first company. Their zug 
leader, recalled a young Britisher, was a tall, tough Prussian called 
Paul, and the company commander was "even more of a Prussian" 
called Max.91 The third battalion of the XII Brigade, the so-called 
Franco-Beige or Andre Marty was even less organized than the Thael-
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mann, lacking even a commanding officer upon departure for the 
front. 92 
A Soviet army officer of Hungarian origin, Mate Zalka, known in 
Spain as General Lukacs, assumed military command of the XII 
Brigade. 93 Renn and Lukacs, old acquaintances from their days in the 
Soviet Union, had run into each other in Madrid on November 3. At 
that time Lukacs had told Renn that he had been sent to Spain to 
organize partisan groups for work behind the enemy lines, a task for 
which Lukacs was qualified by experience. When Renn arrived at 
Albacete on November 6 and offered his services to the Brigade 
directorate, he found to his surprise that Lukacs had become the 
commanding general of the new XII Brigade. Lukacs explained that 
the partisan assignment had been called off. 94 
General Lukacs was a man of many talents and one whose qualities 
of humanity and warmth set him apart from most of his colleagues 
among the Soviet-Comintern hierarchy in Spain. He became the best 
liked of the International Brigade commanders. 95 A cavalry officer in 
the Austro-Hungarian army before and during the World War, 
Lukacs had been captured by the Russian army. When released as a 
result of the Russian revolution, he had joined the Bolshevik party 
and fought in the Red army during the civil war. He continued to live 
in the Soviet Union and remained in the Red army serving at one time 
with Cheka troops in the suppression of "banditry." He had been 
decorated with the Order of the Red Banner for his services to the 
USSR. 96 Communist propaganda, aimed at liberal sentiment in the 
western nations, inevitably stressed that he was an author.97 The 
Communists recognized the value of claiming as many intellectuals as 
possible as supporters of their cause in Spain. To have an intellectual 
general was too good a thing not to make the most of. That Lukacs 
was a Red army officer who had come to Spain directly from the 
Soviet Union was not mentioned publicly. Longo himself assumed the 
post of Brigade political commissar while one Lukanov, a Bulgarian 
who used the nom de guerre "Bielov" in Spain and had reputedly been 
an artillery officer during the Balkan wars, took the post of Brigade 
chief of staff. With this makeshift arrangement the XII Brigade moved 
out for combat. 98 
5 The XIII, XIV, 
and XV Brigades 
While the first two International Brigades fought on the 
Madrid front, new recruits continued to stream into Albacete at the 
rate of 500 to 1,000 a week. Because of the heavy casualties sustained 
by the XI and XII Brigades at Madrid, the Albacete staff posted many 
of the new recruits to those two Brigades as reinforcements during 
November and December. At the same time, they organized new 
battalions slated for a third (XIII) International Brigade. One battal-
ion, composed primarily of French and Belgians, trained at Mahora; 
another, also predominantly French, at Villanueva de la Jara and 
Quentinar de la Orden; a third, composed of Germans, Poles, and 
various Balkan nationalities, at Tarazona de la Mancha; and a fourth, 
predominantly Italian, at La Roda. 1 One of these battalions, later 
dubbed the "Chapaiev" for the popular partisan hero of the Russian 
civil wars, was the most international of all the International Brigade 
units. It contained Poles, Germans, Hungarians, Swiss, Jews, Czechs, 
Austrians, and small groups of Dutch, Swedes, Danes, Norwegians, 
and Yugoslavs.2 The companies and squads of the Chapaiev battalion 
took names of national heroes like the Polish Mickiewicz company, 
or of antifascist heroes like the Czech Gottwald zug. The two predom-
inantly French battalions of the Brigade were later combined to form 
the Henri Vuillemin battalion, named in honor of a Communist killed 
in the riots in Paris in February 1934, an occurrence that had become 
part of the mythology of the Popular Front. 3 
The formation of the command structure, staff, and service units for 
the new Brigade proceeded in a much more orderly way than had been 
the case with XI and XII Brigades. 4 The man chosen to train the new 
Brigade and then to command it, known in Spain as "General 
Gomez," was in fact Wilhelm Zeisser, a German Communist and 
longtime Comintern functionary. He had served as a lieutenant in the 
German army in the World War. Stationed in Russia when the revo-
lution broke out, he joined the Bolshevik party, became a Soviet 
citizen, and remained a devoted Communist from that time on. He 
received specialized training in Moscow which made him an expert 
in the methods and techniques of insurrection and civil war. In the 
1920s and 1930s Zeisser functioned as part of the Soviet military 
The Brigades 69 
intelligence and espionage apparatus in Germany and also on occa-
sion as a Soviet agent in China and Manchuria. His mysterious ap-
pearance in Spain as General Gomez followed the pattern set by 
Kleber, Lukacs, and the other Brigade generals. Zeisser was a classic 
example of the type of professional revolutionary who performed the 
Comintem's work throughout the world. 5 
As chief of staff of the XIII Brigade the Albacete directorate chose 
another German called Schindler, a Communist who, so the popular 
story ran, had once served a prison term for his participation in the 
Spartakusbund in the early days of the Weimar Republic. He had 
since occupied himself as a journalist specializing in military affairs 
and, prior to the Spanish conflict, had been living in France. Schindler 
had entered Spain immediately after the outbreak of the conflict in 
July 1936. He was prominent among the earliest foreigners to fight in 
Aragon where he participated in the formation of the original Thad-
mann centuria and became its first commander. Later he went to Paris 
to help in the recruiting of volunteers for the International Brigades. 
On his return to Spain in early December he was appointed first chief 
of staff in the XIII Brigade. 6 
The Brigade chiefs assumed that the XIII Brigade would join the 
other International units in the Madrid sector. But in the first days 
of December the Albacete command received orders to rush all avail-
able troops to Valencia. The reason given for that unexpected tum 
of events, a tum that subsequently vitally and dismally affected 
the entire future of the XIII Brigade, read that a seaborne inva-
sion by Italian military forces was imminent. 7 Knowledgeable and 
reliable sources have since contended that the real reason behind 
this move was not fear of an Italian invasion but of a rising by the pre-
dominantly Anarchist population and militia units in Catalonia and 
the provinces to the south against the Popular Front government 
itself. 8 
Whatever the reason, the Brigade did go to Valencia where it 
remained for several weeks. Then, in the last week of December, the 
XIII Brigade saw its first combat in an attack on the city of Teruel 
in Aragon. Writing long after the event, Longo claimed that the 
original purpose of the XIII Brigade's being ordered to Valencia was 
to make this attack on TerueP That about three weeks elapsed be-
tween the time the Brigade was ordered to Valencia and the beginning 
of the Teruel campaign and that Teruel was some 140 kilometers from 
Valencia cast strong doubt on this explanation. More likely the Va-
lencia regime saw the use of the Brigade in an attack on Teruel as a 
good method of making a show of strength in an area largely under 
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Anarchist control and prone to a dissident attitude toward the govern-
ment. 
. The attack on Teruel proved to be a costly failure. The Chapiev 
battalion suffered over 50 percent casualties and the two French 
battalions lost so heavily that they were subsequently merged into a 
single battalion. One factor in the poor showing at Teruel was the 
"barely concealed hostility" of the local Spanish command toward the 
Internationals. Also, according to Longo, the Spanish troops in-
volved, mainly Anarchist militia forces, showed a distinct hostility 
toward the Internationals. Whether or not this was merely a rational-
ization for failure by using two well-known Communist scapegoats-
the non-Communists among the. Loyalist military command and the 
Anarchists-or whether it was a real factor in the defeat is hard to 
say. Certainly the Anarchists distrusted the International Brigades as 
a Communist force which many of them undoubtedly believed was 
being used as a counterweight to the Anarchists themselves. The fact 
that the non-Communists among the Loyalist army command in 
general looked with suspicion and ill-concealed dislike on the Interna-
tionals was attested to by others. 10 
The XIII Brigade remained in the southern zone of operations for 
the next five months. As a result it was the only International Brigade 
that did not participate in the central epic of the war during that 
period, the battle for Madrid. 
With the departure of the XIII Brigade for Valencia in December, 
the Albacete directorate set to work organizing three more battalions 
and a fourth Brigade. Appointed commander of the XIV Brigade was 
Karol Swierczewski. Known in Spain as "General Walter," Swierc-
zewski was, like Kleber and Lukacs, a Soviet army officer. Of Polish 
origin he had joined the Bolsheviks during the revolution and fought 
with the Red army during the civil wars. He remained in the Soviet 
army thereafter and served as one of that group of non-Russian Red 
army officers widely used by the Soviet government through its Com-
intern apparatus in operations throughout the world. A rugged ap-
pearing man, he had received the Order of the Red Star for his services 
to the Soviet Union. Walter had served for a time as a professor in 
the Soviet military school in Moscow and on the staff of the Chinese 
Red army. 11 He ultimately commanded a division in Spain and ap-
peared much later as vice-minister of defense of the Communist 
regime in Poland following World War 11. 12 
Andre Heusler, a functionary of the French Communist party, 
filled the post of Brigade commissar while Ralph Fox, a prominent 
member of the small but vocal clique of Communist intellectuals in 
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Great Britain, served as his assistant. 13 A graduate of Oxford's Mag-
dalen College, Fox had worked in the colonial department of the 
Comintern in Moscow in 1925 and had remained a dedicated party 
member ever since. 14 The Italian Communist Aldo Morandi served 
as the Brigade chief of staff. 15 Vincenzo Bianco ("Krieger" in Spain), 
an ex-deputy of the Italian parliament from Trieste and a charter 
member of the Italian Communist party also held a post on the 
Brigade staff. 16 A French Socialist called Putz commanded one bat-
talion of the Brigade. Putz, a soldier of courage and popularity with 
his troops, but not a Communist, ultimately left the International 
Brigades to command a regular Spanish brigade. 17 Boris Guimple, a 
Communist who had been an officer in the French army until shortly 
before his arrival in Spain, commanded a company in Putz's battalion. 
He later took command of the battalion and eventually became XIV 
Brigade chief of staff. 18 Another battalion commander was an ex-
officer of the French army, Delasalle. Delasalle quickly became un-
popular with a number of people in the Brigade hierarchy including 
Marty himself. 19 He was soon to meet the same untimely end that 
awaited many another who provoked Marty's ire in Spain. George 
Nathan commanded the British company of Delasalle's battalion. 
Nathan, who had been an officer in the British army in the World 
War, succeeded Delasalle as battalion commander and eventually 
became chief of staff of another (the XV) International Brigade. He 
quickly gained a reputation for great coolness and courage under fire, 
a reputation that lasted until he was killed in action in July 1937. One 
of the few nonpoliticals who attained relatively high command posi-
tion in the Brigades, Nathan was among those who most clearly fitted 
the description of the Internationals as a "bohemian military society." 
He commonly led troops in combat with no weapon more potent than 
a cane and, in an army not noted for punctilious care in matters of 
dress, Nathan stood out as a one-man exhibition of spit and polish.20 
One of the battalions of the XIV Brigade was commanded by a 
Bulgarian Communist called Stomatov, a man whose political activi-
ties had cost him seven years in prison in his native country. A Serbian 
Communist called Petrovich, who was, as Marty remarked in his 
inevitable speech to departing troops, "a young man, but an old 
revolutionary,''21 served as its political commissar. Commanding the 
Italian company was one Bocchi, a Communist who had been living 
in Paris prior to the Spanish conflict. As political commissar, the 
Italians had the services of a comrade Locatelli, a party stalwart who 
had arrived in Spain but a few days earlier direct from the Lenin 
School in Moscow.22 
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The XIV Brigade had hardly been formed when it was dispatched 
to the Cordova area where it received a scorching baptism of fire in 
an action around the town of Lopera. This action turned into a 
thorough debacle for the Brigade. The resultant high casualties and 
general breakdown in discipline brought both Longo and Marty to the 
scene and led to the execution of battalion commander Delasalle for 
treason. With order more or less restored, the XIV Brigade was 
moved into the Madrid zone of operations where it participated in the 
ongoing battles there. 23 
In late December 1936 the Albacete directorate launched the for-
mation of the fifth and last of the International Brigades. The new 
Brigade, the XV, consisted of four battalions, a British, a French, an 
American, and a Slavic-Italian one. 24 The Brigade's military com-
mander, a Red army officer named Janos Galicz, used the nom de 
guerre "General Gall" in Spain. The Brigade newspaper pictured him 
as "a true son of the people," a Hungarian, a "simple soldier" in the 
Austrian army in the World War. Freed by the revolution in Russia 
he joined the Bolshevik party and the Red army where he "advanced 
militarily." He had been involved, so the story went, in the Bela Kun 
affair in Hungary in 1919 following which he returned to Russia and 
adopted Soviet citizenship. Subsequently Gall performed various ser-
vices for the Comintern including military work in China. 25 Virtually 
all sources except official Communist ones agree that Gall was a vain, 
egotistical, brutal man and the worst of the International Brigade 
generals. 26 Possessed of a harsh personality he quickly gained a repu-
tation for complete disreg~d of the lives of the men under his com-
mand. Despite this he ultimately moved up to a divisional command 
in Spain as did his colleagues Kleber and Walter. 
A Croat Communist, Vladimir Copic, served as Brigade political 
commissar. He too had become a member of the Bolshevik party in 
Russia after being freed from a prisoner of war camp by the revolu-
tion. Immediately after the World War he returned to his homeland 
where he became a charter member of the Communist party of Yugo-
slavia. 27 As fervent in his Communism as his colleague Gall, Copic 
appeared to have been cut from a different mold. A man with rather 
wide cultural interests, he spoke, in addition to his native language, 
Russian, German, and English and could get along in several others 
including Italian and French. He had traveled widely, been a profes-
sional opera singer, and served briefly as a member of the Yugoslav 
Chamber of Deputies. Prior to Copic's entry into Spain he had been 
instrumental in organizing the recruitment system in Yugoslavia for 
the International Brigades. On his arrival at Albacete in February 
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1937, he assumed the post of political commissar of the XV Brigade. 
Copic eventually became commander of the XV Brigade upon Gall's 
being posted to command of a division. 28 The picture of Copic as a 
cultured cosmopolitan may well have been in large part a propaganda 
image. It seems somewhat tarnished by the tone of the following 
statement by him: "It is a month since you have come to this point 
of Jarama face to face with the fascist enemy and received your 
baptism of fire. The fascist hordes have not succeeded in cutting off 
and surrounding Madrid, thanks to the heroic stand of the fighters of 
the XV Brigade. We withstood the mad attacks of the enemy and 
inflicted heavy losses on him. Yet we have even greater and ruder 
tasks in front of us. We must crush completely the fascist reptile. The 
commanders and men of the XV Brigade will strive to make their 
Brigade second to none and to deal with the heaviest blows to the 
fascist robbers. Forward to the complete victory of the People's 
Front."29 
The French Communist Jean Chaintron ("Barthel" in Spain) 
served as assistant Brigade political commissar. A longtime function-
ary of the French party, Barthel had served in various party posts in 
France and had been, just prior to his coming to Spain, secretary of 
the Communist party of Algeria. Upon Copic's assumption of com-
mand of the Brigade, Barthel replaced him as chief Brigade political 
commissar. George Nathan, who had commanded the British com-
pany in the XIV Brigade in its first action at Lopera, became the first 
chief of staff of the XV Brigade. 30 One of the few non-Communists 
who achieved a relatively high military post in the International 
Brigades, Nathan was promoted to major upon his appointment as 
chief of staff. Following Nathan's being killed in action an ex-regular 
German army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Klaus, filled that post. 
Klaus, a member of the German Communist party since 1927, had 
been living in exile in France since 1933 and arrived in Spain in July 
1936.31 
Following the pattern set by the earlier Brigades, the new battalions 
were based and trained at villages in the vicinity of Albacete. The 
British battalion began formation at Madrigueras on December 27, 
1936, with a nucleus of about 150 men. Following the return of the 
XIV Brigade from its unhappy experience at Lopera and its brief 
period of action in the Madrid sector in January, the remnants ofthe 
British company of that unit joined their compatriots at Madrigueras. 
By January 1937 the British battalion had grown to some 500 men. 
The battalion, which included a number of Scots and Irishmen, first 
adopted the name "Saklavata" in honor of an Indian Communist who 
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had once been a member of the British parliament. But the name 
never took firm hold and the unit became generally known simply as 
the British battalion. 32 
The men in charge of training and organizing the British at Ma-
drigueras were Wilfred Macartney, Tom Wintringham, and D.P. 
Springhalt.33 Macartney, in command of the battalion during its 
training period, was a "flamboyant journalist of the Left" who though 
not a member of the Communist party had once served a prison term 
for giving military secrets to the Soviet Union. Macartney had served 
as a British officer in the World War and proved to be an effective 
organizer of men and formulator of a realistic training program at 
Madrigueras. His most formidable problems involved the mainte-
nence of a modicum of discipline and sobriety among what a fellow 
officer and subsequent commander of the battalion called "a mixed 
mob--ex-servicemen, hunger marchers, political enthusiasts, and 
honest toughs and queer'uns. " 34 
Just prior to the battalion's going into combat in early February, 
Macartney was shot in the leg by Peter Kerrigan, a functionary of the 
British Communist party and at that time chief British political com-
missar at Albacete. The British party hierarchy apparently did not 
want Macartney, a nonparty member, to lead the battalion into com-
bat. He was being relieved of command when the shooting, presum-
ably accidental, occurred. 35 As a result of Macartney's incapacitation, 
Wintringham assumed command of the battalion. A graduate of Ox-
ford's Balliol College and more recently editor of the Communist Left 
Review and military editor for the British Daily Worker, Wintring-
ham was a charter member of the clique of intellectuals who found 
a home in the British Communist party. He had been among twelve 
British Communists who were convicted and imprisoned in 1925 for 
violation of the Incitement to Mutiny Act. 36 Although he had served 
in the British army in the World War and had read Clausewitz and 
Liddell Hart, his views on war were based, as he put it, less on their 
theories than on "those of Frederich Engels, and on the general 
Marxist idea of the connections between war and politics."37 
The first political commissars of the battalion were D.P. Springhall 
and George Aitken, both functionaries of the British Communist 
party.38 Fred Copeman, an ex-British navy man who had been court-
martialed as a leader of a mutiny in 1931 and had been a member of 
the Communist party since 1932, quickly came to occupy a leading 
position in the battalion. Another longtime party member who later 
assumed command of the battalion when Wintringham was wounded 
was Jock Cunningham, a man who had been imprisoned for his part 
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in a mutiny of British troops in Jamaica in 1920. By the end of January 
the British battalion, by then numbering some 600 men, most of them 
Communist party members, was organized into four companies plus 
auxilliary units and stood ready for combat. The battalion had re-
ceived a longer period of training and organization than any previous 
International unit. 39 
The French battalion called itself the "6 Fevrier" in honor of the 
political riots in Paris on that date in 1934. The battalion trained at 
Tarazona under its military commander, Captain Fort, a French 
Socialist who had served as an officer in the French army in the World 
War and as a reserve lieutenant since that time. The first political 
commissar of the battalion, a French Communist who went by the 
name "Galli" in Spain, was later replaced as political commissar of 
the battalion by the French Communist Durbecq. Durbecq had been 
a functionary in the French party's labor union work prior to the 
Spanish war, a position he had used to recruit large numbers of 
Frenchmen to fight in Spain before arriving in Albacete himself in 
January 1937.40 
The fourth battalion, composed of Slavs and Italians, had some 
difficulty in deciding on a name. The Yugoslavs in the battalion 
wanted to call the battalion the "Diura Diakovich," in honor of the 
leader ofthe Yugoslavian Communist party and member of the execu-
tive committee of the Comintern. Due to the large number of other 
nationalities in the battalion, however, they finally settled on the name 
of the chief of the Comintern, Dimitroff. The Dimitroff battalion 
trained at Mahora and included four companies of different national 
composition. The first consisted of mixed Slavic and Balkan elements 
including Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, Czechs, and Rumanians; the second 
was predominantly Polish; the third, Italian; while the fourth, the 
machine gun company, contained a mixture of nationalitiesY 
The commander of the Dimitroff battalion, a Bulgarian Communist 
called Grebenaroff, came from among that numerous group of Eu-
ropean Communists who had been living in the Soviet Union prior to 
the Spanish conflict and whom the Comintern used as cadres for the 
International Brigades. Grebenaroff, a man of twenty-eight years of 
age, had attended the Soviet military school in Moscow. He proved 
to be both a fervent Communist and a courageous combat commander 
until killed by enemy fire in the first action of the Dimitroffbattalion. 
The political commissar of the battalion, a German called Furman, 
had a brief and stormy career in the Brigades. A Communist fanatic 
who resented anyone outside the party being placed in any position 
of authority in the Brigades, he soon became the source of a near 
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mutiny among some of the officers in the Dimitroff battalion over the 
appointment of a non-Communist to command. Although Furman, 
like Grebenaroff, came to Spain directly from the Soviet Union and 
therefore had a certain aura of sanctity about him, he was subse-
quently demoted and ultimately shot for his lack of discipline. 42 
Giorgio Anillo, an Italian Communist who had previously been 
commissar of the Italian company of the Dimitroff battalion, suc-
ceeded Furman as battalion commissar. A Bulgarian Communist and 
Comintem functionary called Tabakoff who had been imprisoned for 
his role in a Communist insurrection in Bulgaria in 1924 later suc-
ceeded Anillo as commissar of the Dimitroff battalion when Anillo 
and the other Italians were transferred to the Garibaldi battalion. The 
Croat Communist Vidakovitch commanded the Yugoslav company 
of the battalion, while a Montenegrin Communist, one Arsenovitch, 
acted as the company's political commissar. Commanding the Italian 
company of the Dimitroff battalion was Carlo Penchienati, a former 
officer in the Italian army and a man of no specific political affiliation. 
Penchienati later also joined the Garibaldi battalion with the other 
Italians of the Dimitroffs. 43 
The first contingent of American recruits for the International 
Brigades arrived in Spain on January 5, 1937, and proceeded through 
Albacete to their training base at Villanueva de Ia Jara. Composed 
primarily of Communists, 44 the American battalion included a large 
number of Jews, several blacks, and a contingent of Cubans and 
Puerto Ricans. A number oflrishmen who had fought at Lopera with 
the British company and had become ruffied because the British Daily 
Worker failed to mention the fact that Irishmen had been among 
those killed there also joined the American battalion. 45 
The American battalion, in line with the Communist party's Popu-
lar Front policy of identifying itself with the historical and patriotic 
traditions ofthe various countries, adopted the name "Abraham Lin-
coln." In the same vein a second American battalion, which had a 
brief existence later, called itself the "George Washington," and a 
Canadian battalion, also organized later and which was in fact pre-
dominantly American, called itself the "MacKenzie-Papineau."46 
The American volunteers differed in a number of ways from their 
European counterparts. They were as a group younger. Only a hand-
ful had seen service in the World War. In fact, very few had done any 
military service at all although a few had received some rudimentary 
Inilitary instruction in college ROTC programs. 47 Strong leadership 
cadres among the Americans were also notably lacking, partially 
because of the youth of the group, partially because of its lack of 
The Brigades 77 
military experience, and partially, and most significantly, because the 
Communist party in the United States was reluctant to part with its 
older and more experienced cadres at home. As a result the American 
contingent not only suffered from poor leadership but was completely 
at the mercy of the Albacete directorate, since the Americans had no 
one of sufficient stature in the Communist party of the United States 
to represent their interest in Spain. 48 
Another difference was that the Americans, even though composed 
predominantly of Communist party members, were unaccustomed to 
the strict discipline accepted as a matter of course by their European 
confreres .who had been tempered in the heat of revolutionary and 
military struggles of which the boys from across the Atlantic had only 
a vague and romanticized conception. The situation was not made 
happier by the fact that the Americans were viewed with unrelieved 
contempt by the Comintern hierarchy of the International Brigades 
as little more than adolescent dilettantes and were treated accord-
ingly. In fact, the Brigade chieftains originally intended to use the 
Americans as piecemeal replacements for other units rather than form 
a separate American battalion. 49 
As a result of these shortcomings the Americans experienced seri-
ous disciplinary problems from the beginning. In the absence of any 
real military or political leadership or clear authority on the part of 
any of'the Americans at Villanueva de la Jara, the men attempted to 
operate on the lines of the Communist party at home. The problem 
remained, however, that while at home everyone knew where author-
ity lay, at Villanueva de la Jara no one did. Since the Americans in 
Spain came largely from the same low to middle status in the party, 
none of them could clearly assume policical control as an established 
higher party functionary could have. Phil Bard, ex-cartoonist for the 
United States Daily Worker, acted as political commissar of the first 
contingent of Americans and was apparently intended to serve as 
American base commissar at Albacete. Bard soon returned to the 
United States, however, and never functioned effectively as political 
representative of the Americans at Albacete. He was followed in that 
post by George Brodsky, a minor functionary in the party who proved 
completely unable to cope with the job. As a result of all this the 
Americans at Villanueva de la Jara spent most of their time and 
energy in political meetings. Cliques and dissension developed to the 
point where arrests and counterarrests were being made by the vari-
ous factions on one another's members. In the delicate phraseology 
of a recent apologist: "They were not properly oriented to the exact 
nature and need of a 'People's Army.' " 50 
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United States party headquarters in New York, concerned by re-
ports of the chaos in Villaneuva de la Jara, sent over Sam Stember, 
a second or third echelon party bureaucrat, to try to instill some kind 
of political discipline into the sad disarray of Americans in Spain. 
Commissar Stember had his problems too as can be seen from the 
following somewhat hysterical statement signed by him in the Brigade 
journal: 
Those who challenge the military or political authority of ... 
commanders are self seekers who are no less guilty than the 
deserters who have been sentenced to hard labor in the Labor 
Battalion at a recent trial. 
The challenge manifested itself in the formation of commit-
tees which make demands on the Brigade as if they were framing 
demands against the Capitalist Class; in a form of disruption that 
tends to demoralize the ranks of the honest soldiers who volun-
teered and have a mandate from the working class at home to 
defeat fascism at all costs .... In the American Battalion, such 
a committee flared up recently and for a short time demoralized 
the Battalion until finally order and discipline was reestablished. 
But these traiterous elements are waiting for still further oppor-
tunities .... 
Our slogan must be, no traitors in our midst; absolute disci-
pline; one unified, single command. 51 
The military command picture in the American battalion was as 
bleak as the political. Jim Harris, a party member who claimed to 
have had long experience in the United States Army, had been ap-
pointed military commander of the first group of Americans sent to 
Spain by Fred Brown, a Comintern representative in New York, and 
Alan Johnson, allegedly a former United States Army officer, who 
later played a role in the Brigades himself. 52 On January 11 an Ameri-
can named Robert Merriman arrived at Villanueva de la Jara directly 
from the Soviet Union. 53 Merriman, who had received ROTC train-
ing during his college career at the University of Nevada (and, accord-
ing to some sources, further training at the Lenin Institute in 
Moscow), immediately began to assume a leading role in the battal-
ion. 54 Shortly after his arrival, Merriman, accompanied by Stember, 
went directly to International Brigades headquarters at Albacete 
where they spoke with Marty and Vidal. 55 
Marty, furious with the Americans, vented his spleen, calling them 
"spoiled cry babies" and threatening to send them all back home. 56 
Marty finally calmed down and Merriman and Stember returned to 
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Villanueva accompanied by Vidal, who informed the Americans 
bluntly that they were in an army in which discipline and authority 
were of paramount importance and must be accepted. He then con-
firmed Stember as political commissar and Harris as military com-
mander and appointed Merriman battalion adjutant. It seems most 
likely that Merriman was slated to take over the military command 
of the American battalion from the beginning. Vidal may well have 
been governed by the assumption that since Harris had been ap-
pointed "military commander" by the American party hierarchy it 
would be impolitic to dismiss him summarily, especially in view of the 
already delicate situation in the battalion. Whatever the original in-
tention, Merriman, virtually from the time of his arrival, did assume 
de facto command. 57 After having settled down under the triumvirate 
of Stember, Harris, and Merriman, the Americans engaged in some 
rudimentary military training and instruction. In fact no planned 
program of training existed in the International Brigades at that time. 
Each unit had to improvise its own. 58 
During the first week in February Marty and a contingent of Al-
bacete chieftains arrived at Villanueva de la Jara to review the Ameri-
cans. The battalion, which had by then grown to some 400 men, 
received approval from Marty on its progress. He told the troops that 
they would soon be moved to the new International Brigade camp at 
Pozo Rubio. That, however, never came to pass. 59 
The battalion, as then organized, consisted of two rifle companies 
and a machine gun company. The first company, which contained a 
Cuban-Puerto Rican section, an Irish section, and an American sec-
tion was commanded by Inver Marlowe, a British Communist who 
had been on the editorial staff of the London Daily Worker and more 
recently on the staff of the American Daily Worker. Marlowe went 
under his pseudonym, John Scott, in Spain. Stephen Daduck, a man 
who had previously flown a fighter plane for the Loyalists, com-
manded the second company, and Douglas Seacord, who had once 
served in the United States Army, commanded the third.60 
On February 12 the American battalion received orders to move 
out for Chinchon, a town located in the area in which a large-scale 
battle then raged. Just prior to their departure Vidal appointed Merri-
man and Harris to the rank of captain and issued them revolvers and 
binoculars. Meanwhile the battalion paraded in the bullring at Al-
bacete and received weapons, equipment, and the usual pep talk from 
Marty.61 
Sometime between the battalion's departure from Albacete and its 
entry into combat, the Albacete chieftans removed Harris from com-
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mand and replaced him with Merriman. The explanations of how and 
why this happened vary. According to one story Harris became un-
nerved upon the battalion's being ordered into action, displayed un-
stable and irresponsible characteristics, and had to be replaced. 
According to others the Brigade staff concocted this story about 
Harris as a justification for getting rid of him and appointing Merri-
man to command the battalion, something they had intended to do 
all along. 62 
At any rate Vidal named Merriman commander and the battalion 
saw its first action under Merriman's command. Upon their arrival 
at Chinchon, General Gall ordered the battalion into reserved posi-
tions near Morata. Somewhere between Chinchon and Morata, Mer-
riman stopped the convoy long enough to allow each man to fire five 
rounds from his weapon into a hillside. For many that was the first 
time they had fired a rifle although they had been in Spain for over 
a month.63 
6 A Military Overview 
The entry of the XI Brigade into combat on November 8, 
1936, opened a five-month period in which the Internationals played 
a crucial, perhaps decisive, military role in the Spanish war. While a 
detailed treatment of the campaigns of the International Brigades is 
beyond the scope of this study, a brief synopsis and overview of the 
military developments in the Madrid area and the role played by the 
Internationals in them will serve to illustrate a number of factors of 
importance in understanding the politics of the Brigades, both then 
and subsequently. 
The battles in and around Madrid lasting from November 1936 to 
March 1937 can be most easily visualized as three phases of a five-
month-long campaign in which the Nationalists sought to conquer 
and the Loyalists sought to defend the Spanish capital. The first 
phase, opening in the first week of November and lasting until No-
vember 25, saw the Nationalist effort to take the city by direct frontal 
assault. The second phase, opening on November 29 and lasting until 
January 10, involved the Nationalist effort to envelop Madrid on its 
western flank. The third and final phase, lasting from February 6 to 
March 15, was the effort to achieve the same objectives on Madrid's 
eastern flank. 
Phase one entered its most critical stage when, on the night of 
November 14-15, Nationalist forces succeeded in forcing a crossing 
of the Manzanares River and quickly pushed up the hills into the 
University City on the southwest outskirts of Madrid where they 
occupied several buildings. The Madrid command rushed in rein-
forcements including the XI and XII International Brigades. 1 The 
fighting in the University City quickly developed into a bitter and 
relentless struggle at close range with no quarter asked or given on 
either side. The combatants converted the university buildings into 
fortresses, sandbagging and barricading windows and doors with 
whatever could be found. They mounted machine guns to cover open 
approaches, dug communication trenches between buildings, bur-
rowed tunnels under streets swept by enemy fire, and attacked for 
limited objectives. At times both sides occupied parts of the same 
building and fought for floors and even rooms. The battle raged until 
on November 25, after some twenty days of furious fighting, the 
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Nationalist command gave up the attempt to storm Madrid by frontal 
assault. 2 
During the University City fighting several changes were made in 
the Brigades' command structure and organization. Among the more 
important of these was the elevation of Kleber to command of the 
entire Madrid battle sector, a position he had in fact filled since his 
arrival with the XI Brigade in early November. He now commanded 
not only the XI and XII International Brigades but a number of 
Spanish units assigned to that area, a total of some 18,000 effectives. 3 
Hans Kahle moved up from command of the Andre battalion to 
replace Kleber as commander of the XI Brigade, while Ludwig Renn 
moved over from command of the Thaelmann battalion to become 
Kahle's chief of staff. The German Communist Richard Staimer re-
placed Renn as commander of the Thaelmann. At the same time the 
Thaelmann battalioJt, was shifted from the XII Brigade to the XI and, 
in exchange, the Dombrowski went from the XI Brigade to the XII. 
Thus, the XI Brigade consisted of the two predominantly German 
units, Andre and Thaelmann, and the mainly French Commune de 
Paris, while the XII included the Italian Garibaldi, the French Andre 
Marty, and the Polish Dombrowski. Several changes in the political 
commissar hierarchy also took place. The Italian Nicoletti, who had 
been XI Brigade commissar, moved up with Kleber. Both Hans 
Beimler, the leading German politico, and Louis Schuster, commissar 
of the Thaelmann battalion, were killed at the front during the 
fighting. Albert Denz, a German Communist, became XI Brigade 
commissar. Longo, who had filled the post of XII Brigade commissar, 
reassumed his role as number two man in the overall Brigade political 
hierarchy with the title of inspector general of the Brigades while the 
German Gustav Regier filled the post of XII Brigade political com-
missar.4 
Phase two of the battle for Madrid opened on November 29 and 
lasted, with but brief respites, until the middle of January. The Na-
tionalist command hoped that by shifting the action away from the 
congestion of the immediate Madrid area the advantages of better 
organization, tactical maneuverability, and firepower, which had been 
so important in their earlier successes, would once again prove deci-
sive. The Nationalist thrusts followed one another in regular succes-
sion, swinging in ever wider arcs in the effort to outflank the capital's 
defenders. But the attackers were to be denied. For, as these events 
showed, the forces now defending Madrid were not the disorganized 
militia that had been handled so easily in the march toward the 
capital. The hardheaded Red army professionals, the Soviet tanks, 
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artillery and aviation under their direct command, and the Interna-
tional Brigades, also commanded by professionals, proved quite a 
different matter. 
The last and most powerful thrust of this second phase of the 
campaign came on January 3. The Madrid command threw the XI 
Brigade into the breach and, at the price of its virtual destruction as 
a fighting unit, it broke the momentum of the onslaught. 5 Meanwhile 
the XII and XIV Brigades were moved in and, supported by substan-
tial artillery and armor, brought the offensive to a halt. With this 
move, the Nationalist effort to envelop Madrid on the west ended. 6 
In all these battles the International Brigades played the major role. 
Viewed by the Madrid command as the most reliable troops at its 
disposal, the Internationals were consistently thrown into the most 
critical point of battle and, as consistently, absorbed the Nationalist 
blows at the price of extremely high casualties. Of the XI and XII 
Brigades, Pravda correspondent Koltsov wrote, "Both have fought 
incessantly for more than a month .... They have lost almost forty 
percent of their effectives."7 The Nationalists would try to take Ma-
drid again, from another direction, but for the present they, as well 
as their adversaries, needed time to lick their wounds, restore their 
strength, and gird themselves for future efforts. 
The third and final phase of the battle for Madrid opened on 
February 6. The Nationalists struck hard in a new attempt to envelop 
Madrid, this time to the east of the city. The assault broke the front 
wide open and, as usual, the Madrid command looked to the Interna-
tionals to save the day. The XII Brigade was rushed in first to blunt 
the thrust and the XI Brigade was ordered out of its rest quarters in 
Murcia. Despite the Loyalist command's efforts to contain the assault, 
the Nationalists succeeded in forcing a crossing of the Jarama River 
on the night of February 10 and rapidly extended themselves along 
its east bank. 
On February 12 the recently formed XV International Brigade 
moved into the battle. Its British and Dimitroff battalions arrived at 
the front that day and both were quickly decimated in the severe 
fighting that followed. The British occupied a ridge called, from then 
on, "suicide hill." When the battalion withdrew that night only some 
125 effectives remained of the 600 who had gone up in the morning. 
Most of the officers and political commissars had been killed or 
wounded. The Dimitroffs, too, paid a high price for their first day of 
combat, suffering some 350 casualties. 
The last of the International Brigades to enter the battle, the XIV, 
arrived on February 14. By that time the Nationalist offensive had lost 
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its momentum. Indeed, for the Nationalist the fourteenth was "el dia 
triste de la Jarama," the sad day which "extinguished totally the 
illusions of all who participated in the battle." Nationalist officers 
were impressed by the fighting capabilities displayed by their oppo-
nents. "The machine-gun and rifle fire is intense. The enemy fights 
with a tenacity unknown until now .... The Russian tanks appear 
constantly, firing machine-gun and cannon, and disappearing before 
anti-tank pieces can be used .... The numbers of our fallen is impres-
sive."8 
Not the least of the reasons for the Nationalist defeat was the 
expertise of the Soviet general Pavlov ("Pablo" in Spain) in directing 
the defense and especially in his tank actions which repeatedly 
smashed Nationalist drives. As the Spanish Communist commander 
Enrique Lister, who participated in the Jarama campaign, put it: 
"General Pablo was the true organizer of the Republican resistance 
during those days. . . . The role played by the tanks was at times 
decisive. Their rapid counter-attacks often broke the carefully pre-
pared enemy attacks." Of this the Soviet general Voronov, who de-
voted his talents to commanding the Loyalist artillery, recalled that 
during the Jarama fighting his colleague Pavlov said to him: "Destroy 
with your artillery the anti-tank guns and my tanks will give the 
enemy a blow like they never had. " 9 
Indeed the role of the Soviet-Comintern combine reached its high-
est level during that period. On February 15 the Madrid command 
carried through a reorganization of its forces in the Jarama area into 
four divisions and a tank corps. The XII and XIV International 
Brigades along with a Spanish brigade formed Division A com-
manded by General Walter (Swierczewski). Division B, composed of 
the XI and XV International Brigades and a Spanish brigade was 
commanded by General Gall (Galicz). A third division, all Spanish, 
was commanded by the Spanish Communist Lister, and the tank 
corps by the Soviet general Pavlov. Thus the Soviet-Communist com-
mand role in this army of the Jarama was almost complete, with two 
of the four divisions commanded by Comintern generals and com-
posed primarily of the International Brigades, a third division com-
manded by a Communist stalwart, and the tank corps commanded by 
a Soviet general. In addition, all units, International and Spanish, had 
Soviet advisers. The brunt of the fighting was borne by the Interna-
tional Brigades and the chief direction of the defense came from the 
Comintern-Soviet officers. 10 
Following the reorganization of its forces, the Madrid command, 
by then with a superiority of manpower in the area, sought to retake 
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the ground lost to the Nationalists. The major thrust of the counterat-
tack focused in the area of the Pingarron heights. Chosen to spearhead 
the attack was the recently arrived American battalion. This, their 
first taste of combat, proved to be yet another bloody debacle. Aerial 
and artillery preparation was weak and ineffective and the promised 
tank support failed to materialize. The Spanish battalion on the 
American flank moved out of its trenches on schedule only to be met 
by such a hail of enemy fire that the troops immediately returned to 
their positions. At that point the XV Brigade chief of staff, Lieutenant 
Colonel Klaus, ordered the Americans to attack. Battalion com-
mander Merriman, seeing that the heavy enemy fire would make the 
attack suicidal, contacted General Gall by telephone and attempted 
to explain the situation. Gall demanded that Merriman attack at once 
and, using one of his favorite expressions, "at all cost." At the same 
time, Springhall, the British political commissar, and Lieutenant Wat-
tis, a British officer attached to the Brigade staff, arrived at Mer-
riman's side with orders for the Americans to advance. 
Merriman then ordered the attack. As the men moved out they met 
the same deadly fire that had driven the Spaniards back. Many were 
hit the instant they left the trenches. Merriman was shot through the 
shoulder as he gave the signal to advance and Seacord, the recently 
appointed battalion adjutant, was killed. Seeing the massacre, a num-
ber of the Americans refused to leave the trenches until forced to do 
so at pistol point by Wattis. The untouched Nationalist machine 
gunners cut the poorly trained Americans down by the score. The 
attack stopped dead. The men, wounded and unwounded, remained 
pinned down behind whatever bit of cover they could find until the 
dark of night allowed them to crawl back to their trenches. At nine 
o'clock that night Morris Maken, who had survived for nine hours in 
no-man's-land and was the only officer in the battalion still alive and 
unwounded, found less than 120 men of the battalion who could 
answer roll call. Later counts showed some 120 killed and 175 hospi-
talized for wounds. Less than 125 effectives remained of the 400 men 
who had composed the battalion that morning. 11 
Following the debacle of February 27 the Madrid command aban-
doned its efforts to dislodge the Nationalists, and the dawn of Febru-
ary 28 broke cold, windy, and strangely quiet over the Jarama. The 
losses sustained by all four of the International Brigades that partic-
ipated in the Jarama fighting were extremely heavy. Many of the 
battalions suffered on the order of 75 percent casualties. Included 
among the killed and wounded were a high number of the Internation-
al's military and political cadres including Grebenaroff, commander 
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of the Dimitroff battalion, Wintringham, commander of the British 
battalion, Fort, commander of the 6 Fevrier battalion, Merriman, 
commander of the American battalion, Pacciardi, commander of the 
Garibaldi battalion, Rebiere, political commissar of the XI Brigade, 
Azzi, political commissar of the Garibaldi, and Galli, political com-
misar of 6 Fevrier battalion. 
Militarily the battles of the Jarama resulted in another inconclusive 
standoff between the opposing armies. The Nationalists had main-
tained their initiative in the war, had taken ground, and successfully 
held most of it. But they had failed to achieve the strategic goal of the 
operation, the envelopment of Madrid. The Loyalist had succeeded in 
containing the Nationalist drive, thereby ensuring Madrid's (and per-
haps Loyalist Spain's) continued existence. They had not, despite 
superiority in numbers and the large-scale assistance of the Interna-
tionals and the Soviets, been capable of launching an effective coun-
teroffensive or of retaking the lost ground. In the longer view, and in 
retrospect, the failure of the Nationalists to break Madrid's defenses 
at the Jarama signaled a decisive watershed in the war. Before that 
became clear, however, Madrid's defenders faced one more challenge. 
It came on March 8, when Mussolini's expeditionary force in Spain, 
the Corpo di Truppe Voluntarie (CTV), launched an offensive from 
the northeast toward Guadalajara. The plan envisioned the establish-
ment of contact between the Nationalist forces on the Jarama with the 
CTV, thus achieving what the Jarama offensive had failed to accom-
plish. The Madrid command reacted by committing the best of the 
units at its disposal to the new front, chief among which were the XI 
and XII International Brigades. 
Forward elements of both the XI and XII Brigades made initial 
contact with advancing Italian troops that morning. Heavy fighting 
ensued with the attacking forces making but little headway against 
stiff opposition from the Internationals. Meanwhile the Madrid com-
mand continued to commit all the troops it could muster to the sector. 
By March 11 the defensive line stood fairly firm and was supported 
by increasing numbers of reserves. The weather too came to the aid 
of the defenders when rain began falling and continued for several 
days. The mechanized units of the CTV bogged down in the mud 
while fog and overcast skies effectively deprived them of air cover. By 
March 13 the Italian offensive had clearly failed of its purpose and the 
CTV's commander, General Roatta, made clear to the Nationalist 
high command his desire to withdraw his forces and have them re-
placed by Spanish units. 
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At the same time the Madrid command began preparation for a 
counteroffensive. On March 14 General Ivanov, one of the Soviet 
officers who had participated in the Guadalajara fighting, spoke to the 
staff of the XI Brigade. In high good humor the general informed 
them that having stopped the Italian offensive, they would now strike 
a strong counterblow. Renn and Kahle looked at him in astonish-
ment. Calling him "Comrade General," Kahle said that the Brigade 
had not recovered from the past days of severe fighting. Nevertheless, 
said the general, the offensive would be made. 12 It began on March 
18 spearheaded by the XI and XII Brigades. Despite the general 
disorganization and demoralization of the CTV forces, however, the 
Loyalist offensive soon lost its momentum and within a few days the 
fighting virtually ended. The long and bloody siege against Madrid 
came to a close. 
Clearly, between November 1936 and March 1937 the defense of 
Madrid depended heavily on the efforts and the manpower of the 
International Brigades. If we take into consideration replacements 
and reinforcements, the number of International troops involved in 
the Madrid fighting by the end of December was in the vicinity of 
twelve thousand and must have reached between fifteen and twenty 
thousand by February. These units were consistently used as shock 
troops to be thrown in wherever the fighting was most intense and the 
situation most critical. The undeniably significant role of the Interna-
tionals in the defense of the Spanish capital led many to see the 
Brigades as the "saviors of Madrid." To take just two examples, 
the Italian Socialist Pietro Nenni, who was intimately involved in 
Spain at the time, wrote: "The contribution of the International 
Brigades was, without exaggeration, decisive." And the Amer-
ican journalist Louis Fischer, a close supporter of both the Brigades 
and the Loyalist cause, wrote of the Internationals: "They saved 
Madrid."13 
Others have objected to this view, feeling that it ignores the essen-
tial contribution of the Spaniards themselves in defending the capital. 
The point remains debatable. It seems safe to say, however, that while 
the Internationals did not, and probably could not have, defended 
Madrid alone, Madrid would not have been defended successfully 
without them. Thus, while giving due weight to the essential Spanish 
contribution, the role of the Internationals was probably decisive. But, 
in stressing the role of the Brigades, a larger and even more crucial 
point is often overlooked. That is that the Brigades were only one 
component of a larger, and even more surely decisive, effort in the 
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defense of the Spanish capital, namely, the multifaceted enterprise of 
the Soviet-Comintern organization. 
Following the battle of the Jarama and its immediate but much less 
sanguinary sequel in Guadalajara, the nature of the Spanish war 
changed. The Nationalists gave up on their effort to take Madrid and 
end the conflict quickly. Instead they settled down to building a large 
army composed chiefly of Spanish conscripts and, girding for the long 
war, shifted their main attention to conquering the northern prov-
inces. The Loyalist regime likewise concentrated on building a strong 
central government and a large People's Army based on conscription 
and under that government's authority. This meant an end to the 
heavy fighting in the central (Madrid) area (for several months at 
least) and, for the Internationals, a prolonged period of relative sur-
cease from major combat. 
It also meant a qualitative change in the relative importance of the 
Internationals in the war. With the development of an army of several 
hundred thousand men by the Loyalist regime, the participation of a 
few thousand foreigners as rank-and-file troops could no longer make 
a fundamental difference as it had earlier. In addition to the relative 
decrease in the military significance of the International Brigades, the 
actual number offoreign combatants steadily declined after the spring 
of 1937. This resulted from both the high casualty rates among the 
Internationals and from the decrease in the numbers of new men who 
could be recruited. That ready reservoir of political emigres and Com-
munist militants which had supplied the bulk of the early Internation-
als had been, by the spring of 1937, substantially exhausted. Once that 
limited resource had been drained it became more and more difficult 
to recruit men for the Brigades. No doubt also the reports of disillu-
sioned Brigade men who had managed to get out of Spain, the reports 
of the Communist terror, and the generally growing awareness that 
joining the Brigades was less a romantic adventure than a good way 
to die young played a part in reducing the numbers of men who might 
otherwise have been tempted to join. 
Both the relative and the absolute decline in the military signifi-
cance of the Internationals was clearly shown by the so-called Brunete 
offensive launched by the Loyalists in July 1937. Employing 50,000 
first-line troops organized into army corps and divisions, the offensive 
proved without doubt that the Loyalist regime had succeeded in 
creating a substantial army. Less encouraging, to some at least, the 
offensive had been designed chiefly by the Soviet military staff, and the 
command structure of the key combat units remained heavily Com-
munist and foreign. For example, the five International Brigades 
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which participated in the operation all served under Comintern divi-
sional commanders: the XIII and XV with General Gall's Fifteenth 
Division, the XII and CL 14 with General Kleber's Forty-fifth Division, 
and the XI with General Walter's Thirty-fifth Division. While the 
International Brigades continued to be among the best of the new 
People's Army's combat units they were clearly no longer so crucial 
to Loyalist military strength as before. The numerical weight of the 
International Brigades in the Brunete campaign, some 15,000 effec-
tives, amounted to only about a fourth of the total and even this figure 
included large numbers of Spaniards within their ranks. The progres-
sive filling of the ranks of the Brigades with Spaniards had in fact been 
going on for some time as the only way of replacing casualties. It was 
a process that could not help but alter fundamentally the nature of 
the Brigades. After Brunete, 60 to 70 percent of the XII Brigade were 
Spanish.15 The percentage was as great or greater in the XI and XIII 
Brigades. The process continued throughout the Brigades' sojourn in 
Spain and gradually transformed even the XIV and XV into predomi-
nantly Spanish units with a foreign command. "The XV Brigade is 
so diluted with Spanish soldiers that the Internationals are acting 
mostly as non-coms," wrote the American volunteer Voros during the 
Ebro campaign in 1938. The Brigades were rounding up every avail-
able man and putting them into the decimated combat units. They 
were "a pitiful lot ... men ruthlessly evicted from the hospitals, half-
healed ... unfit for battle; the sweepings of the military offices in the 
rear, soft and flabby." And, he continued, the few new recruits still 
trickling in from the United States and elsewhere were handed rifles 
and sent to the front with a week or two, if that, of training-"lambs 
offered up for the slaughter."16 
From the Brunete campaign to the end of the war, the main field 
of action shifted from the central (Madrid) area to the eastern (Ara-
gon) area. There the Loyalists launched three major offensives: the 
Aragon or Belchite-Quinto campaign of August-September 1937, the 
Teruel campaign of December 1937-January 1938, and the Ebro 
offensive of July 1938. Each followed a similar pattern: initial break-
through, stall, Nationalist counterattack, Loyalist retreat. None 
proved successful in the long run. While the International Brigades 
fought in all these campaigns, their military significance, in an army 
of 500,000 men, was strictly limited. 17 
7 Comintern Politics 
While the purely military role of the International Brigades 
became of progressively less consequence after the spring and summer 
of 1937, the political significance of the Brigades as an element in the 
Comintern's overall operation in Spain (and in the wider Popular 
Front strategy) continued to be seen as of the greatest importance. 
Thus the Communists sought to maintain the Brigades as a viable and 
reliable Comintern-controlled force within the framework of the Loy-
alist political-military structure. 
To succeed in this objective over the long run presented a greater 
challenge than it had during the earlier period when the Brigades had 
consisted almost entirely of disciplined and highly motivated party 
cadres, when most internal problems could easily be brushed aside in 
the first flush of enthusiasm, and when the Loyalist regime itself had 
little cohesion or authority. But to the Communists the effort was 
worthwhile, for from their perspective the Brigades offered a number 
of political assets and advantages which they would not willingly 
relinquish. 
For one thing, so long as the Brigades continued to exist as Comin-
tern controlled units, they remained a source of prestige, political 
leverage, and reliable military strength for the Communists within the 
Loyalist camp. The Communists made no secret of the pride they took 
in the military prowess of the Brigades and stressed from the begin-
ning the key role performed by the Brigades in setting an example of 
military organization, discipline, and efficiency for the Spaniards. 
That example, they held, had been largely responsible for the success-
ful creation of the Loyalist People's Army. 1 "The International Bri-
gades by their high technical qualifications and their discipline, have 
been one of the bases of this new Army," wrote Andre Marty. "This 
has been one of the essential services that the International Brigades 
have rendered the Spanish Republic .... The International Brigades 
... have been a living example of what must be done to win the war."2 
Franz Dahlem, leading German member of the Brigade commissariat, 
wrote: "The International Brigades exerted quite a considerable influ-
ence over the growth of the military and moral strength of the Spanish 
People's army .... They have maintained their character as the basic 
brigades of the People's army, its core.''3 The Brigade press empha-
sized this point repeatedly. The "immense prestige" and the "disci-
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pline on which they [the Brigades] were founded did much to help the 
remodeling of the army," claimed the Volunteer for Liberty. The 
Boletfn de Informacion pointed out how the Internationals had aided 
the Spaniards by their example of "discipline and the maximum ac-
quisition of military technique. " 4 
Comintern spokesmen continued to insist on the significance of the 
Brigades in the military sphere throughout their existence in Spain. 
Addressing himself to this question, Longo told a conference of politi-
cal commissars in August 1937, "The International Brigades have had 
a great role in the resistance. Now we must be the animators of the 
decisive victory."5 Similarly the Brigades' school for political com-
missars, as late as 1938, continued to instruct its charges that the 
Brigades yet had a crucial role to play: "To build the People's Army, 
to conquer all weaknesses, to aid the Spanish Popular Front. " 6 In this 
context, too, the possibility always existed that the Communists 
would see fit to take over the Loyalist regime completely by some type 
of coup d' etat. Two of the most knowledgeable students of the Span-
ish war have concluded that they could have done so at most any 
time. 7 Although never put to the test, had the Communists ever 
decided to do so, their control of the Brigades would have been a key 
element in their chances of success. 
The Communists saw the Brigades as much more than simply a 
reliable military and political force within the framework of Loyalist 
Spain, as important as that undoubtedly was. For the Brigades could 
and did serve a number of political purposes for the Comintern on a 
larger stage than Spain itself. One of the most important of these 
focused on the Brigades as representing the most outstanding exam-
ple, the embodiment in action, of that international and proletarian 
solidarity of which there had long been much talk but little visible 
evidence. The International Brigades, commented the Communist 
International, "represent the highest expression of international 
solidarity, of the anti-fascist united front and of proletarian honor, 
devotion and courage."8 The Brigades were, according to the Com-
munists, "the pride of the working class, the avant garde of combat 
... a symbol of antifascist unity ... the greatest and most active force 
of international solidarity ... the burning point of international poli-
tics."9 They represented the "highest expression, the most living wit-
ness of the solidarity of the labouring masses." They constituted "the 
highest testimony to international solidarity."10 The Spanish Com-
munists were equally unstinting in their praise of the Brigades, calling 
them a "living expression of international solidarity of the popular 
masses throughout the world." "The Comintern was proud," said 
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Mundo Obrero, "on counting many of its best militants on the bat-
tlefields of Spain."11 
The Communists recognized too the significant prestige and fever-
age that the Brigades brought to them not only in Spain but elsewhere. 
Numerous statements by leading Communist spokesmen attested to 
this attitude. "One of the greatest achievements that our party has 
ever made is the building of the Lincoln and Washington battalions 
of the International Brigades," declared Earl Browder. 12 The central 
committee of the United States party assured the American members 
of the Brigades, "Your heroic deeds ... have brought glory and honor 
to the working class .... Your name has become a symbol of heroism 
and inspiration to all of us at home." Maurice Thorez, leader of the 
French party, in referring to the overall Communist role in the Span-
ish war, stressed particularly the contribution of the party in having 
had "many of its best men" fight in the International Brigades.13 
Calling the Brigades an "International of steeled and disciplined revo-
lutionary fighters," British Communist chief Harry Pollitt said, "The 
comrades of the International Brigades, now covering itself with glory 
in Spain, are a real People's Army." Later, he declared, "The Spirit 
of the Anglo-American volunteers is an inspiration to the movement 
at home."14 The German party hierarch Franz Dahlem wrote: "The 
Communist International, the Communist Parties of Germany and 
Austria, as the Communist Parties of other countries, can justly be 
proud of their fighters in Spain. They have borne aloft the Party 
banner." "The International Brigades show in practice the high value 
of the International solidarity of the defenders of democracy and, 
thus, in all capitalist countries assist the growth of the anti-fascist 
People's Front,"15 claimed the Comintern's official publication. The 
Brigade Boletfn de Informacion agreed: "The International Brigades 
are a powerful lever for the creation of united international action, for 
the creation of the international People's Front. The unity between all 
anti-fascists is an accomplished fact in the International Brigades. The 
Brigades are a school for internationalism." The Communist Interna-
tional, once more stated: "The experience of the International Bri-
gade is above all of tremendous positive significance on the wide :field 
of the anti-Fascist struggle in all countries. The example of the ... 
Brigade must be an important step toward the unification of all anti-
Fascist forces for a similar struggle in other countries."16 
The Comintern also saw the Brigades as an instrument through 
which new members could be brought into the Communist parties. 
That would be accomplished directly through proselytization of non-
party men within the Brigades and indirectly through the enhanced 
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attraction of the party to a broad spectrum of persons because of its 
identification with the Brigades and the Loyalist cause in Spain. "I 
make the categoric statement," said Robert Minor, a leading United 
States party hierarch, "that the heroic fighting of the American boys 
in Spain, and the consequent interest and sympathy and pride awak-
ening among the American people are a major factor in the political 
life of this country."17 That the Communists made a continuous effort 
to proselytise nonparty men within the Brigades was clear from both 
the content of the Brigade press and from the policies followed by the 
political commissars. They approached this task for the most part, as 
befitted the general Popular Front orientation of the time, by con-
stantly emphasizing the correctness of Communist policy in Spain and 
elsewhere, by consistently representing the Comintern as the guiding 
light (and only trustworthy component) of antifascism and by re-
peated and unstinted praise and glorification of the Soviet Union. On 
this theme the United States party representative John Little, who had 
just returned from a visit to Spain, reported to a New York party 
convention on the American members of the Brigade: "Their fighting 
spirit, love for our Party, love for the Soviet Union have increased a 
hundredfold .... They want above everything else to continue to build 
our party." 18 
Another important view of the Brigades as seen from within the 
structure of the Comintern focused on their value as a forge from 
which would come "steeled and disciplined revolutionary fighters," 19 
cadres who would lead the party's troops in future battles throughout 
the world. On the battlefields of Spain, Longo told the men of the 
Brigades, "we have learned lessons that will serve us and our own 
peoples in the struggles in our own countries. We have been able to 
learn important political lessons."20 That these lessons were to be 
applied in other times and places was clear from the pledge taken by 
graduates of the XV Brigade officer training school. "We pledge an 
eternal fight against fascism wherever it may be found and in whatever 
guise it may hide; we pledge to the international working class that 
we will fulfill the trust they have placed in us."21 
Men who served in the Brigades were looked upon, said Marty, as 
"worthy members of the World Party of Bolsheviks. They are worthy 
sons of that Party which, formed and led by the greatest minds of our 
time, Lenin and Stalin, has overthrown the Old World ... All are 
worthy of that great Antifascist and Communist, Georgi Dimitroff." 
The Communist International opined, "The working class must 
understand what a treasure and what experience the fighters for free-
dom now returned from Spain bring with them, into what worthy 
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cadres of the movement these fighters have grown." The American 
party spokesman and sometimes political commissar in Spain Bill 
Lawrence wrote: "Our Party, though making terrific sacrifices [in 
Spain], is at the same time developing marvelous cadres."22 
In line with that attitude the Comintern hierarchy treated those 
party cadres who served in the International Brigades with special 
favor and granted them special recognition and opportunities for 
advancement within the party ranks. At a meeting of the politburo of 
the Communist party of the United States in November 1937, party 
chief Earl Browder introduced four men recently back from Spain: 
"The presence of these leading comrades is of special signficance for 
us," he said, "because they represent ... one ofthe greatest assets that 
our Party has .... The fact that these comrades are back with us now 
gives us an opportunity to show how much the Party appreciates such 
sterling, fundamental contributions." Browder then proposed that 
Steve Nelson, one of the four comrades present, be recommended for 
"co-option into the Central Committee of our Party."23 
Given the value of the Brigades in the eyes of the Communists it 
followed that they would make every effort to maintain the Brigades 
as an autonomous Comintern-controlled force. The effort to do so 
became a central theme for the Brigade political hierarchy throughout 
their sojourn in Spain. 
The nexus through which the Comintern exercised control over the 
internal affairs of the International Brigades was the Brigade general 
political commissariat. The formation and functioning of the political 
commissariat itself assured that its policies and operations meshed 
perfectly into the overall Comintern apparatus and policy in Spain. 
Just as the party controls the state apparatus in Communist countries 
by filling all key state posts with disciplined party members whose 
loyalty and duty remain first and last to the party, the Comintern 
ensured the political reliability of the Brigades by filling all key politi-
cal (and most military) posts with disciplined party members. Thus 
the Brigade political commissariat, composed entirely of Communist 
stalwarts, operated at all times under the discipline and authority of 
the Comintern. Indeed, it was for all practical purposes simply a 
direct extension of the Comintern itself. 24 
The Soviet-Comintern apparatus further ensured the reliability of 
the International Brigades by assigning numerous individuals of non-
Russian origin who had been living in the Soviet Union prior to the 
outbreak of war in Spain to military and political commands through-
out the Brigade structure. 25 Some of those so assigned were Soviet 
army officers while others were trained intelligence and espionage 
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operatives who were or had been used by Soviet military or Comintern 
intelligence apparatus in various parts of the world. For example, 
Wilhelm Bahnick, a German Communist, a graduate of the Moscow 
military-political school, and a member of one of the Comintern's 
apparats in Germany was assigned to the International Brigades. 
Victor Sukulov, a Latvian by birth, a Red army officer who worked 
in a Comintern espionage apparatus in Belgium and France in the 
1930s, served as captain in the International Brigades.26 
The Italian Communist Guido Picelli likewise arrived in Spain 
directly from the Soviet Union. Picelli was apparently something of 
a hero among Italian Communists for his actions inside Italy during 
the early 1920s prior to the full consolidation of the Fascist dictator-
ship. The Italian Communists in the International Brigades evidently 
expected great things of him and were bitterly disappointed when he 
was killed in action after only a month or two in Spain. 27 Italian party 
stalwarts Barontini, Raimondi, and Mallozzi also came to Spain di-
rectly from the Soviet Union. Barontini had left Italy for exile in 
France in 1931 at the orders ofthe party. Then, in 1933, he had gone 
to Moscow where he worked for the Comintern. On his arrival in 
Spain he was appointed political commissar of the Garibaldi battalion 
and later of the entire XII Brigade. The American Robert Merriman 
also came to Spain from the Soviet Union and, within a brief time, 
was placed in command of the American battalion. 28 
Another indication of the complete fusion between the Comintern 
and the Brigades was the way in which the hierarchs of the Brigades 
continued to operate quite openly in their capacity as Comintern 
representatives, not only inside Spain but elsewhere. An outstanding 
example of that occurred at the meeting between representatives of 
the Second and Third Internationals in June 1937 in Switzerland. 
Conspicuous among the five-man Comintern delegation were Longo 
and Dahlem, both high-ranking commissars of the International Bri-
gades.29 
That the Comintern considered its functionaries in the Brigades as 
remaining completely at the disposal of that organization was further 
demonstrated by the frequent shifting of Communist personnel from 
the Brigades to other party posts. An example of that interchangeabil-
ity was the high functionary who had played an important role in the 
formation and early development of the Brigades, Nicoletti. The party 
subsequently transferred Nicoletti from the International Brigades to 
Paris where he assumed the post of editor of the party publication 
La Voce degli ltaliani. 30 Likewise, the American David McKelvey 
White was withdrawn from the Brigades at the volition of the party 
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to be used in another capacity. Mter a brief tour in Spain the party 
ordered White out of the Brigades and back to New York where he 
set up a party front organization known as Friends of the Abraham 
Lincoln Brigade. 31 The American party also withdrew Bill Lawrence 
from the Brigades and assigned him to other duties in the United 
States.32 
The experience of the American John Gates offers another example 
of the commissariat's control over Brigade personnel. In the summer 
of 1937 the political commissariat of the International Brigades 
offered Gates the choice of remaining with the International Brigades 
in Spain or returning to the United States where he would be used in 
propaganda and fund-raising campaigns. Gates chose to remain and 
the commissariat appointed him political commissar of the American 
section at Albacete. Similarly, Auguste Lecouer, originally assigned 
to the International Brigades by the French party, was later pulled out 
of the Brigades and reassigned to party propaganda work in France. 33 
"In fact, the commissariat completely controlled Brigade personnel 
and, in the case of Communist cadres, the commissariat and the 
various Communist parties moved them in and out of the Brigades at 
will. 
Brigade members were also assigned to partisan, guerrilla, espio-
nage, and sabotage units as well as the police apparatus operated by 
Soviet and Comintern personnel in Spain. They were recruited as 
Soviet espionage agents to operate in areas having no relation to the 
Spanish war. Alexander Foote, for example, a member of the British 
battalion, returned under orders to England in Semptember 1938, 
ostensibly for the purpose of attending the Communist party congress 
in Birmingham. At that time the party leadership assigned him the 
duty of acting as a courier between Communist party headquarters in 
London and the command in the British battalion in Spain. Suddenly, 
however, he received new instructions to go to Geneva, Switzerland. 
Foote proceeded as instructed and soon found himself working in a 
Soviet espionage apparat for the Red army. 34 
A number of American Brigade men served in one of these catego-
ries. Robert Minor, active in a variety of capacities in Spain, recruited 
Americans from the Brigades to work directly for the Soviet mis-
sion.35 William Aalto, an American who served in one of the guerrilla 
units that were organized, trained, and controlled directly by the 
Soviet staff, later wrote an article in which he said, "In Spain, guerrilla 
warfare was organized under Soviet advice and according to Soviet 
principles. . . . Our Soviet military advisors in Spain brought us the 
principles of that science ... in our guerrilla schools, lessons from the 
Comintern Politics 97 
Red Army's experience were taught us, verbally and through Spanish 
translations of Red Army manuals."38 
The controversy within the Loyalist camp over the use of guerrilla 
warfare tactics offered a striking example of the way the Comintern 
apparatus bypassed the Loyalist government, as well as how it con-
trolled the International Brigades. In January 1937, while the XI 
Brigade was in rest quarters at Murcia, Renn received a visit from a 
representative of the Soviet military mission who spoke to him in 
strict confidence about the partisan work the Soviet experts wanted 
to organize. The object, according to the Russian, was to foster wide-
spread guerrilla activity in Nationalist territory. But, he continued, 
Largo Caballero opposed it. "We cannot, therefore, do it officially," 
he explained, "so we must organize it unofficially."37 The idea, then, 
was to enter the roughly one hundred and twenty men involved on 
the rolls of the XI Brigade so as to account for their presence in Spain. 
Renn, chief of staff of a military unit that claimed to be under the 
orders of the Spanish government, agreed to the request of a represen-
tative of a foreign power to contravene the policy of that government. 
The connection between Renn and the Soviet agent, a connection that 
completely short-circuited the Loyalist government, was the Comin-
tern to which they both owed their first allegiance and the Soviet 
Union, which was the true fatherland of both.38 
Also indicative of the close ties between the Brigade commissariat 
and the Soviet mission in Spain was the establishment of a Brigade 
historical commission. The American base commissar at Albacete, 
Bill Lawrence, informed Voros that, at the request of the Soviet 
military authorities in Moscow, the Comintern had ordered the for-
mation of such a historical commission in the Brigades and that 
Voros, on orders from the Comintern, was to be chief of the Anglo-
American section. Voros was then transferred to the political commis-
sariat of the Brigades where he began work on his new assignment. 39 
A further illustration that the Comintern and not the Loyalist 
government or its military staff controlled the Brigades concerned the 
authority exercised over the Brigade and its personnel by individuals 
who had no connection with that organization except through their 
position within the Comintern hierarchy. For example, Togliatti, the 
top Comintern figure in Spain, often appeared at Albacete where he 
consulted with the Brigade's political chieftains. Despite the fact that 
he had no official position or authority either within the Loyalist 
government or the International Brigades, the Brigade hierarchs rec-
ognized his authority.40 The role played by Prosper Moquet, a French 
Communist deputy, further illustrated the point. Moquet, who was 
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merely on a temporary tour of Spain and had no juridical relationship 
with either the International Brigades or the Spanish government, 
could and did pledge his word, along with that of Auguste Lecouer, 
that certain actions would or would not be taken by the political 
directorate of the Brigades.41 Likewise, Robert Minor, the representa-
tive of the United States party in Spain, with no official connection 
with the International Brigades nor the Loyalist government, exer-
cised authority over American Brigade men solely on the basis of his 
position in the Communist party. Voros, for example, carried instruc-
tions to Minor from the American party regarding the return to the 
United States of certain American party members from Spain. 42 
Another factor in the Comintern's ability both to maintain control 
of the internal affairs of the Brigades and to maintain their autonomy 
within the larger Loyalist framework was the nature of the military 
chain of command. The original International Brigade generals were 
either Red army officers or old Comintern stalwarts who, with the 
single exception of "Gomez" had served in the Red army. Further-
more, the Brigades and their military commanders operated under the 
watchful eyes and close direction of the Soviet military staff in Spain. 
All International Brigade commanders had Soviet army advisers on 
their staffs who represented the direct authority of the Soviet military 
mission in Spain. 43 And, finally, many of those same foreign Commu-
nists who originally commanded the International Brigades later 
commanded the Loyalist People's Army divisions of which the Inter-
national Brigades were component parts. 44 Thus, while the Interna-
tional Brigades were organizationally assimilated into the framework 
of the military structure of the People's Army, they continued to be 
under Communist military command, not only at the Brigade level 
but at the divisional level. 
That the Comintern, and not the Loyalist government, controlled 
the personnel and internal authority structure within the Interna-
tional Brigades can also be seen in certain developments during the 
spring and summer of 1937 when the Brigades were experiencing 
serious internal problems. The XIV Brigade, for example, suffered a 
severe morale and disciplinary breakdown in the wake of the Jarama 
fighting. Despite everything the officers and commissars could do, 
dissension, desertion, and drunkenness continued to plague the Bri-
gade until it came to resemble more "a band of savages" than an elite 
military unit. The Brigade newspaper, Le Soldat de Ia Republique, 
alluded to this state of affairs in an article condeming what it called 
the "malcontent." "An antifascist soldier," it declared, "cannot be a 
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malcontent. The volunteers for liberty condemn absolutely the bad 
comrade who is never content."45 
One reason for this state of affairs was that following the elevation 
of General Walter to a division command, Colonel Putz, a former 
batallion commander, became commander of the XIV Brigade. Putz, 
well thought of by his officers and men, had proved himself a compe-
tent and courageous combat commander. But, as a non-Communist, 
he did not wield the intrinsic political authority that, in the Interna-
tional Brigades, was the ultimate sanction behind the authority of the 
military commanders. 
The Albacete directorate soon took steps to alter the situation by 
placing a staunch party stalwart in command and by reinforcing both 
military and commissar staffs with reliable Communists. On April 22 
Le Soldat de Ia Republique announced the assumption of command 
by Colonel Jules Dumont. Putz was posted first to Walter's divisional 
staff and then to command of a Basque division in the northern zone, 
thus being completely removed from the International Brigade com-
mand structure. 46 
With Dumont's assumption of command of the Brigade, his French 
party colleague Marcel Sagnier took command of the Commune de 
Paris battalion. The French Communist Vittori, a longtime activist in 
the French Communist party, assumed the post of Brigade commis-
sar.47 
Dumont, a longtime Communist activist with strong roots in the 
French party, immediately instituted a severe disciplinary regime in 
the XIV Brigade. The troops were informed that a "pioneer com-
pany" was being formed and that all who continued to indulge in 
drunkenness and undisciplined behavior would be assigned to it. Its 
purpose was "reeducation" and when the first group selected for this 
discipline company were mustered, they were told that only after their 
reeducation was obvious would they be returned to their units. They 
were also reminded that a military prison existed for incorrigibles. But 
discipline companies and guardhouses were not the ultimate sanction 
for indiscipline. During this period the firing squad was introduced as 
an instrument for the punishment of serious cases. 48 
This draconian disciplinary regime was not limited to the XIV 
Brigade but was in line with the general policy laid down by the 
Albacete commissariat. The commissariat's demand for "ruthless ac-
tion," including executions, against indiscipline in the International 
Brigades brought a political crisis in the British battalion where both 
battalion commander Copeman and political commissar Aitken op-
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posed the implementation of such severe measures. Disturbed at hear-
ing that death sentences were being carried out in other Brigade units, 
Copeman felt not only that such measures were unnecessary and 
wrong but that any such actions in the British battalion would likely 
provoke mutiny.49 These disputes brought a thorough shakeup in the 
political hierarchy of the battalion in May 1937. Springhall, who had 
been British commissar on the Brigade staff, and Peter Kerrigan, 
battalion commissar, were both recalled to England. The British 
Communist party replaced them with three new party stalwarts, Wil-
liam Paynter, who became British base commissar at Albacete, Bert 
Williams, who assumed the post of battalion commissar, and Walter 
Tapsell, ex-circulation manager for the British Daily Worker. George 
Aitken, previously at battalion level, moved up to the Brigade political 
staff. 5o 
These changes sufficed to bring the difficulties under control tempo-
rarily, but a new crisis developed from the battalion's experience in 
the Brunete offensive in July. When, after having been withdrawn due 
to heavy casualties and general exhaustion, the British were ordered 
back to the front, the battalion balked. Political commissar Aitken 
finally convinced Brigade headquarters that a return to the lines was 
impossible. 51 But bitterness and recrimination flared. Battalion com-
missar Tapsell was arrested for making disparaging comments about 
the Brigade command. On hearing of this, battalion commander 
Copeman went to Brigade headquarters determined to secure Tap-
sell's release, telling his machine-gun commander to bring his guns 
and rescue him if he did not return within two hours. On his arrival 
at Brigade headquarters Copeman found that not only had Tapsell 
been arrested but that Cunningham, now attached to the Brigade staff, 
was being blamed for the failure. The Albacete commissariat, sup-
ported by certain of the British political commissars, 52 was again 
demanding the death penalty be imposed for indiscipline and leaving 
the lines during the battle. Tapsell, whose release Copeman secured, 
decided that only the party hierarchy in England could straighten out 
the political chaos within the battalion. He told Copeman that he 
should return to England with Tapsell so as to be available for the 
"inevitable political fight" that he expected. Copeman agreed. "I saw 
no reason why indiscriminate shooting of volunteers should be per-
mitted," he wrote. "The fight between us and the others would have 
to be settled." 
Tapsell, Copeman, and Cunningham did shortly return to England 
and a fierce argument before the politburo of the party ensued. Cun-
ningham became so alienated as a result of this affair that he never 
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returned to Spain and soon left the party. The politburo's decision was 
that Copeman and Tapsell were to return to Spain while the leaders 
of the British political commissariat, with the exception of William 
Rust, would remain in England. Feeling that this decision "amounted 
to a sentence on us," Tapsell and Copeman demanded, and got, a 
letter from British party secretary Pollitt, "assuring our authority 
while in Spain."53 This episode demonstrates clearly that such inter-
nal Brigade matters were seen as political issues within the Comintern 
and were dealt with and decided not by the Loyalist government but 
by the Communists themselves, acting through either the Albacete 
commissariat or the party hierarchies of the national contingents 
within the Brigades. 
Developments in the American battalion also demonstrated the 
point. Bitterness over the Pingarron massacre led to a protest delega-
tion going to Albacete and demanding that the contact be made with 
the American party at once. The battalion was in such bad shape that 
Brigade headquarters appointed a Belgian officer, Captain Van der 
Berghe, as temporary commander. In early March Martin Hourihan, 
an American of more or less undefined politics, became battalion 
commander by a sort of popular referendum on the part of the battal-
ion. Battalion commissar Stember became so unpopular that he was 
replaced in mid-March by David Jones, like Stember a Communist 
party man. Stember returned to the United States where the party 
propagandists soon began using him as a living example of the heroes 
of the Lincoln battalion on fund-raising tours. At about this time 
Captain Alan Johnson, an American, arrived on the scene. He had 
been involved in the organization of the original American recruits in 
New York and apparently came to Spain with authority to make 
changes in the command structure of the Lincoln battalion, for 
shortly after his arrival he replaced Hourihan and Jones with Oliver 
Law and Fred Lutz, both Communist party members. Shortly after 
this, Johnson went to Tarrazona de Ia Mancha where he assumed 
command of the recently established American training base. He 
remained in that position until the fall of 1938. Neither Johnson nor 
those he appointed to command in the battalion solved the problems 
however. 
The threat of an embarrassing scandal if word of the sad condition 
of the Americans leaked out spurred the party hierarchy in New York 
to dispatch a number of trusted cadres to Spain to fill the leadership 
vacuum. 54 One of them, Sandor Voros, an American of Hungarian 
descent who had long been active in the party, had volunteered to go 
to Spain earlier, but the party had refused to allow it. The policy was 
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to keep the experienced cadres at home where they were needed rather 
than to send them to Spain and possibly lose them. But several months 
later, Saul Mills, a member of the central committee of the Commu-
nist party in the United States, told Voros that the party now wanted 
him to go to Spain. The party, Mills confided to Voros, was in trouble 
over the Spanish imbroglio. All that glorious hero business that the 
Daily Worker was putting out was so much propaganda. The Ameri-
can comrades in Spain were completely demoralized and wanted to 
get out. Desertion was a serious problem. If the truth got out, there 
would be a tremendous scandal. The party was now sending some 
seasoned leaders over to try to get the Americans into shape. For a 
party functionary such a request was an order and Voros soon left for 
Spain. At about this same time the American party also sent party 
activist Steve Nelson to Spain and the Brigades. Shortly after his 
arrival Nelson, without previous service in or connection with the 
International Brigades, assumed the position of political commissar 
of the Lincoln battalion. Another American who was sent to Spain 
by the United States party and who assumed a ranking commissar 
post upon arrival was Young Communist League functionary Dave 
Doran. He ultimately replaced Nelson as XV Brigade commissar. 55 
The methods and mechanics by which the Comintem controlled 
the Brigades were also indicated by an episode involving the French 
party, the Albacete commissariat, and the XIII Brigade. In February 
1937 Auguste Lecouer, a French Communist activist, was ap-
proached by the French party about serving in the Brigades in Spain. 
The situation in the Brigades, the party spokesman informed Lecouer, 
was desperate. The high casualties of the preceding months and the 
subsequent demoralization was causing severe problems. Further-
more, the quality of those now being recruited left much to be desired. 
The Comintem had urgently ordered the French party to send more 
of its reliable cadres to the Brigades who would be capable offunction-
ing as political commissars. Lecouer and some sixty others were 
chosen. They assembled in Paris where Maurice Thorez, chief of the 
French party, spoke to them, explaining the need and what was 
expected of them in Spain. They arrived at Albacete on February 25.56 
Shortly after Lecouer's arrival Marty summoned him to his office. 
With Marty was a Pole, the political commissar of the XIII Brigade. 57 
The XIII Brigade was experiencing severe morale and disciplinary 
problems, said Marty. Lecouer was to select two assistants from 
among the French cadres who had come with him and proceed imme-
diately to assume the duties of political commissars in the XIII Bri-
gade. As always Marty blamed the failings and shortcomings in the 
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Brigades on traitors, spies, and agents provocateur. Thus, he informed 
Lecouer, a key part of the task of the new commissars was to root out 
these elements. 58 
Albacete also assigned a party writer, Alfred Kantorowicz, to the 
XIII Brigade as information officer. His purpose was to help raise 
morale by giving this Brigade (which did not share in the glory of the 
Madrid battles) some publicity. This he did by writing a series of 
articles on the history and martial exploits of the XIII which appeared 
serially in the International Brigade's official publication, Volunteer 
for Liberty. 59 Although Lecouer was later reassigned to other politi-
cal work by Marty, the commissariat continued to pick tested and 
reliable Communists to occupy the political commissar post in the 
XIII Brigade. In July 1937, for example, Blagoie Parovic, using the 
nom de guerre "Schmidt" in Spain, assumed that post. A member of 
the central committee of the Communist party of Yugoslavia since 
1934 and a party functionary since 1924, Parovic had long been 
engaged in conspiratorial work. In Spain he had gained a reputation 
in the party as an extremely reliable political commissar who fought 
"with all energy and determination against counter-revolutionary 
Trotskyists ... for the Bolshevik line of the party."60 These develop-
ments involving three of the International Brigades, the XIII, XIV, 
and XV, illustrate the fact that the Comintern consistently and effec-
tively used the agencies of the various national Communist parties 
and the Albacete commissariat to maintain its control over the inter-
nal structure and affairs of the Brigades. 
The Communists' proprietory attitude toward the Brigades and 
their determination thoroughly to dominate and control them was 
also clearly shown in the case of Pacciardi and the XII Brigade. The 
issues between Pacciardi and Albacete stemmed, in part, from their 
different conceptions of the origin, nature, and role of the Italian 
volunteers in Spain. Pacciardi held that the Garibaldi unit was 
founded on the charter of the Italian antifascist committee in Paris, 
and his conception centered on the Italian nature of the Garibaldi mili-
tary unit. The Communists, on the other hand, saw it differently. Longo 
took the position that the Garibaldi unit was, like all the International 
Brigades, an integral part of "a great political and military organiza-
tion," which was able to do what it did, including solving the prob-
lems of rapport with the Spanish government, only because of its 
international character. The prevalence of Communists in the Bri-
gades, their discipline and organization, and their international sup-
port, Longo held, were responsible for their success as compared to 
the other Italian efforts in Spain. Pacciardi, said Longo, was ap-
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pointed commander of the Garibaldis by the Albacete commissariat 
on the same basis and by the same authority as all other Brigade 
commanders and commissars and was subject to the same authority 
and discipline. 61 
During the spring and summer of 1937 the differences between 
Pacciardi and the Albacete hierarchy became progressively more pro-
nounced. Pacciardi's appointment of non-Communists to command 
positions and his generally independent attitude led to persistent criti-
cism of him by the Communist politicos. 62 The Communists accused 
Pacciardi of being a chronic critic of the conditions under which the 
unit was committed to battle and one who saw things only from his 
own point of view instead of taking into consideration the big picture. 
Also, said the Communists, he wanted to be the sole authority over 
the internal affairs of the Garibaldi Brigade, accepting no interference 
from the political commissariat at Albacete. They complained that 
Pacciardi surrounded himself with those who admired him, shunned 
the higher authority of the commissariat, and made a point of ap-
pointing non-Communists to his staff, a situation, they said, that 
represented an error in a unit composed in the great majority of 
Communists. Pacciardi was quite aware of the attitude of the political 
commissariat toward him. He informed the non-Communist officer 
Penchienati, soon after the latter's appointment as battalion com-
mander, of the political currents in the Brigade and told him that if 
he, Penchienati, had any trouble with the Communist politicos to 
come directly to him about it. 63 
The political tensions within the XII Brigade were exacerbated 
further by the outbreak of an internecine struggle within the ranks of 
the Loyalist camp and by repercussions of that on the Brigades. On 
May 3 the long-brewing enmity between the Anarchists and Commu-
nists flared into an open clash in Barcelona, and a state of hostilities, 
complete with machine guns clattering from rooftops, existed in the 
city until May 8. The real winners of the ftareup in Barcelona were 
the Communists who exploited the situation to engineer the fall of the 
Largo Caballero government and to carry out a severe repression 
against their political enemies in the Popular Front camp. Neither the 
Communists' hatred of the Anarchists nor their antipathy to Largo 
Caballero was anything new. They simply took advantage of the 
outbreak of open fighting in Barcelona to force a showdown and settle 
old scores. The Communists had, in fact, been angling to oust Largo 
Caballero for some time. They had assiduously used the fall of Malaga 
in February to try to discredit him and his regime but were successful 
only in forcing the resignation of his undersecretary for war. Largo 
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Caballero had grown progressively more suspicious of the way the 
Communists were taking control and, as a result, had become more 
truculent toward them. So far as the Barcelona affair went, he was 
unwilling to allow the type of wholesale repression of "uncontrolla-
bles" demanded by the Communists. The Communist attitude toward 
the Barcelona clash was that "Anarchist adventurers and provoca-
teurs, in accord with the Franquist espoinage agents, opened another 
war front at our backs." Using Largo Caballero's reluctance to crack 
down rigorously on the Anarchists as the reason for withdrawing 
their support, the party determined to force a cabinet crisis and oust 
him. As J6se Diaz of the CPS put it, "Either the government must 
impose order or we will have a new government." In support oftheir 
campaign against Largo Caballero the Communists launched a viru-
lent attack on him to the effect that he was an impediment to the war 
effort and, if not an outright traitor himself, was at least surrounded 
by and under the influence of traitorous elements. 
The Albacete commissariat followed the party line to the letter. As 
Longo himself put it: "Agents of Franco had infiltrated into the 
ministry, the general staff .... Largo Caballero, was under the influ-
ence of traitorous officers .... The reason for all this [lack of stem 
suppression of "uncontrollables" by the Largo Caballero government] 
was that the head of government himself-with some of his ministers 
and many of his collaborators of the central general staff-were par-
ticipating in the anti-Communist campaign ofthe Poumists and ofthe 
fifth column."64 
While the Communists were forcing the cabinet crisis that ousted 
Largo Caballero and replaced him with the more pliable Juan Negrin, 
the Soviet-Comintem police apparatus, operating independently of 
Loyalist government authority, arrested and incarcerated thousands 
and shot an unknown number in their secret prisons. 65 They also 
either murdered or expelled from Spain a number of foreigners who 
had been associated with Anarchist or POUM military units, or about 
whom the Communists had some suspicion as to their "reliability."66 
The Communist vendetta against what they more or less indiscrimi-
nately called Trotskyists, Franco or Gestapo agents, uncontrollables, 
or fifth columnists carried over, inevitably, into the International 
Brigades. In the period following the Barcelona rising the political 
commissars, following the direction of the Albacete commissariat, 
indoctrinated the troops in the Communist line that the affair repre-
sented an effort of traitors, fascists, and, above all, Trotskyists, to stab 
the Popular Front in the back and tum the country over to the 
enemy.67 
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The Brigade commissariat sent telegrams to the new premier, Ne-
grin, pledging the Brigades' loyalty to the new government. The 
Brigade press editorialized that the change in leadership was a result 
of Largo Caballero's failures. The commissars stressed the necessity 
for the Brigades to remain calm, maintain strict discipline, and be 
vigilant against provocateurs and Trotskyists in their own ranks. An 
Albacete directive warned Brigade men who had cause to be in Bar-
celona to secure a special identification document due to the "vigorous 
cleaning up of all undesirable and uncontrollable elements by govern-
ment authorities."68 
The Brigade commissariat also took the occasion to attempt a 
thorough purge of uncontrollables from the ranks of the Brigades. 
The repercussions of that policy were felt primarily in the Garibaldi 
Brigade which was the only one with any substantial number of 
Anarchists (at least non-Spanish Anarchists) and the only one in 
which Anarchists were in any position to command. Pacciardi was 
determined that there should be no purge in the Garibaldi and also 
that the Garibaldi should take no part, on either side, in the Popular 
Front's internecine struggles. On May 5 Penchienati's battalion re-
ceived orders to proceed to Valencia, ostensibly to participate in a 
parade. Instead of parading, however, the units remained in the vicin-
ity of Valencia for several days and then moved to Tortosa, a coastal 
town about halfway between Valencia and Barcelona. A Spanish 
Communist officer who had come from Albacete then ordered the 
battalion to Barcelona. Concluding that his battalion was being or-
dered to Barcelona to be used in suppressing the Anarchists who were, 
as he put it, being persecuted because they disagreed with the Com-
munists, Penchienati refused to move his battalion until he received 
personal orders from Pacciardi whom he contacted by phone. Pac-
ciardi told Penchienati not to move until he got there. The Spanish 
officer in command threatened to arrest Penchienati and disarm his 
battalion. At that, Penchienati and his men returned to their quarters 
and set up machine guns, thus ending the threatened disarming of the 
battalion. Pacciardi soon arrived by automobile and had the officer in 
command arrested by order of General Lukacs. Penchienati and his 
battalion then rejoined the Brigade. 69 
Pacciardi's refusal to sanction the use of his troops in the suppres-
sion of "uncontrollables" or to modify his command structure and 
staff to "conform with recent events," as suggested by the Interna-
tional Brigade commissariat made the Communist politicos of the 
International Brigades more determined than ever to be rid of him. 
For them it was only a matter of waiting for the right moment. 
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Pacciardi on the other hand had by then become thoroughly disen-
chanted with the Communists and was determined that they should 
not completely usurp his authority in the Garibaldi Brigade. As he 
later put it, "I understood the political plots of the Communists, and 
I placed myself against them."70 
While these political currents smoldered within the XII Brigade, 
the new Negrin regime sought to consolidate its position and establish 
its image as a government of victory by quickly launching two sepa-
rate military offensives. One of these involved the XII Brigade in an 
attack on Huesca, a Nationalist bastion in Aragon. The decision of 
the Negrin government to engage in a military action in Aragon 
immediately after its accession to power and its use of International 
Brigade units in the operation seemed to many, including some Inter-
national Brigade men themselves, to be motivated by internal political 
rather than military considerations. 
The suspicion, distrust, and hostility of much of the population of 
Aragon and Catalonia toward the Loyalist regime was nothing new, 
and in much of the area the writ of the Valencia government ran more 
in theory than in practice. The Negrin regime, in which no Anarchist 
ministers participated and which came in the wake of the Barcelona 
affair, was even more suspect to the Anarchist-oriented population of 
Aragon than Largo Caballero's had been. Viewing the International 
Brigades as a Communist military force, much of the population of 
Aragon suspected the presence of the Brigades in their territory and 
feared that they were to be used as forces of public order. 71 
The attack on Huesca resulted in total failure and high casualties. 72 
During the campaign Pacciardi wrote to his divisional commander 
protesting any further waste of men in continuing to attack a position 
without sufficient strength to hope seriously to take it. His protest was 
ignored and the offensive went on. 73 
The Albacete directorate took advantage of the vacancies created 
by the Huesca casualties to strengthen the Communist hand in the 
Brigade. Two party stalwarts, Raimondi and Mallozzi, both of whom 
came to Spain via Moscow, replaced the two battalion commanders 
who had fallen at Huesca. Felice Platone, the party functionary whom 
the Albacete commissariat had earlier forced on Pacciardi, remained 
Brigade chief of staff, and the equally reliable Barontini continued in 
the post of Brigade political commissar. The Brigade command struc-
ture now stood, except for Pacciardi and Penchienati, staunchly Com-
munist.74 
Within ten days of the mauling taken by the Brigade at Huesca it 
was reinforced by some 800 untrained, unarmed, and even ununi-
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formed Spanish conscripts and on the following day orders arrived for 
the Brigade to proceed immediately to Madrid for further action (the 
upcoming Brunete offensive). This, said Pacciardi, was absurd. The 
battalions were disorganized and two of the three had lost their com-
manders. In addition, the task of assimilating, training, and equipping 
the large infusion of raw Spanish recruits into the ranks had not even 
begun. He therefore wrote to his division commander requesting a 
period for training and reorganization. But the answer was no: orders 
were orders. 75 
Pacciardi's open criticism of the Huesca operation and his subse-
quent questioning of the rapid commitment of his Brigade to more 
action further exacerbated the hostility toward him on the part of the 
Communist hierarchy. Open criticism was the most deadly of sins to 
the Communist politicos. Party discipline sealed tight the lips of the 
faithful. But for one who did not accept that discipline absolutely and 
who had the temerity to challenge openly the party's direction, the 
only answer was exorcism from the ranks of the International Bri-
gades. For one of Pacciardi's stature, however, this presented some-
thing of a problem. The events of July and the Brunete campaign led 
to a solution to the problem favorable to the Communists. 
During that offensive Pacciardi's long-smoldering dissatisfaction 
with both the Communist domination of the Brigade and the way in 
which the Brigade was being used flared into open confrontation. The 
Garibaldis, heavily laden with untrained Spanish recruits, suffered 
severely in the early phases of the Brunete campaign. Finally, faced 
with an order to launch one more attack which, he felt, would result 
in yet another senseless bloodbath, Pacciardi protested vehemently to 
General Kleber, and he followed that protest by a violent argument 
with the political commissar of the forty-fifth division during which 
he accused the commissar of trying to run the Brigade and of being 
a spy. 
Informed of this crisis in command, Longo hastened to Garibaldi 
headquarters, where he addressed the highly ruffied troops and, in an 
attempt to soothe them, countermanded the order for the advance. A 
few hours later Pacciardi wrote a letter of resignation. That night he 
changed his mind but refused to go to divisional headquarters despite 
the repeated orders of the Brigade political commissar, Barontini, to 
do so.76 
The XII Brigade became racked with dissension between those who 
supported Pacciardi and those who supported the commissariat. Pac-
ciardi took the position that the Garibladi Brigade had become an 
Italian unit in name only, that the few Italians left were so submerged 
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in the masses of Spanish troops composing the People's Army that 
militarily they were doing the Spaniards little good and that mean-
while the best cadres of Italian antifascism were being wantonly 
wasted. He proposed as a solution the retirement of the Italian volun-
teers for a period, the granting to them of leaves outside Spain if they 
so desired, and a new effort to recruit more men for a revitalized all 
Italian unit. 77 
The Albacete hierarchy by now was determined that Pacciardi 
must go, and the commissariat launched a concerted attack against 
him. The official organ of the XII Brigade, II Volontario della Liberto, 
published a series of articles written by Longo himself which, without 
specifically naming Pacciardi, attacked his position regarding the role 
of the foreign fighters. One of the articles entitled "Discipline in the 
Army Is Necessary for Victory," concluded: "It is necessary that all 
the combatants have the maximum faith in the superior command and 
especially in the top command. Those who command must obey with 
the maximum discipline and promptness . . . the password of our 
volunteers and of all combatants must be . . . discipline, discipline, 
discipline. " 78 Pacciardi, in the face of this impossible situation, de-
cided to present his case to the Italian exile committee in Paris. 
Pacciardi's departure presented the Communist politicos with a 
golden opportunity to take full control of the XII Brigade, an oppor-
tunity they were quick to exploit. Brigade commissar Barontini told 
his subordinate commissars that he now really commanded and that 
Penchienati (who had been left in interim command) counted for 
little. 79 The commissariat activated its maneuvers for ousting Pac-
ciardi permanently from command of the Garibaldis by informing the 
Spanish authorities that he would not be coming back to Spain and 
that a permanent replacement should be chosen. They planned to 
replace him with a reliable party stalwart, preferably Barontini. For 
once, however, the Communists failed to have their way. The Spanish 
authorities, led by war minister Prieto, refused to go along. This was 
all happening at a time when Prieto was taking a jaundiced view of 
the Communists' attempts to dominate the Loyalist Army and com-
misar system. As part of his efforts to curb the Communists, he sought 
to bring the International Brigades more fully under government 
control. Thus he refused to accept the appointment of a Communist 
politico as a commander of the XII Brigade. The immediate result was 
the continuation of Penchienati in the post, but now on a regular 
rather than an interim basis. 
When an angry Pacciardi returned to Spain, the Communists urged 
him to accept a promotion to division staff. He refused at first, saying 
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he had not come to Spain to make a military career but to lead an 
Italian unit. The Communists, knowing that Pacciardi had at his 
disposal a party organization and a newspaper in France through 
which he could greatly embarrass them and disrupt the always deli-
cate facade of Popular Front unity, and aware of the deep cleavages 
within the XII Brigade, did not want him to leave Spain nursing a 
grudge against them. Having achieved their purpose in removing him 
from any effective role in the International Brigades, they now hoped 
he could be bought off by a powerless post at division level. Pacciardi, 
at the urging of both Penchienati and Nenni, finally agreed to accept 
the post of vice commander of the division for the duration of the 
imminent Aragon offensive as a gesture to buttress the badly shaken 
unity and morale of the Garibaldi Brigade.80 In October, following 
the Aragon campaign, Pacciardi left Spain for good. 81 With his depar-
ture the Communists had successfully removed the only person within 
the International Brigades who could conceivably stand up to them 
or threaten their total control. 
While the Brigade political commissariat served as a Comintern 
control mechanism in the internal affairs of the Brigades, it also acted 
as both buffer to and connecting link with the Loyalist regime. It was 
thus the key to maintaining the political autonomy of the Brigades 
within that larger political-military structure. 
The Brigades' relationship to the Loyalist government in the begin-
ning had been tenuous. In fact Longo, with the aid of the Spanish 
Communist and Comintern apparatus in Spain, established the base 
at Albacete, and the Internationals were already there in force, before 
the Loyalist government was ever officially notified. 82 Only then did 
Longo, accompanied by Rene Rebiere, a Frenchman, and Stephen 
Wisniewski, a Pole, officially pay their respects and offer the services 
of the Internationals to the president of the Republic, Azafia, and the 
prime Ininister, Largo Caballero, in Madrid. The conversation be-
tween Longo's delegation and the two Spaniards amounted to little 
more than formal and meaningless niceties. Both Azafia and Largo 
Caballero were cool toward the delegation and showed little en-
thusiasm for the entire project of the foreign volunteers. 83 Largo 
Caballero, who had earlier turned down suggestions for the organiza-
tion of foreign units, now accepted the existence of the International 
Brigades, though without enthusiasm. The reason for his doing so was 
most likely that he was simply presented with a fait accompli and saw 
no way of avoiding it short of alienating the USSR and the Commu-
nists (both of whom he needed). 
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On October 17, 1936, Largo Caballero instructed Martinez Barrio, 
civil governor of the province of Albacete, to cooperate with the 
Comintern chiefs in the establishment of a base for the foreign troops. 
The political command of the Brigade, represented by the same three 
Comintern stalwarts, Longo, Rebiere, and Wisniewski, concluded a 
formal agreement with Martinez Barrio concerning their use of Al-
bacete and on October 22 the base officially opened. 84 All these for-
malities thus amounted to nothing more than an ex post facto 
recognition of things already done. 
All these public and official acts were done in the name of the 
international Popular Front in accordance with the policy of the 
Comintern that the specifically Communist role be muted as much as 
possible and that the Brigades appear as a spontaneous manifestation 
of antifascist solidarity. The Communists generally suffered from a 
logical dilemma on this point. They wanted credit for the Brigades as 
a Comintern-inspired and -directed unit but at the same time they 
needed to present the Brigades as an expression of a broad Popular 
Front antifascism. Their efforts to have it both ways produced some 
interesting mental gymnastics. For example, after arguing that the 
Brigades were not a Communist organization, Longo went on to insist 
that it was only the connection of the Brigades with the Comintern, 
the discipline, unity, and strength afforded by that connection, and the 
prevalence of Communist cadres in the Brigades which made the 
Brigades an effective organization and fighting force. 85 
The role of Pietro Nenni offers some insight into the nature of the 
relationship between the Brigade and the government. As leader of 
the Italian Socialist party, Nenni was an important figure in the 
overall Popular Front political picture. The fact that he and his party 
were affiliated with the Second International and at the same time firm 
supporters of the Popular Front program and of the Comintern policy 
in Spain made him uniquely valuable to the Communists. Nenni was 
perhaps the prime example of a well-recognized non-Communist pro-
letarian leader being intimately involved with and committed to the 
Comintern's policies and program in Spain. Being a Second Interna-
tional man also made Nenni more trusted by the Socialist leadership 
of the Spanish Popular Front who, in the persons of both Largo 
Caballero and Prieto, were less than completely convinced of the 
trustworthiness of the Communists. 
Nenni had been among the first foreigners to become actively en-
gaged in the Spanish war and he apparently enjoyed close relations 
with the Spanish Socialists. He had, naturally, been involved in the 
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negotiations of the Italian committee in Paris in creating the Italian 
legion, but he had no part in the origins or organization of the Interna-
tional Brigades. In fact, his first direct contact with the Brigades came 
only on November 25, 1936. On Nenni's first arrival at Albacete, 
Marty offered him the post of political commissar of the new XIII 
Brigade, but Nenni declined the honor. Unknown to Marty, Nenni 
already had in his pocket a letter from the Spanish authorities ap-
pointing him special commissar in charge ofliaison between the Inter-
national Brigades and the government. It was apparently in that 
capacity that he remained closely involved with, but not subject to the 
authority of, the Brigade political command. 86 
This arrangement seems to indicate several things: first, that the 
Loyalist government recognized that the Brigades were an essentially 
autonomous organization outside their direct control; second, that the 
Spanish leaders saw in Nenni a man who could, and did, work closely 
with the Communists and yet was not under Comintern discipline 
(and was thus more reliable from their point of view than anyone 
under that discipline could be); and third, that Nenni, despite his very 
close ties with the Comintern and his acceptance of their policies and 
direction, wanted to maintain the possibility of taking an independent 
stance and did not therefore want to place himself under Comintern 
authority by accepting a post in the hierarchy of the International 
Brigades. 
In the early stage of the war, autonomous, party-controlled military 
units were characteristic of the Popular Front's fighting forces. But 
as the Loyalist regime developed more centralized control and built 
the People's Army, the situation gradually changed. This change 
eventually put the Brigade hierarchy in a difficult position. For while 
the Communists were the strongest proponents of centralized control 
and a unified army they, at the same time, strongly resisted all efforts 
on the part of the government to exercise any real control over the 
internal affairs of the International Brigades or to absorb the Brigades 
into the People's Army. Thus the Communists had to talk as if they 
favored control of the Brigades by the Loyalist ministry of war and 
general staff. But at the same time they consistently resented and 
thwarted any attempt on the part of the government actually to 
implement and make such control effective. 
The ambiguity of their attitude toward this question can be seen in 
this statement by Longo: "The International Brigades were the ex-
pression of the world Popular Front, at the service and the orders of 
the Spanish Popular Front and nothing more. The safeguarding and 
defense of this position was the maximum preoccupation of all the 
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International volunteers, and was the essential mission, on the politi-
cal plane and in the relations with the government and the various 
Spanish political movements, of the Commissariat General of the 
International Brigades."87 Longo did not say that the Brigades were 
at the orders of the Loyalist government and military authorities. 
Using the standard Communist jargon of the day, Longo, in effect, 
said nothing more than that the Brigades were at the orders of the 
Comintern. For the Communists saw themselves and their policies as 
the only valid and reliable expression of the Popular Front, both 
international and Spanish. Indeed, Longo later harshly condemned 
the Loyalist authorities, both political and military, for their failure 
to implement fully the Communist program in general and the Bri-
gade commissariat's proposals in particular. He believed that the 
reason for this failure was the anti-Communism of the authorities. "It 
was because of parties and groups, not the direct action of the enemy, 
that the difficulties to the normal and rational development of the 
International Brigades were artificially created," he insisted. "They 
[the Spaniards) feared their [the Brigades] force and their prestige, 
just as they feared the force and prestige of the Spanish Communist 
Party. They opposed and impeded a large mobilization of the masses, 
the creation of a strong popular army, because they feared that all 
these favored the development of the influence of the Communist 
Party." And, he continued, "they risked the war against fascism for 
fear of favoring the Party which was the most tenacious sustainer of 
the war and which had sacrificed to it the best of its cadres and its 
militants." Thus Longo's attitude, typical of the Communists in gen-
eral, was that only those Spaniards who faithfully followed the Com-
munists' lead were really the Spanish Popular Front. All others were 
consigned to the category of traitors. "Naturally," he said, referring 
to the Loyalist government and military authorities, "the Commis-
sariat General and the command of the International Brigades could 
not close their eyes against the disgraceful actions of the fifth column 
and of Gestapo and Ovra agents. These people, in every way, in low 
and in high places tried to impede the fusion and the agreement 
between the Internationals and the Spaniards."88 
In stating that the essential mission of the Brigade political commis-
sariat was to ensure that the Brigades continued to represent the 
world and Spanish Popular Front vis-a-vis the Loyalist government, 
Longo was in effect underscoring the attitude of the Brigade director-
ate, and the Communists in general, that the Brigades were an autono-
mous political element and not simply a military unit within the 
regular framework of the Loyalist governmental or military structure. 
114 COMINTERN ARMY 
The very fact that the International Brigades continued to maintain 
their own political commissariat, separate and distinct from the 
commissariat of war of the Loyalist government, or any other 
governmental organ, clearly indicated their autonomous political na-
ture and status. Had the Brigade directorate been truly interested 
in a full assimilation of the Internationals into the Loyalist Peo-
ple's Army the disbandment of the Albacete political commissariat 
would have been an obvious move. No such thing was ever con-
templated. 
Both the determination of the Comintern to maintain its control 
over the Brigades and the relationship between the Brigade hierarchy 
and the Loyalist government were evident in the debate that arose 
over the question of the Brigades' role and status in the spring and 
summer of 1937. Following the heavy losses ofthe Jarama battle and 
the impossibility of replacing those losses with foreign recruits, 
Longo, speaking for the Brigade commissariat, proposed to the gov-
ernment that the Internationals be used more fully as cadres for the 
training of the large numbers of Spaniards being conscripted into the 
army. Significantly, the method for achieving this would not be the 
disbandment of the International Brigades as distinct units and the 
posting of the Internationals to regular units of the People's Army. 
Rather, the Brigade commissariat proposed that the number of Inter-
national Brigades be doubled so that the experience and capacity of 
the International cadres could be used to train and command large 
numbers of new Spanish conscripts. 
This approach had obvious advantages from the commissariat's 
point of view. It could be camouflaged as an effort to use more fully 
the talents of the International cadres and to assimilate the Brigades 
into the People's Army through the incorporation of Spaniards into 
the Brigades. In reality, it would be a method for increasing Commu-
nist influence within the Loyalist army while still retaining the essen-
tial political autonomy of the Brigades. The Spanish conscript troops 
who would fill these new Brigades would be trained, indoctrinated, 
and controlled by the Communist political and military hierarchy of 
the Brigades, and the Comintern would retain, and even expand, the 
benefits and advantages that accrued to it by having, in effect, its own 
army in Spain. 
That the non-Communist Spaniards in the Loyalist government 
and army saw through this camouflage no doubt accounted for their 
failure to implement the Brigade commissariat's proposal to double 
the number of International units. The Spaniards could not, for obvi-
ous reasons, say what they thought. They, after all, needed the Com-
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monists. Longo reported having had many discussions with Loyalist 
political and military authorities about the best way to use the Inter-
nationals. He complained that while the Spaniards generally ex-
pressed agreement in principle, they never followed through in 
practice. 89 Thus the Brigade chiefs were thwarted in their desire to 
expand their role and influence much beyond the original five Interna-
tional Brigades. The Brigade commissariat did succeed, however, in 
maintaining the essential autonomy of the Brigades and in filling the 
steadily shrinking ranks of the Internationals with Spanish recruits. 
These recruits, commanded, trained, and politically indoctrinated by 
the International cadres, made possible the continued existence of the 
five International Brigades and thus of a Comintern-controlled army 
in Spain. 
The commissariat's success in maintaining the International Bri-
gades as a reliable Communist force as the number of foreigners 
dwindled was closely correlated with their success in training and 
indoctrinating the ever-increasing numbers of Spanish conscripts 
within their ranks. Marty, referring to this, called the Brigades "an 
immense anti-fascist school" in which the Spaniards would be turned 
into thoroughly indoctrinated antifascists. Dahlem called it "the most 
important question of the internal life of the Brigades."90 In an article 
in the Brigade Boletfn de Informacion, Commissar Inspector Longo 
set forth the problem and the solution. The new developments, he 
said, created several new problems for their military and political 
work. Admitting that some among the Internationals were beginning 
to doubt that the Brigades could any longer function in their old 
capacity as shock brigades due to the influx of Spanish recruits, he 
said this attitude was incorrect. To the contrary, "It must be the task 
of the veteran cadres, both military and political, to train, mold, 
discipline the new recruits." These new tasks clearly presented new 
problems. When the International Brigades were "mainly composed 
of comrades who had had a life of militancy behind them, the task of 
the military and political command was fairly easy .... Revolutionary 
consciousness, the spirit of sacrifice of our volunteers was largely 
sufficient to write glorious pages." Now the problems were more 
difficult. The most important task of the International cadres now 
must be "to transform these people [Spanish recruits] into advanced 
and heroic combatants." This, he concluded, was both a "problem of 
enlightenment and political propaganda" and "a problem of military 
organization and education." Finally, he said that these new tasks 
required "a much higher standard of discipline than before."91 This 
became a permanent theme in the Brigade press. "The [new] troops 
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must always be prepared for combat; they must always be prepared 
politically for the operation. This is the permanent task of the com-
missars, commanders and soldiers," insisted II Garibaldino. Le Soldat 
de Ia Republique explained that the new Spanish recruits had little or 
no political understanding. Thus it was the duty of each veteran of the 
Brigade to instruct them "not only militarily but politically."92 
In line with the commissariat's efforts in this direction, the Brigades 
established Spanish sections in all their training schools, both military 
and political, in which special attention was given to the problems of 
creating effective cadres from among the Spanish recruits. These 
efforts brought about what Longo referred to as "a profound transfor-
mation ... in the work of our political commissars."93 In this way the 
International Brigades remained in existence and continued to serve 
the Comintern's purposes both as a reliable military and political 
force in Spain and as a potent propaganda instrument in the overall 
Popular Front policy. By 1938, for example, the XII Brigade had only 
some 20 percent Italian effectives to 80 percent Spanish. Yet the 
Brigade was still called the Garibaldi, was still commonly viewed as 
the Italian Brigade, was still effectively commanded by Italians and 
politically controlled by the Albacete commissariat. The same situa-
tion existed to a greater or lesser extent in all the International Bri-
gades. 
In its efforts to maintain the Brigades as an autonomous Comintern 
army, the Albacete directorate faced its most determined opponent in 
the person of the Loyalist minister of war, Prieto. Since assuming the 
post of war minister in the Negrin cabinet, Prieto had become increas-
ingly concerned at the ever-growing Communist predominance in 
both the army and the political commissar system. As a result he 
issued a number of orders designed to curb the Communists from 
further enhancing their position in these two highly critical organiza-
tions. As an integral part of his general efforts to decrease, or at least 
contain, Communist influence in the Popular Army, Prieto issued a 
decree in late September 1937 dealing in very specific terms with the 
International Brigades. The clear import of the decree was to begin 
the process of assimilating the Brigades into the People's Army and 
bringing them under full government control. 
The Communists could not overtly oppose the decree's purpose. 
After all, the party had been saying that that was what they wanted 
from the beginning. They therefore took the public position that they 
favored the objectives of the decree. Longo spoke the official word for 
the Brigade commissariat on the decree by reaffirming that "a regular 
army and unified command" are essential. Therefore, "we receive 
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with enthusiasm all those measures in the decree which tend to make 
our Brigades more and more intergral parts of the Spanish People's 
Army." Actually it fell like a bombshell among the Brigade politicos, 
for if energetically carried through it signaled the end of the Brigades 
as an autonomous Comintern army in Spain. The Communists pre-
tended to be shocked and insulted by the decree's use of previous 
legislation which dealt with the old "Tercio de Extranjeros," or Span-
ish foreign legion, as the legal basis of the Brigades' existence. The 
Italian party stalwart Calandrone called the decree "a punch in the 
eye for us." But, he continued, "we are in Spain to fight fascism and 
we continue to fight in spite of any decree which offends our dignity 
as antifascist and as men."94 
Still, a decree was one thing; putting it into effect, another. Only 
in the Garibaldi Brigade did it have any noticeable impact and even 
there the effect proved to be temporary. Prieto had intervened in the 
affairs of the Garibaldi Brigade following the replacement ofPacciardi 
as commander. Due to Prieto's stance the Brigade politicos had been 
forced to settle for Penchienati, another non-Communist in that post. 
Following the Aragon campaign in August 1937, Penchienati suffered 
an injury in an automobile accident, and the Brigade commissariat 
replaced him, on an interim basis, with Raimondi, a party stalwart. 
The commissariat now confidently expected to achieve its goal of a 
reliable commander of the Garibaldi Brigade. 
Once more Prieto thwarted them. In October he appointed Arturo 
Zanoni as commander of the Garibaldis. The Italian Zanoni had 
served prior to this time in a Spanish unit and had no previous 
connection with the International Brigades. Unlike Penchienati, how-
ever, he had political connections (with Prieto and Nenni) which 
made him loom as a real threat to Communist control of the XII 
Brigade. Furthermore, he apparently had instructions from Prieto to 
put energetically into effect the spirit of the recent decree assimilating 
the Internationals into the regular Loyalist military and political 
framework. 
The Communist chiefs who had maneuvered so ardously to oust 
Pacciardi were aghast. It was not the ends of the decree that they 
opposed, they said, but the speed with which Zanoni sought to imple-
ment them. Such drastic changes would disrupt the Brigade and lower 
its efficiency. Actually morale and efficiency in the Brigade could 
hardly have been lower than they already were. The Communists 
found fault with such inconsequential things as Zanoni's insistence on 
speaking Spanish to them instead of Italian and of his referring to the 
Brigade as the XII instead of the Garibaldi. All these faults were 
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merely rationalizations for their opposition to the obvious import of 
Prieto's decree and his intervention in Brigade affairs. Zanoni's deter-
mination to put the new policy into effect and his refusal to be domi-
nated by the Brigade commissariat made him the focus of the 
Communists' frustration. The attitude of the Brigade hierarchy 
showed clearly the falseness of their much-talked-of desire to make 
the Brigades a normal part of the People's Army.95 
In the long run, the Brigade commissariat had its way. Prieto's 
effort to curb Communist influence in the Popular Army and the 
commissar system inevitably brought the mobilization of all sectors 
of the Communist apparatus in Spain against him and his ultimate fall 
from office. 96 Following his departure from the government in April 
1938, the Communists once again held full sway in the military minis-
tries. Premier Negrin himself assumed the title of minister of defense, 
but he had three Communist undersecretaries for army, navy, and air 
force. The "crypto Communist," Alvarez del Vayo, returned as chief 
of the revivified commissariat of war in control of the political com-
missar system throughout the entire army and it too was thoroughly 
Communist-dominated. With these changes at the top the Brigade 
commissariat regained complete control of the Garibaldi Brigade and 
appointed two party stalwarts, Martino Martini and Emilio Suardi, 
commander and commissar respectively.97 Thus, despite the avowed 
Communist policy of establishing a regular army under centralized 
command and despite the attempts by Prieto to regularize the position 
of the International Brigades, which meant, in the final analysis, 
bringing them under the direct control of the government, the Bri-
gades continued to be, in fact, a Comintern-controlled military force 
and an integral part of that interlocking directorate which was the 
Communist apparatus in Spain. 
8 The Political Commissar 
The International Brigade political commissariat maintained 
its absolute dominance over the internal affairs of the Brigades 
through a variety of means including control of the Brigade press, 
censorship, control of appointments to military and political posts, 
and, ultimately, the Brigade police apparatus, which carried with it 
the power to imprison and execute without recourse to or review by 
higher authority. But within the spectrum of the commissariat's con-
trol mechanisms, nothing was more important than the political com-
missar system. 
A political commissar system functioned throughout the Loyalist 
People's Army from the date of its origins in late 1936 to the end of 
the war. The Communists had taken the lead and set the example in 
the use of political commissars in their own militia unit, the Fifth 
Regiment, from the beginning and were chiefly responsible for the 
adoption of the system by the Loyalist government. 1 The Loyalist 
government's political commissar system was, throughout the war, 
directed by the closest Communist collaborator in the Popular Front 
cabinet, Alvarez del Vayo, and the top echelons of the commissariat 
were always filled by Communist party cadres. 2 The Communists 
moreover took great pains to fill the ranks of the political commissars 
at all levels with reliable party members. So successful were they in 
doing so that both Largo Caballero and later Prieto attempted to 
reduce the virtual Communist monopoly on the commissar posts. 3 
The Communists denounced as treasonous all such efforts to bring the 
political commissariat and the appointment of political commissars 
under the control of the ministry of war. Dahlem's statement that 
"Caballero's struggle against the political commissars ... was a crime 
against the army and the country" epitomized the Communist atti-
tude. He continued, "The more subtle, but nonetheless ruinous policy 
operated by Prieto, of introducing the spirit of 'no politics' in the 
army, was one of the reasons why there were times when the People's 
Army failed." Marty too took up the cudgels on this subject, denounc-
ing Largo Caballero's attempts at "subjecting the political commis-
sars' appointment to strict rules and subject to the Minister ofWar."4 
The commissariat of war of the Loyalist government, while an 
element in the apparatus through which the Communists sought to 
control the People's Army, exercised no direct connection with or 
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control over the political commissariat and the commissar system of 
the International Brigades. The two systems had, however, the same 
general purpose and philosophical-political foundation. From the 
Communist point of view, military organization, discipline, and 
strength were indissolubly linked to, were indeed essentially a func-
tion of, their political counterparts. The Communists frequently com-
pared the Loyalist People's Army to the Soviet Red Army. Both were 
"essentially different from any imperialist army .... The special char-
acteristics of the Red Army are due, not to the abstract thinking of 
military idealists, but to the nature of the political struggle out of 
which they were born."5 
This view of the essentially political nature of Communist armies 
accounted for the Communists' prime emphasis on the role of the 
political commissar. "The International Brigades have never been 
nonpolitical," declared Marty. "Far from that. Not a unit has gone 
to the front without the political commissars being appointed. . . . It 
is here that the essential strength lies." Dahlem wrote: "Political work 
in the International Brigades was indissolubly connected with the 
military training and education of the men .... The fighting power ... 
depended to a considerable extent on the political work."8 
The Communists thus set the highest value on the work and effec-
tiveness of the political commissars, both within the International 
Brigades and in the People's Army in general, and never tired of 
heralding the message of the political commissars' key role in the 
army. Dolores lbarruri (La Pasionaria) summarized the Communists' 
glorification of the political commissars by calling them "the spirit 
and the heart of the army."7 Another leading Spanish Communist and 
sometime subcommissar of war, Enrique Castro Delgado, wrote of the 
commissars: "They have been the permanent animators of our sol-
diers .... Their continued work in the development of the political 
content of our army is the firmest guarantee of its maintaining its 
popular and revolutionary character."8 The leading Comintern figure, 
Vittorio Vidali, intimately associated with the commissar system, 
wrote: "The Commissar is the soul of a combat unit ... is always the 
best, the most intelligent, the most capable. " 9 Again, "The Commis-
sar, the political essence of the most conscious strata of fighting 
antifascist&, is the soul of this army. He has forged it into being."10 
Indeed, the Communists placed far greater emphasis on the role of 
the political commissar than on that of the military officer, whom they 
saw primarily as a technical specialist. As Marty put it: "It is the 
military commander who places the sentries, the cannon and the 
machine guns and gives the command to fire at the right moment. But 
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it is ... the political commissars upon which the political and orga-
nizational work falls. . . . The Commissars constitute the veritable 
backbone, the heart and soul of the army." Again, "The Commissars 
were the unshakable rock on which the magnificent International 
Brigades were built." The work of the political commissars, agreed 
Dahlem, "must secure the fulfillment of the military task. ... Com-
missars are the political soul of our Army; they inspire it with her-
oism, see to its ideological education .... Such an army as ours cannot 
function without Commissars."11 
Given the Communists' attitude toward the political commissars, 
it was perhaps inevitable that friction between the commissars and the 
military command often presented a problem. The work and role of 
the political commissar was ostensibly separate from and complemen-
tary to the technical role of the military officer. The relationship 
between the political commissar and the military commander as the 
system was ideally supposed to work received much attention from 
those concerned with the commissar system. Generally the official 
formula could be summed up in the statement: "The political commis-
sar was to be the first and best auxiliary of the Commander, to be his 
right hand ... without for a moment trying to decide military or-
ders."12 The commissar, however, subject to a separate chain of au-
thority, was essentially independent of the military command. Thus 
the commissar was to be free to "complete his functions without 
interference from the command."13 
Despite the effort to separate the roles and functions of the commis-
sar and the military officer, there were many areas of potential con-
flict. The interpretation of what constituted strictly military decisions 
or what involved political considerations could vary greatly. Not only 
that, but the commissars' duties entailed large areas that were in fact 
of a military nature and clearly overlapped the duties of the military 
officer. For example, commissars were instructed that their duties 
included such matters as arranging and checking the transport of 
troops, loading of troop convoys, choosing and preparing campsites, 
cooking and mess facilities, and general control of troops during 
movements. When his unit relieved another at the front, the commis-
sar was to check the state of the weapons and munitions and to ensure 
new supplies if needed. On taking an enemy position the commissar 
was to see that it was immediately fortified against possible counterat-
tack, to see that his troops did not waste time stripping and looting 
the enemy dead, and to make sure sentries were posted and relieved. 14 
The commissars also took the lead in such matters as sanitation and 
hygiene in their units. Lecturing the troops on the poor latrine facili-
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ties and generally poor sanitation situation in their unit, the commis-
sars of the British battalion went so far as to hold up the British army 
as an example of the way such matters should be handled. "We must 
copy the good points of the Capitalist army," they concluded.15 The 
commissars also carried on a continuous effort to promote general 
military efficiency by emphasizing the importance of care of weapons 
and equipment by the troops. This problem, and the commissars' 
attack on it, intensified with the introduction of Spanish conscript 
troops into the Brigades. For example, a front-page article, printed in 
II Garibaldino in capital letters, exhorted the soldiers to take care of 
their weapons, to learn to be "military technicians." "We must dedi-
cate ourselves to obtaining absolute dominance of the technique of 
war .... That every man in our Army shall be a true and efficient 
combatant!"16 
The most serious area of ambiguity and potential conflict between 
the commissar and the military officer, however, lay at the very heart 
of the matter of command: where and with whom did final authority 
reside. The ambiguity of the situation was indicated in an article in 
the Brigade press on the role of the political commissars which con-
cluded, "Only in special circumstances can the political commissar 
countermand the orders of the military commanders."17 
This problem was never really solved. Indeed it could not be. From 
the Communist point of view the commissar represented the best, the 
most reliable, the most politically conscious element in the army as 
well as the most direct representative of the party. 18 Thus they could 
never consent to anything that would limit the scope of the commis-
sar's role, nor could they accept the idea of his being placed under the 
authority of the military command. On the other hand, everyone 
recognized the necessity for a technically competent Inilitary com-
mand which must exercise authority in the area of technical military 
matters. In discussing the problem, Vidali wrote that the "relation-
ship between commissar and officer should be 50-50." This, of course, 
answered nothing. He went on to emphasize the key role of the 
political commissar in the People's Army and to say that the commis-
sar must participate fully in all phases of military operations, must 
indeed be "a good Inilitary chief himself."19 
The problem also received considerable attention in the instruc-
tional material for the International Brigades' training school for 
political commissars. Here, perhaps more clearly than anywhere else 
and despite the effort to smooth over the problem, the crux of the 
matter of ultimate command authority was apparent. "The Inilitary 
commander is the chief of the unit," read these instructions. But, 
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"once the plans of operation have been worked out and approved, if 
the command fails [to carry through or perform the orders] the com-
missar has the supreme duty . . . to take into his own hands the 
direction of the unit in the attack."20 The commissar, the instructions 
continued, must acquire at least a minimum understanding of the 
elements and weapons of war in order to perform his role in combat. 
This was necessary not only in the case where the commander fell 
during the operation, but to be able intelligently to check the work 
of the military commanders. "While the commissar does not place the 
machine guns it is clear that unless he has some military expertise he 
will not be able to suspect the faults committed in that area, that he 
will not be able to detect sabotage in cases where it happens." Com-
missars were "to check orders received by the military officers, verify 
that they are precisely transmitted and that the distribution of duties 
is fair." To the extent possible he should emphasize the lessons 
of previous battles and explain to the officers "the politico-strategic 
significance of the work at hand." The commissar was assured 
that his responsibility was not in the least dependent on circum-
stances or chance. Rather he was just as responsible as the military 
command for all aspects of the work of the unit. "The commissar 
is responsible, as much for political work as the military, as much 
for the morale of the troops as for their combat capacity and for 
the way in which the soldiers and the chiefs perform during the 
attack."21 
Given the extensive overlapping of authority and areas of compe-
tence between the commissars and the military officers, conflict be-
tween the two was frequent within the People's Army, especially 
where the commissar was a Communist (and the large majority of 
them were) and the military commander was not. General Vicente 
Rojo, chief of staff of the People's Army, wrote of "the abrasive 
interpretation of their [the commissars] function of control which 
went so far at times as to act as censors of the orders and dispositions 
of the military command. "22 
In the Communist-dominated International Brigades the areas of 
conflict were reduced since the vast majority of the military com-
manders were also Communists and thus subject to the same political 
authority as the commissars themselves. In the Brigades, the political 
authority of the commissariat was clearly supreme and thus, in fact, 
the commissar was the dominant partner. In cases where the military 
commander was also a Communist party member of stature, the 
commissar might well hesitate to challenge him, due to the comman-
der's political position rather than his military rank. 23 
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The political commissar system within the International Brigades 
operated under the direct authority of, indeed was simply an arm of, 
the Comintern-controlled Brigade political commissariat. Subject to 
that authority each of the separate Brigades had its own commissariat 
directed by a Brigade-level commissar. Directly subject to the Brigade 
commissars were the battalion and company commissars. 24 At what-
ever level of command, the commissar, representing the central Bri-
gade commissariat, carried the ultimate authority of the Comintern 
into the military units of the Brigades. As commissar inspector of the 
International Brigades, Longo made frequent tours of the various 
units of the Brigades at which time he gathered the commissars 
together for a report to him and for the purpose of informing them 
of any new policies or changes in old ones. He often appeared person-
ally when serious trouble arose in any of the Brigades and also made 
it a point to be in evidence at the front when the Brigades were in 
combat. He used members of his own staff as troubleshooters on 
occasion and posted reliable men from the headquarters staff to focal 
positions, both political and military, when he felt the need for a 
firmer grip on a given unit. The work of the commissariats of the 
individual Brigades and battalions thus proceeded under the watchful 
eye and close supervision of the Comintern hierarchy of the Bri-
gades.25 
The two most fundamental roles and duties of the commissars were 
those of politically conditioning the troops and maintaining discipline. 
The Brigade commissariat attached the highest priority to the job of 
insuring the "correct political orientation of the soldiers," a function 
"indissolubly connected with the military training and education."26 
Men being trained to become commissars were taught that the most 
important of their duties would be the ideological preparation of the 
troops. 27 Commissar Inspector Longo credited the "education and 
political propaganda" work of the commissars with making the Bri-
gades a "truly model unit," a "homogeneous bloc."28 In performing 
this role when their units were at the front, the commissars were to 
carry out "the most intensive activity in political explanation and 
educational work," to impress upon the troops "the comprehension 
of the necessity of sacrifice," and thus to create "an atmosphere in 
which the soldiers submit voluntarily to military discipline and to 
orders received."29 Commissars were to carry out the ideological 
preparation of the troops prior to combat by explaining the military, 
strategic, and political significance of the action to be undertaken, 
pointing out the problems to be overcome in carrying out the objec-
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tive, and clarifying the importance of the action in the context of the 
overall political-military situation. In carrying out this task the com-
missar was to bring out the lessons of previous military actions and 
to warn of the activity of the fifth column and the Trotskyists. The 
techniques to be used in accomplishing this work of ideological prepa-
ration included use of the Brigade press, tracts, political meetings, and 
"the mobilization of the party activists."30 
The Brigade commissariat also stressed the role of the commissar 
in directing propaganda toward the enemy. The most spectacular, or 
at least most widely publicized, effort of this sort occurred during the 
Guadalajara battle. The commissariat, knowing that Italian troops 
were on the other side of the lines and knowing from prisoners taken 
that the general level of morale among them was low, decided to 
launch a vigorous propaganda effort in the hope of encouraging mass 
surrender. Longo, his wife Estella, and his close aides, Camen, Calan-
drone, and Nicoletti all played a direct part in the effort. Rounding 
up all available typewriters, duplicating machines, and loudspeakers, 
they bombarded Mussolini's legions with both verbal and written 
propaganda, even dropping tons of leaflets behind the enemy lines. 
These messages urged surrender and promised good treatment and 
repatriation for those who took advantage of the offer.31 They also 
attempted to appeal to them politically. "Italian brothers, the Spanish 
people are fighting for their freedom. Desert the ranks of their ene-
mies! Come over to us! We will welcome you as comrades-in-arms."32 
The messages, both in leaflet and in spoken form, used the information 
gained from prisoners already taken and interrogated to touch the 
weak spots in the psychological armor of the enemy troops. Prisoners 
who were willing were used to speak to their comrades over the 
loudspeakers telling them of the friendly reception they could expect 
if they came over. 
The initiators of the propaganda effort claimed that it brought 
about significant results in weakening the enemy's will to fight and in 
spurring surrenders. 33 Whether or not it did in fact produce notice-
able results could not be proved. There were no mass surrenders and 
those surrenders that did occur, as well as the generally poor perfor-
mance of the Italian units, were quite likely due to their poor orga-
nization and morale and the failure of their mechanized units to stand 
up under the weather and other difficulties encountered. The one 
positive effect the propaganda effort had on inducing surrenders was 
probably in its assuring the enemy troops that they would not be shot 
if they did so. 
126 COMINTERN ARMY 
But while Guadalajara offered a unique opportunity for the Italians 
of the Brigades to use these techniques, the commissariat stressed the 
role of propaganda directed toward the enemy as a regular function 
of the political cominissars of all units. An article signed by Gallo 
(Longo) in the Volunteer for Liberty laid down the commissariat's 
guidelines on this subject. An outline of topics to be covered in this 
propaganda included the reading of war bulletins, why we fight, what 
happens within our lines as compared with theirs, why Hitler 
and Mussolini send troops to Spain, the inevitability of Loyalist 
victory, crimes committed by invading troops, and how we treat 
our prisoners. Calling for "loudspeakers at every front," the article 
stressed that this work should be carried on systematically and 
continuously.34 
The instructions to candidates at the Brigade school for political 
cominissars also stressed this function. Candidates learned that their 
duties would include finding out the type of troops their units were 
facing, their condition and morale, and then pitching the propaganda 
effort accordingly. The future commissars also learned that both loud-
speakers and written tracts were to be used in carrying out this duty 
and that they should use enemy deserters and prisoners, where possi-
ble, to talk to their comrades as a method of influencing them to 
surrender. The Brigade commissariat, calling this the "new artillery," 
showed the importance it attached to this whole operation by assign-
ing top politicos to develop it, including even, in 1938, Vittorio 
Vidali.35 
The commissar's role as political propagandist included much more 
than just the psychological preparation of his troops for battle and the 
direction of propaganda toward the enemy. At the very core of his 
ideological-political role was the duty to propagate the Communist 
point of view on all subjects. The Communists had in Spain, as else-
where, a unitary line which explained all things and which was, for 
the true believer, the only correct explanation. It was the absolute 
duty of every party member not only to accept the party line but to 
be "ardent defenders and propagandists of the correct policy of our 
Party." All communist party members and especially all political 
cominissars were expected to strive continuously to put across the 
"Bolshevik line of the Party" and to oppose all "faction mongers," a 
term elastic enough to include anyone who opposed that line. In the 
words of a top Brigade politico: "The concise line of the Communist 
Party ... was the guiding star in the political training of our Interna-
tional Brigades cadres and in improving the political morale of the 
battalions."36 
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The process of indoctrinating the troops began with the indoctrina-
tion of the commissars themselves. The interpretation of each military 
and political development in Spain was worked out by the top eche-
lons of the Albacete commissariat along with the best method of 
integrating the party line into the overall context of the war and of 
presenting it to the rank-and-file troops. An American Brigade mem-
ber later recalled being present at a meeting of the American commis-
sars where the leading United States party representative, Robert 
Minor, explained to the assembled commissars the party line on the 
fall of Santander. In the same vein, Le So/dat de Ia Repub/ique carried 
a report on a meeting of all Brigade commissars at which they dis-
cussed the topic of the new Negrin government.37 
Once the correct explanation had been decided upon, the commis-
sars at all levels of command had the duty of presenting it in a 
convincing way to the troops. They used the Brigade press and peri-
odic political meetings to do so. These political sessions were a regular 
feature of life in the Brigades and were considered highly important 
by the commissariat. As British Commissar Rust put it: "Morale and 
discipline was maintained and strengthened by organized political 
work." The American commissar Voros said that attendance at these 
meetings was compulsory. The commissars often used excerpts from 
official Comintern or Spanish Communist sources as the vehicle for 
conveying, through the Brigade press, the party's explanation of 
events to the troops. On the fall of Malaga, for example, the Brigade 
press printed the promulgation of the central committee of the Span-
ish party on the subject. 38 The Spanish party itself served chiefly as 
a convenient conduit for Comintern decisions and policies. 
The other side of the commissariat's control of the press and propa-
ganda output of the Brigades as a vehicle of political thought control 
was its strict censorship of all reading material not officially sanc-
tioned by the party. Few nonparty newspapers and periodicals, either 
Spanish or foreign, could be obtained by the men of the Brigades, and 
those that were allowed were strictly censored for news or interpreta-
tions that conflicted with the party line. An American attached to the 
staff of the Volunteer for Liberty had as one of his duties the censoring 
of all American publications prior to their distribution to the troops. 
His orders were to remove any material which indicated that a Loyal-
ist victory was not inevitable and any unfavorable references to the 
Soviet Union, the Comintern, or any Communist party. 39 
The actual effectiveness of the commissars as ideological mentors 
varied depending both on the quality and skill of the individual com-
missar and on the receptiveness of the people with whom he had to 
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deal. Political interest among most of the Internationals was high to 
begin with. A large majority were Communist party members who, 
for the most part, accepted the party line as propounded by the 
commissars without qualm or doubt. As Andre Marty put it: "The 
Commissars have relied on the workers who form the majority in the 
units, and among them on the mass of Socialists and Communists who 
now in reality form one united body."40 Even those in the Brigades 
who were not party members were not likely to find much to oppose 
in the line as propounded in Spain since it was, on the surface at least, 
oriented chiefly toward the general theme of the Popular Front and 
antifascist unity. 
When the commissar won the respect of the men by courage in 
action, hard work, and sincerity of purpose, and when he carried out 
his job of explanation skillfully, the troops largely accepted and even 
appreciated his efforts as performing a necessary function. Wintring-
ham wrote of the commissars: "For discipline they were more useful 
than any number of guard rooms," and through their meetings and 
talks and through their example they "strengthened and organized the 
morale, the political understanding, and determination that was the 
basis of discipline." He called theirs "the most valuable work in 
Spain." Gustav Regier, himself a commissar in the XII Brigade, saw 
the commissar's role as "a maid of all work, a democratic priest, an 
army doctor with his fingers always on the pulse of the Brigade." "The 
political commissar," wrote Dahlem, "is the guide, philosopher and 
friend of the men. He is always in the front line, and there are many 
cases when the command of units has been undertaken by the com-
missar." John Gates, the American Communist who became the chief 
commissar of the XV Brigade said: "The commissar was entrusted 
with the job of education .... While a military officer in combat, the 
commissar was a combination morale officer, chaplain, information 
and education officer in the rear."41 Interestingly, however, Gates 
later referred to "the troops under my command," showing, perhaps 
unconsciously, the ambiguity of the role of the commissar, even to the 
commissar himself. 42 
Many commissars, however, became filled with self-importance 
and, determined to use the authority granted them by the commis-
sariat, exhibited a haughtiness and arrogance toward both the troops 
and the military commanders which made them resented and, there-
fore, ineffective. Inevitably such arbitrary and unlimited power went 
to the heads of some. A commissar who gained a reputation as one 
who made use of his power to bully or threaten or who abused his 
authority to arrest, jail, or shoot men for breaches of discipline or 
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criticism quickly became the object of bitter hatred. Reflecting on his 
own experiences as XV Brigade commissar, the American John Gates 
admitted, "I used my ... authority to denounce and even jail men who 
dared to dispute my word." Another American, Sandor Voros, wrote 
of the death sentences imposed on Brigade men by the American 
commissar, Dave Doran. The most notorious case of a Brigade com-
missar's having men shot for "political dissidence" was Andre Marty 
himself, a proclivity that gained him a dreaded reputation in Spain. 43 
Other commissars warranted not hatred but merely contempt. 
They approached their job of political indoctrination or education in 
a pedantic way, gave "long, boring ... political lectures ... a school-
boy rehash of the propaganda poured out by the ton by the Commu-
nist Party."44 Such an approach quickly bored the rank and file of the 
troops. Showing awareness of this problem, the Albacete commis-
sariat warned that the commissars must guard against becoming bu-
reaucrats. If the commissar was to be successful in getting through to 
the men, he must "bear in mind the peculiarities of each battalion, 
each company, the characteristics of their members .... The work 
must be done from different angles, adopted to the mentality and the 
general political education of the soldiers."45 Some commissars, too, 
took a narrowly puritanical approach to conduct and discipline, 
frowning on such soldierly activities as hard drinking, free and easy 
use of four-letter words, and occasional visits to the local bordello. 
These, too, were looked upon with dismay and ridicule by the large 
number of men in the Brigades who made no remote claim to being 
"clean-cut kids" and could scarcely tolerate the lecturing of what they 
scorned as a "prissy clique of Y.C.L.ers."46 Commissars who spent 
too much time in Albacete, especially when their units were at the 
front, met with that particular contempt that front-line troops reserve 
for rear-echelon officers and soldiers with cushy office jobs. They were 
tagged by the men with the ironical sobriquets "comic-czars," and 
"rearguard commandos"47 and inevitably became the butt of doggerel 
poems and songs such as The Albacete Generals: 
On the front of Albacete 
Meet the generals of the rear, 
Oh! They fight the grandest battles 
Though the shells they never hear. 
For the wind is in their makeup. 
You can hear the generals say: 
"Yes, we're going to Jarama 
Maiiana or next day." ... 
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See them strolling in the evening 
To the grogshops for their wine 
For they are the brave defenders 
Of the Albacete line. 48 
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The second most important duty of the commissar, and one that 
related closely to his role as political mentor of the troops, was the 
maintenance of discipline. From the very beginning of the Spanish 
conflict, the necessity for discipline stood near the top on the Com-
munist's list of matters of importance. As early as July 22, 1936, the 
party press was demanding "Discipline, Hierarchy, Organization." A 
manifesto of the central committee of the Spanish party stressed the 
point that "in all organization discipline is the fundamental base of 
power and strength .... Only in the measure to which this discipline 
exists will it be possible to conquer an organized and disciplined 
enemy." In this spirit commanders and commissars of the Fifth Regi-
ment demanded a "discipline of steel" and at times exercised 
draconian measures to maintain it. Dolores lbarruri (La Pasionaria) 
stated the Communist view when she said, "The Commissar's duty 
is especially the creation in the new army of a new discipline, a higher 
discipline than the old." Longo wrote that the commissar had to be 
above all things "an apostle of the necessity of a firm, rigorous, iron 
discipline." Thus the Communists stressed both the absolute necessity 
of discipline and the central role of the political commissar in achiev-
ing and maintaining it.49 
In the matter of military discipline in the International Brigades, 
however, the Communists faced a rather special problem. The Com-
munist line, at least in the western "bourgeois democracies," had long 
been "antimilitary." Many of the young men from countries such as 
France, Great Britain, and the United States who joined the Interna-
tional Brigades arrived in Spain with naive illusions of becoming part 
of a "democratic army," where liberty, equality, and fraternity were 
the guiding principles and where soldiers, officers, and commissars 
shared the good and the bad as comrades in a spirit of "proletarian 
brotherhood." As the British Communist party spokesman and some-
time political commissar in Spain William Rust put it: "Some of the 
volunteers had rather extreme ideas as to what constituted democracy 
within an armed force, and thought that the International Brigade 
could be run by committees and elected officers like a trade union or 
political party. Some would have liked to elect a committee to exam-
ine the 'class content' of every order."50 
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In the earliest days of the Brigades, political commissars were 
sometimes elected by the men themselves, 51 a phenomenon often 
pointed to as indicative of a "democratic army." But this took place 
during the hectic period of organization as a matter of expediency 
rather than choice. The Brigade commissariat had not yet had time 
to organize itself sufficiently to undertake systematic appointments. 
Even so, commissar posts at Brigade and battalion level inevitably 
went to Communists of known reputation and reliability. 52 Once the 
Brigade commissariat had time to organize itself, all appointments to 
political commissar posts came under its authority and they were, 
almost without exception, filled by reliable Communist cadres. Writ-
ing of the problems of establishing discipline in the early days of the 
Brigades, Longo recalled that it was only with a certain amount of 
difficulty that the Brigade directorate imposed the concept that offi-
cers and commissars were appointed from above and that they were 
responsible only to their superiors and not the rank and file. This was 
accomplished primarily, he said, through the work of "the most quali-
fied Communists." Marty also gave credit to the Communist cadres 
who filled the commissar posts. They were, he declared, "the unshaka-
ble rock on which the magnificent International Brigades were built." 
Dahlem concurred: "The establishment of this type of political com-
missar is the great merit of the central political commissariat of the 
International Brigades. " 53 
Actually the problem of military discipline presented relatively few 
problems so long as the Brigades were composed overwhelmingly of 
seasoned and dedicated party activists. These men were accustomed 
to strict party discipline and the political commissars derived their 
authority among them on the basis of being the spokesmen of the 
party. Thus it was political discipline and authority deriving from the 
party and not military discipline deriving from the International Bri-
gades as a military unit which held the Brigades together in the 
earliest period. 
Recognizing the strength and value of party discipline as a method 
of enhancing and ensuring their firm control of the Brigades, the 
Communists maintained a regular party cell structure within each 
military unit. This assured them of a solid core of reliable party 
cadres, a disciplined and unified group that could be counted on to 
carry through the party position on any given question. This party 
structure offered a tighter and, for the party member, more rigid 
control mechanism than could possibly be exercised through any 
other form. Within the party cell unit the rank-and-file party member 
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could be told in a straightforward and authoritative way just what 
party policy was and what the party expected of him. The extra 
baggage of the Popular Front line could be dispensed with and prob-
lems could be dealt with frankly on their merits as seen by the party 
hierarchy. As Dahlem put it, "Many difficulties that arose out of the 
specific character of the International Brigades and of the influence 
of the inner political struggle for the life of the battalions were only 
able to be solved with the aid of the Party organizations which existed 
in the battalions from the very outset and the decisions of which were 
always carried through by the Communists."54 
While many of the more naive of the rank-and-file Internationals, 
especially those from the western democracies, continued to suffer 
under the delusion that blind obedience was unbefitting a "demo-
cratic, proletarian and revolutionary army," no such dewy-eyed non-
sense influenced the professional Communists who carried out 
Comintem policy in Spain and in the International Brigades. While 
Communist propaganda continued to speak of their "revolutionary" 
discipline as opposed to "bourgeois," "class," "medieval," or "capi-
talist" discipline, 55 the practical difference, so far as the individuals 
concerned, was impossible to discern. Indeed, the disciplinary tech-
niques used in the International Brigades proved a good deal harsher 
than in most "bourgeois" armies, and the period of romantic illusions 
about the International Brigades being something new and essentially 
different in the way of a military organization faded quickly. Many 
Brigade men became embittered by the contrast between the demo-
cratic, revolutionary fraternity of equals which they had expected an 
army run by Communists to be and what the International Brigades 
were in fact. Instead of comradely equality they found as great or 
greater rank differentiation as existed in "bourgeois" armies, includ-
ing not only higher pay for officers and commissars than for the rank 
and file, but officers' clubs from which the troops were strictly ex-
cluded, an officer's mess, and officer's uniforms which sharply 
differentiated them from the common soldier. Instead of comradely 
discussion of matters and a fraternal equalitarianism throughout all 
ranks and stations they found a stem discipline imposed from the top 
and often brutally enforced. 56 
Even in the International Brigade hospitals commissars worked 
zealously at their roles of ideological preparation and the maintenance 
of discipline. "The life of the hospital," wrote a volunteer nurse, "was 
carried out in an atmosphere of preparation for the front." Activities 
of the hospital commissars included the production of a "wall newspa-
per," the distribution of L 'H umanite, the organization of political and 
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"self-criticism" meetings, and song fests at which antifascist songs 
were sung in various languages. The political commissar of the hospi-
tal, she continued, was "a very sectarian German comrade" who 
insisted on rigid discipline, even though many of the comrades, "espe-
cially the French, did not like it."57 
The problem of maintaining a high level of discipline within the 
Brigades became progressively more difficult as the war dragged on, 
bringing the inevitable boredom, frustration, and disillusionment to 
many of the foreign volunteers as well as a decline in the numbers of 
hard-core party activists among them. Also, the ever-increasing num-
bers of Spanish recruits assigned to the Brigades, most of them nonpo-
litical conscripts, presented new disciplinary problems. On the 
problem of the Spanish conscripts, Commissar Inspector Longo 
wrote: "The veteran cadres, both military and political, must go all 
out to train, mold and discipline [the new recruits]. The task is not 
only a problem of enlightenment and political propaganda, but also 
a problem of military organization and a much higher standard of 
discipline than before." On the same problem, and indicative of the 
Communist view of the essentially political nature of military disci-
pline, Franz Dahlem wrote of the "considerable amount of political 
education required to impose military discipline on these [Spanish] 
troops. " 58 
An interesting approach to the problems of inculcating discipline, 
motivation, and military technique to the ever-increasing numbers of 
Spanish conscripts who, by 1938, far outnumbered foreign comba-
tants in all the International Brigades was the "Activist" program. 
This was an effort to foster the soldierly virtues by creating a special 
category, the ACtivist, which would attract the more highly motivated 
troops. They would then, as Activists, serve as examples and exhort-
ers to their less highly motivated comrades. In an article entitled 
"Soldados Activistas," Commissar Inspector Longo answered the 
question "What is an Activist," by saying, "The activist is the first and 
the best." He must be a "model combatant ... and ... an example 
for all his comrades .... He must be the most loyal collaborator of the 
officers and commissars." The organ of the XIV Brigade defined the 
role of the Activist this way: "The Activist must be in the forefront 
at all times in accomplishing whatever work there is, especially in 
fortification, vigilance and discipline. They must be also the leaders 
in combat, animating all their compaiieros of their unit. If there are 
comrades who are ignorant of what we fight for, it is the duty of the 
Activist to explain clearly .... To gain victory, we must all be Activ-
ists."59 
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In the face of all difficulties the commissars hammered away zeal-
ously at the task of inculcating and maintaining discipline. As early 
as February 1937, Le Soldat de Ia Republique was demanding that 
"all acts of indiscipline ... be dealt with in an exemplary fashion. We 
must have an army with discipline of iron ... both in the front and 
in the rear." In March 1937 Our Fight was strongly condemning 
indiscipline and insisting that "measures must be taken to punish the 
culprits and to eliminate bad elements .... We are confident that the 
political commissars will do their utmost to irradicate all tendencies 
to indiscipline and so carry on the political education of our comrades 
so as to make our battalion worthy fighters."60 
The Brigade press enthusiastically endorsed the decree on military 
discipline issued in June 1937 by the Loyalist government. "The 
necessity of assuring discipline within the army calls for a penal code 
of adequate sanctions against indiscipline," editorialized the organ of 
the XV Brigade when publishing the new code. Few would argue that 
"adequate sanctions" were not included in this one. Among the stipu-
lations of the code were: Any soldier who left his post, twenty years 
or death; anyone who fled in the face of the enemy, immediate execu-
tion; any soldier who struck an officer, twelve years or death; any 
soldier who disobeyed an order or failed to execute an order, twenty 
years or death; any of the above perpetrated at the front or in combat 
could be punished by death immediately by either military or political 
officers without recourse to higher authority. 61 
Along with this the commissars conducted a vigorous and continu-
ous campaign in the Brigade press designed to convince the troops 
that military discipline was not "unproletarian." One point in this 
effort involved the question of saluting officers. "A salute is not un-
democratic," the men were informed. "A salute is a sign that a com-
rade who has been an egocentric individual in private life has adjusted 
himselfto a collective way of getting things done." In a eulogy to the 
American commissar, Dave Doran, John Gates, new XV Brigade 
coinmissar, wrote: "We vets remember when it was thought bourgeois 
to salute an officer." Now, thanks to the work of such exemplary 
commissars as Doran, concluded Gates, we have learned better. 62 
Meanwhile the Brigade press campaign emphasizing discipline con-
tinued unabated, the commissariat insisting in the most unequivocal 
language that an army could not function without "iron discipline, 
absolute and blind obedience." The Brigade Boletfn de Informacion 
summarized the commissariat's attitude succinctly when it ran the 
slogan, boxed and in bold type, "Discipline is to the army what blood 
is to the body."63 
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Another important disciplinary function of the commissar was to 
act as a political police agent within his unit, to ferret out "fifth 
columnists," "Trotskyists," and "defeatists," terms broad enough to 
include anyone who proved recalcitrant, critical, undisciplined, or 
merely unenthusiastic. The official formula for this function was that 
"the political commissar must be always vigilant against and liquidate 
energetically all tendencies of treason in our ranks." The political 
commissars were to exercise "political vigilance against provocation" 
and to "maintain constant vigilance toward defeatist elements, 
Trotskyists and deserters."64 
That Trotskyism and desertion were lumped together illustrated 
the ambiguity in Communist thinking regarding discipline. They 
tended to make little or no distinction between political discipline and 
military discipline. This resulted in the tendency to see political dissi-
dence, "enemy agents," or Trotskyism behind all disciplinary prob-
lems and to react to all indiscipline as if it were politically inspired 
and treasonous. 
Typically, both Marty and Longo took the attitude that all signs of 
indiscipline within the Brigades were inspired by Trotskyists and fifth 
columnists. Marty saw Trotskyists lurking everywhere and was con-
vinced they were doing everything possible to "split and demoralize 
the International Brigades." That the work of these "provocateurs" 
did not succeed was due, claimed Longo, to the "quick and firm 
reaction by the political commissars." It was the political commissars, 
he continued, who overcame the disruptive attempts of "enemy 
agents" within the Brigades. 85 
9 Comintern Propaganda 
Instrument 
Among the most important roles played by the International 
Brigades within the Comintern's Popular Front strategy during the 
Spanish war was that of an extremely potent propaganda instrument: 
both as source and as symbol. As source, the voluminous propaganda 
output of the Brigades themselves consistently adhered to and rein-
forced Comintern policy in its specifically Spanish and in its larger 
international aspects. As symbol, the very existence of the Interna-
tionals in Spain made them a tremendously attractive propaganda 
vehicle that could be, and was, exploited to appeal to a number of 
different audiences. 
Within the Brigades themselves the commissariat's control of all 
press and propaganda activities was a vital element in carrying out its 
political and ideological function. Commissar Inspector Longo exer-
cised direct authority over that most potent instrument of control 
throughout the entire International Brigades. As early as December 
1936 the XII Brigade commissars were turning out mimeographed 
news sheets, Noi Passeremo for the Italians, Vers Ia Liberte for the 
French, and the Dombrowski for the Poles. On January 10, 1937, 
Longo ordered Alfred Kantorowicz, a German Communist writer, to 
set up and edit a newspaper for the German-speaking volunteers of 
the XI Brigade and to recruit someone to translate it into French. 
During the four months thereafter Kantorowicz organized and edited 
the German and French editions of the Volontaire de Ia Liberte from 
Valencia. On April 27 the operation was moved to Madrid at which 
time Kantorowicz was assigned to the XIII Brigade for the purpose 
of producing some publicity for that theretofore largely ignored unit. 
He subsequently produced a series of articles on the XIII Brigade 
which appeared in the Volunteer for Liberty. 1 
At a conference of political commissars held on the night of Febru-
ary 14, 1937, during the heat of the Jarama battle, Longo promulgated 
a new policy on press and propaganda operations within the Brigades. 
From that time forward every Brigade and battalion was to publish 
brief and frequent news bulletins that would reflect the immediate 
experiences and concerns of the troops. These bulletins would be, as 
Longo put it, "the instrument of military and political direction of the 
Commissariat. " 2 
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The various Brigade and battalion commissariats quickly acquired 
the equipment and personnel necessary to begin immediate publica-
tion of their "bulletins of information and orientation." The XV 
Brigade, for example, set up, during the long trench vigil following 
the Jarama battle, a mobile office in a large, camouflaged truck. On 
one side it carried its wall newspaper called L 'lnternationale. These 
wall newspapers were' common throughout the Brigades and were 
apparently highly thought of by those in charge of press operations. 
The XIV Brigade journal, Vers Ia Liberte, for example, ran a front-
page article in which "le journal mural" was said to have "immense 
utility" and to be "a necessity."3 Inside the truck a duplicating ma-
chine and three typewriters provided the hardware with which the 
staff turned out the Brigade's bulletin, a task which at that time in the 
XV Brigade had to be accomplished each day in three editions: the 
French Notre Combat, the English Our Fight, and the Spanish Nos 
Combats. It was also translated into Croat and Czech for the Slavic 
units of the Dimitroff battalion. 4 
The overall press and propaganda apparatus of the Brigades under-
went further systemization and elaboration at a conference of political 
commissars held shortly after the Jarama fighting. In addition to the 
bulletins of the various units there was now to be a centrally edited 
and published newspaper which would serve as the official organ of 
the commissariat. That publication, to be called the Volunteer for 
Liberty, would be published simultaneously in French, German, En-
glish, Italian, Polish, and Spanish. 5 
The Volunteer for Liberty, as the official organ of the Brigade 
commissariat, was carefully edited to ensure the correct applica-
tion of the party line to all subjects. The editorial staff met regu-
larly to discuss the treatment to be given various topics to ensure 
the proper integration of the party line into them. They were 
guided in ·this by a careful study of the positions taken and the in-
terpretations given by various official party publications and state-
ments.6 
In addition to the Volunteer for Liberty and the various individual 
unit publications, the commissariat published a centrally edited news 
bulletin, the Boletfn de Informaci{m de las Brigadas Internacionales, 
which appeared daily beginning in March 1937 in Spanish, French, 
Italian, German, Polish, Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, and English. 
The news bulletin normally consisted of from four to six mimeo-
graphea pages. The standard format featured news flashes from the 
fronts, Spanish news, international news, articles, and reproductions 
of commissariat orders or notices of changes in the Brigade commis-
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sariat's personnel. The news flashes from the front were almost invari-
ably optimistic and meaningless, and the Spanish and international 
news and articles always reflected the general party line, much of it 
being excerpts from Mundo Obrero, Izvestia, Pravda, and the British 
Daily Worker. In line with the heavily Spanish composition of the 
Brigades, the publication of the Boletfn de Informacion in non-Span-
ish languages ceased in December 1937. From that time each unit 
produced a similar bulletin in the Spanish language for which the 
commissariat continued to furnish news, information, and direction. 7 
The Brigade commissariat maintained a Madrid headquarters in a 
large building on the Calle Velasquez. From there emanated the large 
and varied press and propaganda output of the commissariat as well 
as political direction and editorial support for the agitation and propa-
ganda activities of the various sub units. A staff of some thirty-five in 
the Madrid headquarters published approximately 2,500 bulletins in 
eight languages each day. 8 Under Longo's overall supervision the 
editorial staff in Madrid was headed by his trusted lieutenants of the 
Italian Communist party, including Edoardo D'Onofrio and 
Giacomo Calandrone and Longo's wife, Teresa Noce ("Estella"). 
Representatives of the various nationalities in the Brigades were regu-
larly assigned to the editorial staff. For example, the English Commu-
nist and sometime Brigade political commissar Ralph Bates served as 
the editor of the English edition of the Volunteer for Liberty when it 
began publication in May 1937. The American Edwin Rolfe, late of 
the United States Daily Worker staff, took over that position in July 
1937 and was later succeeded by his assistant, the American Commu-
nist John Tisa. The last to occupy the editorship was the American 
party functionary Sandor Voros. 9 
The Brigade commissariat also demonstrated the high value it 
placed on propaganda by the publication of expensive productions 
designed for various audiences. One example, issued in magazine 
format, using high-priced glossy paper, a multicolored cover, several 
types of print, and many photographs, was entitled Nuestros Es-
paiioles. Aimed chiefly at the Spanish population, it glorified the role 
of the Yugoslav element in the International Brigade. The introduc-
tion reiterated the usual Popular Front propaganda line and used the 
International Brigades, and in particular the Yugoslav element, as the 
great example of the Popular Front in action. The strictly Communist 
nature of the message was quite overt. The cover displayed the ham-
mer and sickle emblem prominently. The publication was dedicated 
to Blagoye Parovic, whom it described as a member of the central 
cominittee of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, and contained a 
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full-page photograph of Georgi Dimitroff. Another page was devoted 
to glorification of Dimitroff and made the statement that "the Yugo-
slavs fight in Spain in the name of and under the banner of Comrade 
Dimitroff."10 
The Brigade commissariat's press and propaganda section also ed-
ited a number of yearbook or souvenir book publications which were 
highly propagandistic in nature. Longo, his wife Estella, and Calan-
drone collaborated on the production of one such publication for the 
XII Brigade called Garibaldini in Spagna. Following the battle of 
Brunete, Alfred Kantorowicz devoted himself, at the direction of 
Longo, to editing a book on the XIII Brigade which he called 
Tschapaiev: Das Batallion Der 21 Nationen. 11 Theodor Balk per-
formed the same task for the XIV Brigade in his La Quatorzieme, and 
the XV Brigade produced Nos Combats: Livre de Ia 15eme Brigade 
which also came out in an English version. 
The voluminous propaganda output of the Brigade commissariat 
unfailingly echoed the Comintern position in all respects. The Popular 
Front strategy required the Communists to pitch their propaganda 
toward "antifascist solidarity," the "defense of peace and democ-
racy," and "defense ofthe Republic" in Spain, and to avoid an overt 
or exclusive emphasis on Communism or "revolution." Thus, as was 
intended, Communist propaganda during that era, including that 
emanating from the International Brigades, seemed on the surface to 
be concerned only with democracy and antifascism. To the Commu-
nists, however, antifascism, for all practical purposes, meant pro-
Soviet Union, and democracy meant Communism. That this was 
indeed their underlying premise came through clearly, if perhaps 
unconsciously, in much of their propaganda output. For example, this 
statement from the Brigade Boletfn de Informacion: "The defense of 
the USSR is a fundamental duty of all anti-fascists .... The enemies 
of the USSR are the mortal enemies of all humanity .... The USSR 
is the invincible lever of peace, of real democracy, of progress and 
humanity throughout the entire world." 12 
Thus, despite the broad antifascist and Popular Front facade of the 
Brigade press output, it meshed smoothly in all respects with the 
larger Comintern propaganda effort. While this was so of its overall 
tone, it was especially clear in a number of specific areas in which the 
party line was consistently followed. Among these were a virulent and 
vociferous anti-Trotskyism; a consistent condemnation of all proletar-
ian or labor organizations that failed to follow the Comintern's lead; 
a 100 percent pro-Soviet Union and Comintern orientation (including 
an inordinate amount of coverage of the USSR for a press supposedly 
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directed to and concerned with Spain); consistent adherence to the 
Soviet-Comintern line that the Sino-Japanese conflict was an integral 
part of an international fascist conspiracy; and a never-failing accep-
tance of the Communist position on all internal Spanish affairs. This 
orientation was further shown (and reinforced) by the almost exclu-
sive use of Soviet and Comintern sources, the most prevalent of which 
were Pravda, Izvestia, Communist International, Imprecor, Mundo 
Obrero, Frente Rojo, L 'Humanite, and the Daily Worker. 
Perhaps the most conclusive of these specific areas was the Bri-
gade's treatment of Trotskyism. The Trotskyist hysteria, which was at 
that time running its grotesque and bloody course in the purges in the 
Soviet Union, cast its spell over the Comintern leadership and ap-
paratus. It became one of the main preoccupations of the Communists 
in Spain to liquidate Trotskyism. "One of the necessary conditions for 
the victory of our people must be the destruction, with an iron hand, 
of the Trotskyite traitors .... The Trotskyites are just as dangerous 
as the armies of fascism," declared a leading Communist spokesman 
in Spain. 13 
As interpreted by orthodox Stalinists of the time the term Trotsky-
ism came to include virtually anyone whose political persuasions were 
to the left of the party line. In Loyalist Spain that created something 
of a problem for the Communists because a substantial part of the 
population, especially the Anarchists and their large labor organiza-
tion, the CNT, were in fact more revolutionary than the Communists. 
The Communists worked around the problem by concentrating their 
anti-Trotskyist fire on a small left-deviationist Marxist party, the 
Partido Obrero Unificaci6n Marxista (POUM). They then invented a 
special denomination, the "uncontrollables," to cover those Anar-
chists and left-wing Socialists who opposed Communist policies. 
"Who are the enemies of the people?" asked Jose Diaz, chief of the 
Communist party of Spain. His answer: "Fascists, Trotskyists and 
uncontrollables." 14 
The International Brigade leadership marched in lockstep with the 
Comintern on this. The Brigade press zealously took up the chorus 
and, like the Communist press in general, raged mightily against the 
Trotskyists. An article by the German Communist writer and politi-
cal commissar in the XII Brigade Gustav Regier began by admitting 
that the purge trials in Russia were causing some differences of opin-
ion between the leaders of the Second International and the Comin-
tern. It then proceeded to defend the trials by saying, in effect, that 
since the USSR represented the socialist revolution it could not be 
wrong. "Every comrade must understand that the trial that is devel-
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oping in Moscow is part of the international fight against world 
fascism, the same fight as the International Brigades themselves are 
in. To disturb the unity of the Soviet state is to disturb the Popular 
Front of all Europe .... The people accused of being enemies of the 
Soviet Union are also enemies of our Brigades."15 In another rational-
ization of the purges in Russia the Brigade press declared that the 
"unmasking of the Trotskyist center in the USSR has shown that 
Trotskyism is an agent of German-Japanese fascism." The Trotsky-
ists, it warned, are "employing against the heroic fighters of Spain the 
same methods of combat which served the saboteurs, spies, and ter-
rorists condemned by the Moscow trials.'016 
A feature article entitled "Fascismo y Trotzkismo" in the official 
organ of the XIV Brigade offered an outstanding illustration not only 
of the anti-Trotskyist line but of a number of other basic Communist 
assumptions which regularly, ifless blatantly, found expression in the 
Brigade press. The first of these was that "Capitalism, caught in its 
contradictions, developed a new phase, fascism." Fascism was defined 
as "the rule of finance capital.'' Then, by an extremely convoluted 
logical jump, the reader was told that one of the methods by which 
this finance capital rule called fascism achieved its ends was-
Trotskyism! Thus, the principal allies offascism were the Trotskyists: 
"the bloodiest enemy of the working class" and the "chief support of 
fascism." Finally, the real reason for the necessity for proletarian 
unity and no talk of revolution in Spain until the war was won was 
"in order to take the succession of the capitalist regime which is in 
decomposition."17 
The strange logic by which the Trotskyists became, in Communist 
terminology, fascists, showed the basic attitude that anyone who op-
posed the Communits was, by definition, a fascist. This was apparent 
in a speech by Jose Diaz: "In their hate against the Soviet Union, 
against the Great Party of the Bolsheviks and against the Communist 
International they [the Trotskyists] show the hand of fascism.'' 18 
The Communist nature of the Brigade press and propaganda was 
also clear in the inordinate amount of space devoted to, and the 
absolute adulation of, the Soviet Union, Soviet leaders, and Soviet 
policies. Articles appeared regularly on topics concerning the Soviet 
Union. Typical of these was one entitled "Twenty Years Ago the 
People Took Power," which appeared in a special edition of the 
Boletfn de Informacion celebrating the anniversary of the Bolshevik 
revolution. The cover page featured a picture of a Soviet worker with 
hammer and sickle held high and a Red army soldier behind him. 
Others included "A Recent Stalin Speech," "Soviet Agriculture," 
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"Twenty Years Ago in the USSR," "Capitalist Maneuvers on the Eve 
of the Russian Revolution," and an essay on Lenin in which he is 
quoted with approval as saying, "The only criterion by which human 
conduct must guide itself is to discern if it aids or if it hinders the cause 
ofSocialism."19 Soviet military specialists discussed the campaigns in 
Spain, the statements of Litvinov, Molotov, and Voroshilov were 
quoted on various topics, and Stalin received the virtual deification 
which had become de rigueur among Communists. 20 
This sustained attention to the Soviet Union in the Brigade press 
continued in this sequence from the Boletfn de Informacion in Decem-
ber 1937: on the fourth of the month, an article on Sergei Kirov, 
"Hero of the Soviet People"; the fifth, John Strachey defending the 
Soviet purges; the seventh, "Soviet Socialism Comes of Age," by 
Sidney Webb; the eighth, portraits of the candidates in the Soviet 
elections; the ninth, another full-page coverage of the elections in 
Russia; and on the twelfth, a special edition devoted entirely to the 
Soviet elections and the "Stalin Constitution." 
The Brigade propaganda machine went into raptures over the 
Soviet elections. The theme was that these were the "only truly demo-
cratic elections ever held anywhere," and no opportunity was lost to 
compare them with the "sham elections" of the bourgeois democra-
cies. "The elections will be the demonstration of the fact that only 
Socialism, only the dictatorship of the proletariat can realize the real 
democracy for the workers," declared the Brigade press. Again, "The 
USSR is the most liberal and democratic country in the world."21 The 
Red army was consistently depicted as "the best guarantee for peace 
among peoples" and as a shining example for the Spanish People's 
Army.22 In a full-page spread on the Red army by Marcel Cachin, in 
which he glorified its strength and military virtues, he was able to 
discuss its origins without so much as mentioning Trotsky. "The Red 
Army was constituted," he declared, "by Lenin and Stalin with other 
old soldiers."23 
The same heavy emphasis was devoted to the Comintem and its 
leading figures and policies. The basic theme here was that the Comin-
tem and its leadership were the true originators and only staunch 
defenders of the Popular Front which in tum made them the only true 
and trustworthy leaders of antifascism. Georgi Dimitroff, chief of the 
Comintem, was regularly praised as the leading light of the world 
antifascist crusade and the moving spirit in the creation of the Inter-
national Brigades. There were also frequent articles dealing with other 
well-known Comintem leaders, their activities and statements. The 
German and French editions of the Boletfn de Informacion ran stories 
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on Ernst Thaelmann, leader of the KPD; the English-language edi-
tions often featured Earl Browder and Harry Pollitt, leaders of the 
American and British Communist parties. Frequently featured also 
was Maurice Thorez, chief French Communist. "It would be ungrate-
ful not to recognize and underline the forces represented by Maurice 
Thorez," declared the Brigade press. "He is the spiritual leader of the 
French people." The first several issues of the Brigade journal, Vers 
Ia Liberte, included the articles "Trois anniversaries-Lenin, Rosa 
Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht," a "Message from La Pasio-
naria," a reprint from L 'Humanite of an article by Maurice Thorez 
entitled "Huit mois de government de Front Populaire," and the 
article "Le 5 Regiment passe dans l'armee populaire," which included 
passages from speeches by Commandante Carlos (Vidali), Jose Diaz, 
La Pasionaria, and XII Brigade commissar Gustav Regler.24 
In the area of Spanish politics the Brigade press emphasized almost 
exclusively the writings and statements of leading Communists who, 
naturally, adhered strictly to the policy and position of the Comin-
tern. For example, every article in the July 25, 1937, issue of the 
Boletfn de Informacion came directly from leading Communist func-
tionaries and spokesmen. 
In many ways the Brigade press seemed almost a Comintern house 
organ. News, notes, and messages regularly appeared which dealt 
with strictly Comintern affairs and personalities that had nothing 
directly to do with Spain or the International Brigades. For example, 
when Paul Vaillant-Couturier died he was eulogized in the Brigade 
press, being identified as a "leading French Communist writer." A 
message of condolence to the French Communist party from Dimi-
troff, speaking for the executive committee of the Comintern, was 
carried in the Boletfn de Informacion. Another example of this ap-
peared in an article to the effect that "we fighters of the International 
Brigades thank the vanguard of the proletariat, the Comintern, for 
having expelled from its ranks such traitors as Doriot, Mastow, and 
Ruth Fischer."25 The Brigade press also frequently carried messages 
to the Brigades from the Communist parties of various countries and 
reported on the activities of the Communist parties at home. The 
English-language edition of the Volunteer for Liberty, for example, 
carried full coverage of the Congress ofthe British Communist party, 
in June 1937 at which D.F. Springhall, former political commissar of 
the British battalion, offered several resolutions condemning the Brit-
ish government and the British Labour party for their policy toward 
Spain and paid a glowing tribute to the British battalion, which, he 
declared, "has saved the honor of the British working class." The 
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Congress ended by sending greetings to the British, Irish, and Ameri-
can comrades in the Brigades. Similarly the Boletfn de Informacion 
carried a "Greeting to the International Brigades from the Young 
Communist League of France at their 9th Congress." It read, in part: 
"We greet all you young antifascist& [in the Brigades]. We greet the 
Young Communists among you at the head of which are found mem-
bers of our Central Committee: Richard, Guguet, Escure, Lafout, 
Hacke, and Clonet. "26 
The Brigade press consistently took the Comintern position regard-
ing the relations between the Comintern and the various European 
proletarian and labor organizations. This position was unfailingly 
hostile to the British Labour party leadership which was characteristi-
cally referred to as "reactionary." Labour party policy was described 
as "a shameful betrayal of the Spanish workers ... a stab in the back." 
The British should "take the line of the Soviet Union and the Popular 
Front."27 
The same echo of Comintern policy was apparent regarding the 
Second International and the International Federation of Trade 
Unions. The Communists wanted very much to get those two impor-
tant "proletarian" organizations to follow their lead and worked hard 
to achieve proletarian solidarity. "Unity between antifascist& all over 
the world is the only force that can and must put an end to the vast 
fascist conspiracy. Comrade Dimitroff has said that this unity is well 
on the way to becoming a fact .... The working class of the capitalist 
countries has almost liquidated the split provoked in the world move-
ment by social-democracy. . . . The existence of the great Socialist 
country [the USSR], powerful bulwark in the struggle by the world 
proletariat, bulwark for peace, liberty and progress, is the greatest 
factor for liquidating the split in the world movement."28 Not only 
did the Brigade press report extensively on the Comintern's efforts in 
this direction, but two of the Comintern representatives in its negotia-
tions with the Second International were the top Brigade politicos, 
Luigi Longo and Franz Dahlem. 29 
In April 1937 a significant delegation of European Socialist and 
Syndicalist leaders visited Spain and the International Brigades. 
Among them were Fritz Adler of the Second International and Louis 
Schevenels of the Federation of International Syndicalists. Later that 
year another important figure, Louis de Brouckere, chief of the Sec-
ond International, visited the Brigades. All these dignitaries received 
the full VIP treatment. 30 As a follow-up to these visits the Brigade 
commissariat dispatched the following messages that were published 
in the journal of the XIV Brigade: 
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We have been fighting as anti-fascists in Spain for six months 
in the columns of the International Brigades .... We ask you to 
hear our appeal for your help. 
Your authority ... in the II International means your voice 
will be heard, and we, anti-fascists, hope that those forces which 
could be realized in this moment of unity of international action 
will be utilized to aid Republican Spain.31 
The same issue carried a similar message to Adler and Schevenels: 
We have fond memories of your visit to our XIV Brigade in 
April ... We, who are giving our lives and our blood in the fight 
against fascism were proud to see you in the company of respon-
sible Communist comrades. It is for us the assurance that the 
union of all the workers in favor of Republican Spain is in the 
process of being realized. 
How good we felt to hear you, Adler, exalt our work of 
international solidarity in the name of your organization. How 
good we felt, Comrade Schevenels, to hear your assurance of 
the complete solidarity of the International Syndicalist Federa-
tion. But speed is essential in realizing common action of the 
Communist, Socialist and Syndicalist Internationals. . . . Re-
solutions in favor of Republican Spain are fine but we need 
action .... 
We are certain, Comrades Adler and Schevenels, that our 
appeal will be understood. 32 
The reluctance of the leadership of the non-Communist proletarian 
and labor organizations to "adhere to the unity line called for by 
Dimitroff'' led to frequent and often bitter condemnation by the Com-
intern, a position fully reflected in the Brigade press. 33 Some of these 
recriminations went so far as to imply that Trotskyism lurked behind 
any failure to toe the Comintern line. In an article significantly enti-
tled "Franco's Trotskyist Allies against International Solidarity," this 
implication was quite clear: "After the eloquent example of the Com-
munist International's demand for the common action of all workers 
organizations in favor of the Spanish people, when already it had done 
everything humanly possible, such as the sending of volunteers for the 
International Brigades ... and the creating of enthusiastic popular 
demonstrations in favor of Spain, none can deny that international 
solidarity does not exist." The article then goes on to condemn groups 
of Trotskyists in various countries as being "splitters of the workers" 
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and "disguised agents of fascism."34 The reader was left to draw the 
obvious conclusion. 
The Brigade's propaganda line on the Chinese-Japanese conflict, in 
complete conformity with the Comintern's, followed the rather 
strained interpretation that Japanese aggression in Asia, like fascist 
aggression in Spain, was an integral part of a worldwide fascist con-
spiracy.35 "Faced with the monolithic block of totalitarian states 
plotting with imperialist gold, faced with the bloody campaign of all 
warmongers, faced with fascist audacity, only a rigid union of all 
workers of the world ... can preserve liberty .... Pitting against that 
block the union of all the proletariat our victory ... is secure. " 36 Also 
emphasized were the key role of the Chinese Communist party and 
their Popular Front with the Chinese Nationalists and the interna-
tional working class's interest in the Asian conflict. 37 "In spite of the 
resistance of a series of leaders of the Second International and the 
reformist leaders of the trades unions, enormous masses have been 
mobilized in favor of Spain .... The Chinese people will find the same 
support." As to the International Brigade's own role toward the 
Chinese, the theme went: "We are aiding the Chinese People by direct 
action .... With our Spanish Comrades of the Popular Republican 
Army, we shall register further blows against Hitler and Mussolini. 
Each defeat for Hitler, Mussolini and Franco in Spain is, at the same 
time, a defeat for the Japanese bandits in China."38 
The Brigade press regularly took a vocal and partisan view of 
internal political affairs within Loyalist Spain, a view that always 
conformed perfectly with the Comintern line. This was true in the 
position on Trotskyism and the general implication that those ele-
ments within the Loyalist ranks who did not conform to Communist 
policies were "uncontrollables" and, in fact, traitors. 39 It was also true 
in the attitude taken on the necessity for unity, a unified army and 
command, military and civilian discipline, and "no revolution."40 The 
Brigade leaders and press did not hesitate openly to condemn or 
support Spanish government leaders and their policies. The Commu-
nist vendetta · against Largo Caballero, and later against Indalecio 
Prieto, was faithfully reflected in the Brigade press and propaganda. 
Andre Marty set the tone by saying that while Largo Caballero served 
a useful purpose for a while he "did not grow with the situation." The 
Volunteer for Liberty handled the replacement of Largo Caballero by 
Juan Negrin in what appeared on the surface to be a straight news 
story. The "objective facts" were arranged to justify the change in 
government as being a result of Largo Caballero's failures. The same 
issue carried the text of telegrams sent, in the name of the Intema-
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tional Brigades, by Luigi Longo to Negrin, Prieto, and Alvarez del 
Vayo, members of the new cabinet, pledging the enthusiastic support 
of the Brigades to the new government. Also, interestingly, the same 
issue carried a message from the "coordinating committee of the 
Socialist and Communist parties" ordering all their militants to re-
main calm and to follow the orders received directly from their re-
spective national committees during "any difficulties which the 
solution of the present crisis might provoke."41 
The undiluted Communist nature of Brigade propaganda was crys-
tal clear too in the training of political commissars. The study guide 
provided for instructional use in the Brigade school for commissars 
devoted itself, in large part, toward the political-ideological indoctri-
nation of the students. This indoctrination followed, in all respects, 
the Communist position. The first theme, for example, purported to 
cover the history of Spain. The emphasis, however, was on the fascist 
nature of the military pronunciamiento of July 1936 and in placing 
that event in the context of the "world fascist conspiracy." Fascism 
was defined as "the reaction of the most reactionary elements of 
finance capital." These elements were "preparing to conduct the im-
perialist war for a new partition of the world." Fascist methods for 
conquest were described as "collaboration with fascist forces and the 
bourgeoisie" in the country to be attacked. Trotskyism acted as an 
"agent of fascism" in this preparation by dividing the working class, 
and the POUM acted as the main Trotskyist element (and therefore 
fascist collaborator) in Popular Front Spain. To complete the picture 
of the war in Spain as an integral part of the fight against the "world 
fascist conspiracy," a connection was drawn between the war in 
Spain, the Sino-Japanese war, and the "fascist war against the USSR." 
Required readings for this theme included two articles by the secre-
tary of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitroff, excerpted from the Commu-
nist International, and one by Brigade chief Andre Marty. Thus the 
war in Spain was placed in the correct perspective for the student 
commissars. 
The second theme dealt with "The character of the Spanish revolu-
tion" and the policies of the Spanish Popular Front government. It 
condemned what it called "the policy of division of the fight against 
the Spanish Communist Party of the Caballero group," and Largo 
Caballero's policy "against the Commissars of War." It accused that 
group of trying to form a block with "the agents of Trotskyism and 
the extremist elements of the Anarchists." It then praised the Negrin 
government which, it said, "was opposed by the UGT, CNT and FAI 
but was supported by the masses." Thus, in a strange way the largest 
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mass organizations of Popular Front Spain were cast into the ranks 
of the opponents of the masses. This left only the Communists as the 
true representatives of the masses. Assigned readings included an 
analysis of the Spanish revolution by Togliatti (Ercoli) and a speech 
before the Plenum of the Communist party of Spain by Jose Diaz. 
Theme Eight dealt entirely with the subject of Trotskyism. Here the 
Trotskyists were, as usual, identified as "the agents of fascism in all 
countries." The reasons given for their being such were: they opposed 
the Bolshevization of the party; they opposed the Popular Front 
policy; they opposed the policy of the Soviet Union; they opposed the 
Comintem. They were "the direct agents of the Gestapo" and the 
"chief enemies of the people." 
The opportunity was used to smear a number of other groups that 
were anathema to the Communists with the broad brush of Trotsky-
ism. For example, the German Social Democratic party was labeled 
"the principle channel for the activity of the Trotskyists." Trotskyists 
had "infiltrated the Anarchist leadership" and the "left wing of the 
Spanish Socialist Party." In other words, all political elements that 
opposed Communist policy were tarred with Trotskyism and thus 
cast into the outer darkness as "agents of fascism." The clear duty of 
the party and of all antifascists was the liquidation of Trotskyism and 
the "purifying of antifascist organizations." Readings for this theme 
included the "Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Comin-
tem of September, 1937, Concerning the Fight against Trotskyism," 
and a speech by Jose Diaz to the Plenum of the CPS entitled "The 
Enemies of the People." In this speech Diaz asked the rhetorical 
question, "Who are the enemies of the people?" His answer: "fascists, 
Trotskyists and uncontrollables." Given the broad definition ofthese 
terms by the Communists, that meant, in effect, anyone who opposed 
the party line. Thus the would-be commissars were indoctrinated into 
the specifically Communist attitude toward Trotskyism which was so 
broadly defined that it included virtually all political forces in Popular 
Front Spain (and in the world proletarian movement) which did not 
sympathize with and support Communist policy. 
Theme Seventeen entitled "Twenty Years of Soviet Power: The 
Victory of Socialism and Democracy in the Soviet Union," devoted 
itself entirely to praise of the USSR and Communism. The "result of 
the Communist line," the theme ran, "has been the victory of Social-
ism over one-sixth of the globe." The result of "the line of the capital-
ists and reformists is the victory offascism." The power of the Soviets 
reinforces a policy of peace against the policy of war of the bourgeoisie 
and "the Social-Democratic leaders." The theme concluded by stating 
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that "the defense of the Soviet Union is the duty of men of the entire 
world." Readings listed included the Report of Comrade Stalin to the 
VII Congress of Soviets on the New Soviet Constitution, the Resolutions 
of the VII World Congress of the Comintern, various selections from 
Imprecor, and Stalin's Problems of Leninism. 42 
In addition to serving as a direct source of propaganda, the Bri-
gades were a potent symbol for dramatizing and publicizing "prole-
tarian solidarity," the Popular Front, the Loyalist cause in Spain, and 
the Comintern itself. "The Brigades," declared the Communist Inter-
national, "represent the highest expression of international solidarity, 
of the anti-fascist united front and of proletarian honor, devotion and 
courage."43 Here was a theme that the Spanish Communist press and 
the Brigades' own press never tired of repeating. The Brigades were 
the "living expression of international solidarity of the popular masses 
throughout the world," declared Frente Rojo in October 1937.44 The 
organ of the XII International Brigade, II Garibaldino, said: "These 
glorious columns are the bearers of international solidarity in the 
people's fight against international fascism." The Boletfn de Informa-
cion opined, "In the history of the working class, the action of the 
glorious International Brigades will always be engraved in letters of 
blood. They are the best sons of the International working class."45 
That the Brigade directorate saw the Internationals as a major force 
among the world proletariat was crystal clear in this passage from the 
organ of the XV Brigade in commemoration of May Day 1937: "In 
every part of the world when the workers gather together today 
to demonstrate their solidarity with one another, we will be in their 
thoughts. They will think of all the comrades in the International 
Brigades with love and pride .... And as they listen to the story of 
the heroic deeds of our Brigades they will pledge themselves to in-
creased support of us volunteers and of the heroic Spanish people." 
In a similar vein Le Soldat de Ia Republique reminded its readers: 
"We don't forget that we constitute the first International Popular 
Army known to history and that the entire world is watching us .... 
Therefore, we must be an example of proletarian unity." This view of 
the Brigades was also clearly in mind when the Brigade political 
commissariat ordered the creation of a historical unit for the Brigades: 
"The popular anti-fascist movement will have to know the history of 
the International Brigades, so as to be furnished with the ideological 
weapons to carry on the struggle against fascism. "46 
The Comintern also saw the Brigades as an especially good instru-
ment for appealing to a much wider public than the specifically prole-
tarian. In this respect the Brigades served especially well the Popular 
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Front policy. The American journalist and supporter of Loyalist 
Spain Louis Fischer reported an interview with Georgi Dimitroff, 
then secretary of the Comintern, in which Dimitroff voiced the hope 
that an American Popular Front could be forged from the Americans 
in the International Brigades.47 Since there were only a few thousand 
Americans in the Brigades, Dimitroff could only have had in mind 
that the propaganda appeal of the Brigades would be the catalyst for 
the formation of a Popular Front in the United States. 
Evidence that Dimitroff's optimism about the effects of the Interna-
tionals was fully shared by the American party's hierarchy was re-
flected in this Christman Greeting message to the Americans in the 
Brigades. 
Your heroic deeds ... have brought glory and honor to the 
working class of America, have encouraged and inspired hun-
dreds of thousands and millions to fight against the disgraceful 
policy of isolation and false neutrality. 
Your great deed is having a profound and enduring effect 
upon every section of progressive America. Your deeds and 
heroism are today the proud boast of all that is best in America 
from coast to coast. Your name has become a symbol of heroism 
and inspiration to all of us at home. 48 
Somewhat later Robert Minor, a leading hierarch in the Commu-
nist party in the United States, said: "I make the categorical statement 
that the heroic fighting of the American boys in Spain, and the conse-
quent interest and sympathy and pride awakening among the Ameri-
can people are a major factor in the political life of this country." The 
perspective from within the Brigades themselves was much the same. 
"The heroic struggle of the Americans in Spain has, to a great extent, 
been responsible for winning the sympathy of the American people to 
the support of Republican Spain. This support is expressed in pressure 
on the American Government to speak out against the agressors in 
Spain and China, in contributions of large sums of money and supplies 
... and in the increasing numbers of Americans and Canadians arriv-
ing in Spain to join the struggle against International Fascism," edito-
rialized the Brigade press. 49 
This optimistic view of the propaganda value of the Brigades was 
not limited to America. "The International Brigades show in practice 
the high value of International Solidarity and, thus, in all capitalist 
countries assist the growth of the anti-fascist people's front," declared 
the Communist International. Again, "The experience of the Interna-
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tional Brigade is above all of tremendous positive significance on the 
wide field of the anti-Fascist struggle in all countries .... The example 
of the ... Brigade must be an important step toward the unification 
of all anti-Fascist forces for a similar struggle in other countries." The 
Brigade press echoed this sentiment: "The International Brigades are 
a powerful lever for the creation of united international action, for the 
creation of the International People's Front."50 
The central committees of the Communist parties of Germany and 
Italy assured their colleagues in the Brigades that by fighting in Spain 
they were "a symbol of resistance" to the regimes in their respective 
countries. 51 From England, Communist party chief Harry Pollitt 
declared: "The spirit of the Anglo-American volunteers is an inspira-
tion to the movement at home. " 52 The Brigade press assured the 
troops: "At home in England, the presence in Spain of so many brave 
comrades has produced profound impressions, and has led to many 
actions in support of Republican Spain. Important contributions of 
money and materials are being made every day and the significance 
of the struggle in Spain has led to a strengthening of the home fight 
against reaction, fascism and war."53 
The Brigade press dramatized this point through an interview with 
an American lawyer, Levinson, who, apparently, had defended Dimi-
troff in the famous Reichstag fire trials in Germany. In answer to his 
interviewer's questions as to his view on the influence of the Interna-
tional Brigades on international politics, Levinson replied: "The influ-
ence of the International Brigades is felt immediately by the people 
and has its reflection on the politics of the nation and the world. " 54 
Among the most valuable of the Brigades' propaganda roles in the 
overall Communist effort in Spain was that of maintaining the interest 
of large sections of the public in the various western nations in the 
Spanish conflict. The constantly reiterated fact that Americans, or 
Englishmen or Frenchmen, as the case might be, were fighting and 
dying in Spain exercised an undoubted effect in their respective coun-
tries in keeping alive the identification of at least segments of the 
population with that war. In that respect the Communists could count 
on the help of much of the bourgeois press of the various nations, 
many of whose correspondents in Spain were strongly sympathetic to 
the Loyalist cause in general and the International Brigades in partic-
ular. The group of newsmen and writers who were more or less 
permanently domiciled in Spain during the war, men such as Herbert 
Matthews, Vincent Sheean, Ernest Hemingway, Henry Buckley, 
Louis Fischer, Sefton Delmer, Louis Delapree, and George Seldes, 
mingled freely and continuously with the men of the International 
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Brigades, especially with their more appealing and articulate members 
such as Gustav Regier, Ludwig Renn, Hans Kahle, and General 
Lukacs. 
Typical of the good press afforded the Brigades by bourgeois writers 
and correspondents was this by the American Louis Fischer: "The 
International Brigade is a daily reminder of the importance of events 
in Spain to the cause of democracy .... The Spaniards greatly appreci-
ate the lofty idealism that moved each foreign volunteer to leave his 
peaceful home." Martha Gellhorn wrote in the mass circulation mag-
azine Collier's: "The men who came all this distance, neither for glory 
nor for money and perhaps to die, knew why they came .... But it 
is nothing you can ask them about. ... It belongs to them .... But you 
can think about it at night, with the windows open, listening to the 
thud of trench mortars .... You can think of it with respect."55 
New York Times correspondent Herbert Matthews summed up his 
view of the Lincoln battalion this way: "You cannot dismiss these 
youngsters with the contemptuous label of 'Reds.' They are not 
fighting for Moscow, but for their ideals.'' Vincent Sheean wrote: "In 
the darkest moments of the whole dark year of 1938 ... I could think 
of the International Brigades in Spain and be sure that courage and 
generosity still existed somewhere on this planet .... In the long epic 
of the war [the International Brigades] ... suffused the total effort 
with a moral value more precious than their lives.''56 
The Brigade commissariat was keenly aware of this sympathy and 
cultivated it carefully. The commissariat's instructions for commis-
sars specifically mentioned that the American "bourgeois press" was 
very friendly to "the workers.''57 The close relations between the 
Brigades and the foreign correspondents as well as the exploitation of 
this relationship by the Brigade commissariat was apparent to those 
in a position to know. For example, Arturo Barea, a Spaniard who 
was a close observer of the foreign press through his position in the 
Loyalist censorship bureau in Madrid, wrote of the "foreign writers 
and journalists [who] revolved in a circle of their own ... with a fringe 
of men from the International Brigades." He also mentioned that the 
Brigade political commissars "visited us as a matter of course and gave 
us information which we could pass on to the journalists. " 58 
Similarly, numerous books on the Brigades were written by Com-
munist party members and published by bourgeois publishers. These 
normally made no mention of the party affiliation of the author and 
thus were read by the uninitiated public as objective accounts. Typical 
of these were Edwin Rolfe's The Lincoln Battalion, Alvah Bessie's 
Men in the Ranks, William Rust's Britons in Spain, Tom Wintring-
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ham's English Captain, Geoffrey Cox's Defense of Madrid, and Gus-
tav Regier's Great Crusade, which had a foreword by Ernest 
Hemingway. 
The Brigades also served an important propaganda function in 
providing a focal point for the activities and interests of numerous 
foreigners coming and going in Spain. A great many of these people 
visited one of the Brigades. Many others communicated with the 
Brigades in writing. This type of activity served not only to focus 
attention on the Brigades themselves but to develop and maintain 
foreign interest and sympathy toward the Loyalist cause. Among 
those who visited the International Brigades frequently was Maurice 
Thorez, chief of the French Communist party. His visits were the 
occasion for reviews, festivities, speeches, and exchanges of fraternal 
greetings. The organ of the XII Brigade, Vers Ia Liberte, carried a 
description of a visit by Thorez as its lead article under the heading: 
"Maurice Thorez brings the salute of the Popular Front of France to 
the XII Brigade." The next edition again gave major space to Thorez's 
speech to the Brigade. 59 Other French visitors reported on in the 
Brigade press included a Comrade Zyromski who assured the troops 
that "the International Brigades represent that which is most influen-
tial in the International workers movement. The XIV Brigade is a 
symbol for us."60 
Numerous Americans also visited the Brigades. In reporting on the 
festivities in honor of the first anniversary of the International Bri-
gades, the English-language edition of the Brigade press noted that 
along with "La Pasionaria," "Gallo," and other Communist stal-
warts visiting the Brigade were "Congressmen Bernard and O'Con-
nell from the U.S.A .... Bernard applauded as vociferously as any 
and clenched his fist in the Popular Front salute many times. 
He stated that he had seen President Roosevelt before leaving 
the U. S. and the President had requested that he bring back a per-
sonal report on the Spanish situation and about the Americans in 
Spain."61 
Another American admirer of the Brigades was the writer Anna 
Louise Strong. The Volunteer for Liberty reported a visit by her to the 
American battalion and a speech she made to the United States over 
the Loyalist government radio. The speech was a panegyric of the 
Americans in the International Brigade stressing the often expressed 
PoP.ular Front interpretation that they were showing their patriotism 
by fighting in Spain. This was followed by a message from her to "the 
boys of the Lincoln, Washington, and Mackenzie-Papineau battal-
ions" which assured them that they were indeed great heroes. 62 
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In May 1937 Notre Combat carried an article, with photographs, 
of United States party representative Robert Minor and "Comrade 
Ford," the vice-presidential candidate on the Communist party ticket 
in the elections of 1936, who were visiting the XV Brigade. "Comrade 
Minor," the article stated, "will remain in Spain indefinitely as the 
representative of the Daily Worker, among other duties." In July 
these two again visited the Internationals, this time conversing with 
XV Brigade commander Vladimir Copic. With them also was the 
British Communist Ralph Bates, shown "lecturing the boys of the 
regiment de train. " That edition also carried a greeting from Francis 
Gorman, president of the United Textile Workers of America, and a 
member of the North American Cominittee to Aid Spanish Democ-
racy. Paul Robeson also made a much-publicized visit to the Brigades. 
Robeson had the advantages, from the Communist's point of view, of 
being an American black who was both a well-known singer and a 
devout adinirer of Communism and the Soviet Union. He thus com-
bined the useful qualities of representing one of the earth's downtrod-
den people, of being an artist-intellectual, and also a firm adherent of 
the Popular Front and its chief protagonist. British party leader Harry 
Pollitt selected the active Charlotte Haldane to accompany Robeson 
as guide and interpreter on his Spanish tour. 63 
From England, too, came numerous visitors to the Brigades, among 
whom was Harry Pollitt. 64 "The English comrades are feeling inches 
taller today in consequence of the surprise visit of Comrade H. Pol-
litt," declared Our Fight. A greeting from Pollitt to the British battal-
ion went, "We are proud of your glorious achievements and pledge 
ourselves to ever greater support from Britain." Our Fight announced 
in May 1937 a visit to the British battalion of Communist party 
members Will Paynter and Ted Bramley. Paynter, the readers were 
informed, was going to remain in Spain, taking over a post as political 
commissar at Albacete. One of the more important non-Communist 
British visitors to the Brigades, and one whom the political cominis-
sars tried particularly hard to exploit for Popular Front propaganda 
purposes, was the well-known Labour party Member of Parliament 
Clement Attlee. The Brigade press gave his visit extensive coverage 
and the First company of the British battalion took the name "Major 
Attlee Company."65 
The International Brigade also proved a valuable propaganda in-
strument in its role as a focal point for various organizations outside 
Spain in professing their solidarity with the Loyalist cause. For exam-
ple, the Brigade press carried a notice that the North American 
students who were fighting in the Brigades presented a flag to the 
Comintern Propaganda Instrument 155 
Federal Union of Spanish Students. The flag bore the words "Ameri-
can Students Union" and was presented by George Watt who was 
recovering from wounds received at Fuentes de Ebro. "The greatest 
proof of the solidarity of American students in Spain," the article 
continued, is that "American students have been fighting in Spain side 
by side with their international comrades." All this was seen as "proof 
of the friendship between students in American and Spain and anti-
fascist students throughout the entire world. " 66 
Another example of this friendship was the report of a message 
received from the World Youth Congress which had recently con-
vened at Vassar College. The message, addressed to John Gates and 
all the American boys in Spain, told of the wild cheers that had 
greeted the reading of a message from the title page of a book about 
the XV Brigade signed by John Gates, George Watt, and Milton 
Wolff, members of the Abraham Lincoln battalion. This was "cer-
tainly the proudest moment that Americans at the Congress had," the 
message continued. "In fact it was the only moment at which Ameri-
can young people could say that the international cooperation we all 
talked so much about was actually being put into practice by Ameri-
can students."67 
Other organizations were created by the Comintern specifically as 
auxiliaries to the International Brigades. Among these were the 
Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the United States and the 
Dependents Aid Committee in England. Organized by the Commu-
nist party and staffed by party functionaries who had spent at least 
a brief period with the Brigades in Spain, the Friends served as the 
most direct open link between the United States and the Americans 
in the Brigades. The United States party used the Friends as a propa-
ganda agency, sponsoring meetings and fund-raising campaigns, re-
cruiting, publishing propaganda material, and supervising the 
statements of returned American veterans to the press. An example 
of the latter of these functions was the experience of Lincoln veteran 
William Herrick. Upon his return to the United States, Lifo magazine 
interviewed Herrick. When asked why he had gone to Spain he an-
swered that he had gone as a member of the Communist party. At that 
point the representative of the Friends told Herrick to change his 
statement and say that he had volunteered because he was Jewish and 
wanted to join the fight against fascism. " 68 
In Britain the Dependents Aid Committee served the same function 
as the FALB in the United States. Party worker Charlotte Haldane 
acted as chief spokesman for the DAC at the request of Harry Pollitt. 
Her staff consisted of paid party functionaries but, in good Popular 
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Front style, numerous prominent persons were solicited to become 
patrons of the organization. The Daily Worker ran a daily ad for 
contributions. Later, in the fall of 1937, Pollitt replaced Haldane with 
Fred Co(leman, ex-commander of the British battalion, now returned 
to England after being seriously wounded in action. 69 
Given the Comintern's attitude toward the Brigades as the best 
example of proletarian solidarity and the Popular Front in action, the 
Communists naturally viewed propaganda emanating directly from 
the Brigades or from those closely identified with them as especially 
valuable. As the Brigade commissariat itself put it: "Every people, of 
every nation, must know who are their best sons, what heroic things 
they have done, how they have fought, how they have died and in 
what manner they have finally won. All of you must communicate this 
to your people, from your lips they must know the truth about the 
fight and the heroism of your comrades."70 With this in mind, the 
Brigade leadership regularly used selected Internationals for broad-
casting to their various homelands over Radio Madrid, an especially 
valuable method of getting propaganda into those countries where 
other methods could not be used. The Brigade press informed its 
readers of these activities on occasion and sometimes included ex-
cerpts from the texts of the broadcasts. 71 
Another technique for using the Brigades as an instrument to influ-
ence opinion outside Spain involved a continuous stream of written 
messages sent in the name of the Brigades to persons or groups in 
various countries. The German and Czech sections of the Brigade's 
officer training school, for example, sent a message to the president 
of Czechoslovakia expressing sympathy on the death of Jan Masa-
ryk. 72 An example of how the Brigades were used as a symbol of and 
a vehicle for the Popular Front was this telegram sent to the United 
States in the name of the Lincoln battalion in commemoration of 
Independence Day 1937: 
We, Americans in Spain fighting for the preservation of world 
democracy, are proud to celebrate today the national festival of 
our American ideals on Spanish Soil. ... 
As Lafayette, citizen of France, urged by impulses which all 
American democrats will honor today, sailed from his own land 
... so we have offered ourselves to the Spanish government. ... 
Let us unite in our efforts to preserve democracy in Spain, in 
America, and throughout the world. 73 
This passage typified the approach taken by the Brigade commissariat 
when trying to appeal to the broadest possible audience, and espe-
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cially in the identification of the Brigades with "democracy," the 
"Spanish government," and "American ideals." Typical also was the 
total absence of any mention of Communism or that the party had any 
remote connection with the Brigades, the war, or the message itself. 
From the other end, widely publicized messages sent to the Bri-
gades from various sources could serve much the same purpose. For 
example, this one to the Lincoln battalion from the American Leo. 
Gallagher, identified as a "liberal lawyer": 
The progressive forces, [in America] ... know that the vic-
tory of democracy in Spain will immediately strengthen the 
United front, democratic forces throughout the world, and spe-
cifically in the United States .... 
The role of the members of the Washington-Lincoln Battal-
ion can be understood when one realizes that the fight in Spain 
is likely to shape the future of society .... 
For this reason, we in America scan each day's paper for news 
about the Washington-Lincoln Battalion. We have read with 
pride the record of your struggles-volunteers who on foreign 
fields are defending American democracy. 74 
The commissariat also demonstrated its interest in propaganda and 
the Brigades' image by ordering writers in the Brigades, Alfred Kan-
torowicz, Ludwig Reno, Jef Last, Ralph Bates, and Bodo Uhse, to 
attend the International Writers' Conference in Madrid in July 1937 
and by assigning a number of the Brigades' intellectuals to the duty 
of making foreign propaganda tours. In the summer of 1937 Renn 
went on the propaganda circuit in the United States, Canada, and 
Cuba. In the fall Gustav Regier performed the same role in the United 
States. Pietro Nenni made a propaganda tour of Europe in September 
of 1937, as did JefLast. Many of the lesser lights of the Brigades were 
also used on propaganda tours in their own countries. 75 
The commissars also exhorted the men of the Brigades to make 
every effort to influence opinion back home. The commissar of the 
British battalion, for example, after telling his readers that "we are 
playing our part here but [Aneurin] Bevin and Company [the British 
Labour party] are stabbing us in the back," reiterated the point that 
the men of the British battalion must "use all influence to change the 
course in Britain and force unity [of the Labour party with the Com-
munist position of Spain]. One interesting method of getting Brigade-
oriented propaganda out of Spain was the printing of postal cards with 
propaganda posters and slogans on them and the label "Comisariado 
de las Brigadas Intemacionales." Another technique was by encour-
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aging the men to mail their issues of the various Brigade publications 
home. For example, the Boletfn de Informacfon asked its readers: 
"Are you still sending the bulletins to your organizations in Britain 
and America? It is a powerful weapon for combatting press lies."76 
The Volunteer for Liberty ran letters from home which, no doubt, 
encouraged this practice. For example, a letter from the Friends of the 
Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion, the Canadian version of the FALB, 
sent a letter thanking the men of the battalion for sending them copies 
of the Brigade journals which were "very helpful in gaining support 
for the common cause." The Communists also used letters from Bri-
gade men to people back home for propaganda purposes by sponsor-
ing their publication in printed collections. Numerous such letters 
also appeared in sympathetic periodicals. Those selected for such 
publication naturally conformed to the accepted Popular Front view. 
"What impresses one immediately," ran one letter published by the 
Nation, "is the complete and unbroken solidarity of all the workers 
and peasants in wanting the war won." Then the writer, identified as 
a twenty-year-old volunteer with the Lincoln battalion, exhorted his 
readers to "mobilize every possible group to give aid to Spain." He 
concluded by pointing out that "the fight in Spain is extremely impor-
tant for the future of the world. " 77 
10 Dissidence, Desertion, 
and the Terror 
The mentality of political suspicion, hatred, terror, and mur-
der that was then running its grotesque and bloody course in the 
Soviet Union and that cast its spell throughout the Comintem spilled 
over into Spain and the International Brigades. An NKVD contingent 
arrived with the Soviet diplomatic and military missions in September 
1936, under the control of the veteran NKVD officer known as Alex-
ander Orlov. The NKVD, or "Cheka" as it was commonly called, 
became notorious in Spain due to its widespread campaign of terror 
which included the jailing, torture, and physical liquidation of numer-
ous elements of the political left, most of whom were lumped together 
under the elastic and inclusive term Trotskyists. This included numer-
ous groups within the Spanish Popular Front who were too revolu-
tionary as well as a large number offoreigners in Loyalist Spain, many 
of whom had been attracted to that country for the very reason that 
it was in the throes of a revolutionary situation. Of the operations of 
the Cheka in Spain the Soviet Intelligence officer General Krivitsky 
wrote: "Thousands were arrested, including many foreign volun-
teers. . . . Any criticism of methods and unflattering opinion of the 
Stalin dictatorship in Russia, or association with men of heretical 
political beliefs became treason. [The Cheka] employed all the meth-
ods familiar in Moscow of extorting confessions and of summary 
executions." 1 
Franz Borkenau, a man of the left and Loyalist sympathizer, was, 
like hundreds of other foreigners in Spain, arrested by the Cheka and 
accused of Trotskyism. Referring to what he called "Trotskyist para-
noia," he wrote: "The Communists have gotten in the habit of de-
nouncing as a Trotskyist everyone who disagrees with them about 
anything .... In the Communist mentality, every disagreement in 
political matters is a major crime, and every political criminal a 
Trotskyist. A Trotskyist, in the Communist vocabulary, is one who 
deserves to be killed."2 "Trotskyist" referred to "left" disagreements. 
"Right" disagreement as surely labeled one a "fascist," although the 
circle closed as the "Trotskyists" were also labeled a "fascist fifth 
column" and the "direct agents of Franco."3 
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George Orwell, too, found himself caught up in the Cheka reign of 
terror which reached a peak in the wake of the Barcelona crisis of May 
1937. He wrote of the many foreigners with "doubtful political 
records" from the Communist point of view who were "on the run 
with the police on the track" and of the "horrible atmosphere pro-
duced by fear, suspicion, hatred ... crammed jails ... and prowling 
gangs of armed men. "4 
The NKVD carried out its operations in Spain independent of the 
authority or control of the Loyalist government although it also rap-
idly infiltrated the ranks of the official Loyalist police organizations. 5 
Virtually all the firsthand accounts of arrest and imprisonment for 
political reasons in Loyalist Spain make very plain the fact that the 
police apparatus was full of foreign Communists acting essentially as 
Cheka agents under the guise of government police. Indeed Loyalist 
cabinet ministers Prieto, Zugazogoita, and Irujo affirmed that the 
Loyalist police were heavily infiltrated with Communists, that the 
police carried out mass arrests without government authority, and 
that the Communists operated, in addition to all this, their own 
independent police apparatus. 6 
An example of the techniques of the Cheka was the case of Peter 
E1stob. Elstob, a young Englishman of twenty volunteered to go to 
Spain as a pilot. Somehow he ended up with a contingent of men 
destined for the International Brigades and, despite his efforts to 
explain that he was a pilot, he was retained with this contingent at 
Figueras, the entrep6t for the Brigade volunteers in Spain. Finally, for 
no apparent reason, he was placed under arrest and held incom-
municado for several weeks. Among the people who arrested, impris-
oned, and interrogated him were foreigners of various nationalities. 
Many of his fellow prisoners were also foreigners. While in prison he 
witnessed the summary execution of numerous men who were stood 
against a wall and shot. At one point during his detention the London 
Communist party representative in Barcelona appeared at the pris-
on for the purpose of inquiring about Elstob's case. No more was 
heard from this individual, however, and Elstob was finally freed 
and expelled from Spain thanks to the efforts of the British 
counsul. 7 
A similar experience was that of Olaf DeWet. An Englishman 
flying for the Loyalists, he had volunteered not through political 
conviction but for adventure and money. Suddenly, and without ap-
parent cause, he was arrested and imprisoned. Those who arrested, 
incarcerated, and interrogated him were foreigners. He mentioned 
particularly various Germans among his interrogators. He also wit-
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nessed the execution of a number of his fellow prisoners who were 
taken from their cells at night and dispatched with a revolver. 8 
An even more pointed example of Cheka terror was that of the 
Englishman Robert Smillie. Smillie, a member of the British Indepen-
dent Labour Party (a "left deviationist" Marxist party), was asso-
ciated with the POUM in Spain (and was thus a "Trotskyist" in the 
eyes of the Communists). He was arrested, incarcerated, held incom-
municado by the Communists, and eventually died in one of their 
secret prisons. 9 
This atmosphere of political terror carried over, perhaps inevitably, 
into the International Brigades. The Brigade hierarchs--staunch, 
dedicated, and disciplined party members all-naturally adhered fully 
to the pervading Communist attitudes and were determined to main-
tain the political purity of the Brigades. The search for political 
dissidence, its unmasking and punishment, became one of the primary 
concerns of the Brigade commissariat. As Brigade man Jef Last put 
it: "One of the principal activities of the GPU [NKVD) in Spain 
was to imprison, torture and often kill volunteers of the opposition 
parties with the intention of ferreting out their relations with the 
so-called Trotskyists abroad who could then be handed to the 
Gestapo."10 
While the regular Brigade political commissar system served in part 
as a political police, the main instrument by which the search for 
political dissidence was carried on within the Brigade was the so-
called Servicio Investigaci6n Militar (SIM). One of the Loyalist gov-
ernment's secret police units had the same initials, but the Brigade 
SIM was an autonomous organization; there was no connection be-
tween the Brigade organization and the government. In reality the 
Brigade SIM was simply a special unit of the Comintern designed to 
perform the role of a political police apparatus within the Brigades. 11 
It was staffed by Comintern functionaries and party cadres of diverse 
nationalities, many of whom had performed similar services for the 
Comintern prior to the Spanish war. 12 
The Brigade Cheka, as the SIM was commonly called, operated 
from headquarters in Albacete and at the direct disposition of the 
political commissariat of the International Brigades. The Brigades 
maintained their own prison at Albacete until Brigade headquarters 
moved to Horto, near Barcelona, in 1938, at which time the Brigade 
established its prison at Castel de Fells in the same area. Commandant 
of the prison at Castel de Fells was a Lieutenant Copic, younger 
brother of the Colonel Copic who commanded the XV International 
Brigade.13 
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The Brigade Cheka was a microcosm of the police state in action. 
Once a man fell into its clutches he was completely at its mercy. No 
judicial review of any kind existed within the Brigade structure and 
no review of the internal matters of the Brigades was seriously at-
tempted by the Loyalist government or military authorities. 14 Among 
the examples of this were the experiences of Brigade men Gillain and 
Honeycomb. Gillain, an officer with the XIV Brigade, fell afoul of the 
Brigade leadership and was arrested and imprisoned. Knowing that 
no hope existed of any intervention into Brigade affairs by the Loyalist 
authorities, he sought the help of Longo, General Walter, and, finally, 
de Brouckere of the Second International. None of these, however, 
proved willing to interfere in the workings of the Cheka. Honeycomb, 
an American, sought the intervention of the Loyalist authorities in his 
efforts to leave the Brigades and Spain. He was informed by the 
Spanish ministry of war that the matter was not within their author-
ity, that the International Brigades had "complete autonomy." 
Honeycomb was subsequently arrested, along with several other Bri-
gade men rounded up in Barcelona, and taken to the front. 15 
The Cheka placed undercover agents in all units of the Brigades to 
report any words or actions that might be construed as "dissidence," 
a term that very definitely included criticism of the Communist party 
or Communist policy. Any individual reported to Cheka headquar-
ters, either by Cheka agents, who in some cases were also the official 
political commissars, or by others, faced arrest, imprisonment, or 
death. If the arrested person was a Communist party member, he was 
likely to be charged as a Trotskyist and "traitor to the party." For 
non-Communist Spaniards, the usual charge was "fifth columnist." 
German and Italian volunteers, whether party members or not, were 
likely to be labeled Gestapo or OVRA agents respectively. In the 
Brigade prison the Cheka attempted to force confessions from the 
suspects through the use of the same techniques then being used by 
the Gestapo and their own parent organization, the Soviet NKVD; 
solitary confinement in windowless cells too small for a man to move 
about in, the withholding of food, water, and sleep, all-night interro-
gations, beatings, and various other refinements. The final technique 
of the Brigade Cheka was the firing squad in the courtyard or a walk 
into the cellar and a pistol bullet in the back of the neck. 16 
If prisoners died under torture, the case was usually written off as 
a suicide. "Suicide a la Beckman" was the ironical term coined to 
cover this contingency in the International Brigades. It stemmed from 
the case of a German Brigade captain who was arrested by the Cheka 
in May 1937 because it learned that Beckman had written a letter to 
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the Loyalist authorities criticizing the activities of certain of the Bri-
gades' Communist chieftains including Marty, who, Beckman 
affirmed, had ordered the execution of four soldiers and a captain 
from Beckman's battalion. He was subsequently arrested by the Bri-
gade Cheka and incarcerated in the prison at Albacete where he was 
tortured to death during the attempt to force him to confess that he 
had written to the Loyalist authorities because of a personal quarrel 
with Marty. Meanwhile, advised of Beckman's arrest and incarcera-
tion by a friend of his, the Spanish authorities sent officials to Albacete 
to investigate. When they arrived, Beckman was dead, a so-called 
suicide. The affair provoked a small scandal within government circles 
and a few demands for investigation. But at the demand of Marty and 
Longo, backed up by the Comintern and the Spanish Communist 
members of the cabinet, the matter was not pursued. 17 
The Brigade Cheka was controlled directly by the Comintern hier-
archy of the International Brigades. According to Penchienati, Vit-
torio Vidali, the ubiquitous Comintern stalwart of Fifth Regiment 
fame, acted as the first chief of the Brigade Cheka. Both Marty and 
Longo, as the political chieftains of the Brigades, were, no doubt, 
intimately involved. The well-known German Comintern figure Wal-
ter Ulbricht played a role in this activity too. According to Ruth 
Fischer, Ulbricht, operating from Brigade headquarters in Albacete, 
organized the Cheka unit dealing with the German-speaking elements 
in the Brigades, personally directed the search for Trotskyists among 
his fellow Germans, and ordered the death of many of them. 18 An-
other highly placed German Communist and ex-chief of a GPU 
apparatus in Germany, Heinz Neumann, operated with the In-
ternational Brigade Cheka, sometimes using the name "Enrique 
Fischer."19 An American assigned to the Brigade commissariat where 
part of his duty was to read outgoing mail for signs of dissidence, 
especially any criticism of the party or its operation of the Brigades, 
worked under the direct supervision of Neumann who told him on 
numerous occasions that he, Neumann, had recently caught and 
killed "Trotskyite Fascists."20 
The Cheka recruited agents from among party cadres of all nation-
alities. As the British Labour Member of Parliament John McGovern 
(who visited Spain and participated in an investigation of the terror 
there) put it, there were two International Brigades in Spain, the 
military unit of that name and a horde of Comintern gangsters and 
gunmen-the Cheka.21 One of the better documented examples of the 
type of person who carried out this work was the American George 
Mink. Mink, a long-time Communist, had been involved in party 
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work in the seaman's unions in the United States as early as 1930 and 
had worked for the Soviet secret police in various capacities, including 
that of assassin, for years prior.to the Spanish war. Supplied with a 
false passport under the name "Alfred Hertz" by the NKVD, he 
entered Spain in early 1937 and took up his work as a Cheka agent.22 
Mink bore striking similarities to the stereotype of the gangland "tor-
pedo." "I met him in a hotel in Barcelona in April, 1937," said an 
American who had previously been a party member himself. "He 
[Mink] got drunk and boasted about his NKVD work. ... He showed 
me a roll of bills and he was wearing a London tailored suit which 
cost him $150.00 and he had very expensive leather luggage and said 
that that was the way to get a good reception in a hotel."23 He appar-
ently worked directly for the Soviet NKVD in Spain and was involved 
in their activities against various elements of the left. Mink "operated 
in the safe hinterland," wrote Jan Valtin. "His apartment in the Hotel 
Continental [in Barcelona] became the breeding place of many of the 
murderous GPU night raids on the homes of anti-Stalinists in Bar-
celona." Liston Oak reported that Mink talked to him about the 
Communist plan to provoke the POUM into a violent encounter and 
implied that Mink had some part in the murder of POUM leader 
Andres Nin. 24 
Mink was also deeply involved in the Cheka operations in the 
International Brigades. He was, in this sense, an example of the close 
interconnection between the Soviet NKVD and the Brigade Cheka 
activities. He offered Liston Oak an assignment "to put the finger on 
'untrustworthy' volunteers [in the International Brigades] ... such as 
members of the British Independent Labor party and the American 
Socialist party." Another American member of the International Bri-
gades who had known Mink personally through their party work 
prior to coming to Spain, testified that he had been present when Mink 
and another Cheka agent shot and killed two American Brigade men. 
As to the reason for this execution, the witness did not know whether 
the men had tried to desert the Brigade and leave Spain or whether 
it was for some kind of political deviation. Yet another former Com-
munist also testified regarding Mink's role toward the Americans in 
the Brigades, "I know that plenty of American Loyalists [Brigade 
men] would like to get their hands on George Mink. He was responsi-
ble for shooting many Americans in the back over there."25 
The American party functionary Steve Nelson was also a good 
example of the interlocking nature of the various components of the 
Communist apparatus as it operated in Spain. Nelson had attended 
the Lenin Institute in Moscow where he received training in espionage 
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and organizational work. Later he worked as a Comintem agent in 
China and was sent to Spain in 1937 where he apparently worked 
closely with the NKVD. "I heard much of his courage and ruthless-
ness in stamping out Trotskyists for the secret police," said Louis 
Budenz, then editor of the Daily Worker. In early May 1937 the party 
sent Nelson to Spain where, without previous service in the Interna-
tional Brigades, he assumed the post of political commissar of the 
Lincoln battalion and subsequently that of commissar of the entire 
XV Brigade. As a result of his work in Spain the central committee 
of the Communist party in the United States "co-opted" Nelson in 
1938, an unusual procedure to distinguish a man who had performed 
exceedingly valuable work for the party. At that time United States 
party chief Earl Browder spoke "in glowing terms of Nelson's great 
services ... in uprooting anti-party elements," recalled Budenz. But 
Nelson later told Budenz that Browder and the American party hier-
archy had no choice in the matter. They had been ordered to do it by 
"the people he [Nelson] was working with in Spain," that is, the 
Russians. 26 
In February and March of 1937, when the Brigades were threaten-
ing to fall apart under the combined impact of the heavy casualties 
incurred in the Jarama battles and the widespread disillusionment and 
poor morale, the Comintem ordered even more of its reliable cadres 
into the Brigades to strengthen the party's control. Most of these men 
were assigned either to political commissar posts or to specifically 
police work. 27 This approach reflected the essence of the Communist 
attitude that military discipline was essentially a product of political 
discipline. This attitude accounted for the tendency of the Brigade 
directorate to see political dissidence, treason, and Trotskyism behind 
any and all disciplinary problems from desertion to such common 
soldierly foibles as drunkenness, apathy, frustration, and general grip-
ing. It also accounted for their proclivity to treat all disciplinary 
problems as extremely serious and deserving of the most rigid coun-
termeasures. The problems of low morale, indiscipline, and desertion 
led the Albacete commissariat to demand "ruthless action" by politi-
cal and military authorities in the Brigades and the use of the death 
penalty to maintain discipline. Lecouer referred to this period as one 
in which summary executions and "promenades" (a euphemism for 
shooting political enemies) became common in the Brigades.28 
From at least as early in the war as March 1937, men were deserting 
or attempting to desert in large enough numbers to make it a major 
issue in the Brigades. As early as February 1937 reports from United 
States consular officials in Spain began to ask instructions for dealing 
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with American deserters from the Brigades who turned themselves in 
to United States consuls for protection and repatriation.29 
The Brigade press also began to attack the problem of desertion 
during the spring of 1937. In an article entitled "The Battalion Gets 
Cleaned up of Cowards," British political commissar George Aitkin 
said that as a result of the recent combat and tours in the lines there 
were some grumblers and some attempted desertion. The deserters, he 
added, were caught and sentenced to disciplinary labor battalions for 
work in the front lines. Le Soldat de Ia Republique warned its readers 
against believing a document recently put out by the Nationalists 
telling Frenchmen in the Brigades that they would be given safe 
passage to France if they came over to the Nationalist lines. The 
document also told French Brigade members that if they turned 
themselves in at any of the French consulates in Spain they would be 
repatriated. Do not believe this, cautioned the Brigade press. It repre-
sents the work of fascist agents and will only get you in serious 
trouble.30 
The problem of those in the International Brigades who, for one 
reason or another, wished to bid a personal farewell to arms was 
complicated by a number offactors. One was that the volunteers never 
signed any definite contract as to their length of service in the Bri-
gades, nor did they take any formal oath of allegiance to the Spanish 
government. Many assumed that since they volunteered for no partic-
ular period of time that they had the prerogative of leaving when they 
so desired. Indeed many of the volunteers had been told very specifi-
cally that their term of service would be three or six months, after 
which time they would be free to go or stay as they saw fit. 31 
Numerous French and Belgian volunteers, arrested on charges of 
desertion, claimed that they had been assured by the Communist 
functionaries at the recruitment centers that they would be allowed 
to return to their own countries after three-months service in Spain. 
When they applied for repatriation, however, they were told that no 
such verbal agreement was binding and that they were in for the 
duration.32 So also did various American and British men. On No-
vember 22, 1937, the United States consul in Valencia reported that 
a number of Americans from the International Brigades had pre-
sented themselves at the consulate asking for help in getting out of 
Spain. They said their contracts with the Brigade had terminated but 
that they could not obtain discharges. These men said they had just 
come from Albacete where they had witnessed the arrest of some 
twenty-five Americans who had left the front and reported to head-
quarters for discharges because their contracts had expired. After a 
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fake court-martial the twenty-five had been taken back to the front 
under guard and executed. 33 
Numerous men also claimed that they had been lured to Spain with 
the promise of high-paying jobs. Once in Spanish territory the Brigade 
authorities took their passports and informed them that they were in 
the army. When the men complained, the answer given was that since 
they had no passports they were strictly subject to the Spanish author-
ities and that if they attempted to "desert," they would be shot. An 
experience of this type was recounted to the American newspaper 
correspondent Edward Knoblaugh by Lawrence Muliers, a Canadian, 
and Tim Kennan of Dublin when he met them on board a British 
naval vessel. They had succeeded in reaching the British consulate in 
Valencia and had been put aboard the ship by the consuP4 That men 
were sometimes recruited under false pretenses was also corroborated 
by a twenty-six-year-old American bricklayer from Minneapolis to a 
New York Times correspondent in France: 
I was born in Coleridge, Neb., where I joined the Communist 
party .... Last month I saw an ad in a Minneapolis morning 
newspaper for skilled workers for Spain to take the place of men 
who had gone to the front. The ad was signed by the Society for 
Technical Aid to Spanish Democracy. 
"I applied and soon received a ticket to New York. Only 
when I reached New York did I begin to suspect that the tools 
of my 'trade' were to be a rifle and bayonet. " 35 
The problem of desertion grew in intensity as time went on because 
of the widespread disillusionment with the Brigades and the war. The 
disillusionment stemmed from various causes that were, in some 
cases, of a diametrically opposed nature. Some, the type whom party 
orthodoxy labeled "left deviationists," became dissatisfied because 
they came to feel that the party line in Spain was not "revolutionary" 
or "socialist" according to their understanding of the terms. An exam-
ple of this was the case of Henry Scott Beattie who, in a letter to the 
editor of the Canadian Forum, voiced the sentiment that the party's 
"Spanish policy was nothing less than a betrayal. ... To crush the 
mass parties of the Spanish workers and farmers in order that the war 
. . . might be made respectable and Spanish capitalism preserved. 
Anyone inside or outside our [Communist] Party who was openly 
against the protection of private capital was in danger of arrest by our 
own secret police."36 Others became embittered by the contrast be-
tween the democratic revolutionary fraternity of equals which they 
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had expected an army run by Communists to be and what the Interna-
tional Brigades were in fact. Indicative of this was an article by a 
deserter from the British battalion in which he recounted how the 
recruiter at Communist party headquarters in Glasgow, where he had 
joined, had presented a picture of an army of brothers who shared all 
things equally. This, said the disillusioned Brigade man, was far from 
being the case. Rather the difference in living standards between the 
Brigade officers and the rank-and-file soldier was immense. It was not 
"communistic. " 37 
On the other side of the coin were those who became alienated due 
to the too blatantly Communist nature of the Brigades. The English 
writer and Loyalist supporter Stephen Spender told of the disillusion-
ment of some of the British volunteers who had originally joined the 
Brigades because they identified the Republic with liberalism. Once 
in the Brigades they had become embittered by the overbearing Com-
munist control. 38 
That there was a widespread desire on the part of many of the 
Internationals to depart from Spain, either permanently or, as it was 
more usually put in official circles, on leave, was too obvious for the 
Brigade directorate to deny. Yet the Communist hierarchy of the 
International Brigades, quite logically from their point of view, op-
posed any policy that would have allowed the Internationals to leave 
the Brigades or Spain. A situation in which troops could simply quit 
and go home any time they wanted would be disastrous for discipline 
and morale in any military organization. The difficulty of the position 
of the Brigade chiefs in the face of a situation in which a goodly 
percentage of the troops would have left had they been able was 
epitomized by the comment of British political commissar Kerrigan, 
when asked to send to a rear echelon post a young British volunteer 
who was clearly unfit for combat duty: "It is difficult to withdraw one 
man without discouraging the rest," he said.39 
The obvious impracticality of a policy of allowing men simply to 
leave whenever it suited them could certainly have been replaced by 
a policy of specified enlistment periods. The Communists, however, 
had reasons for opposing any policy of allowing men to leave the 
Brigades and Spain on any conditions, except in those cases where the 
party itself and for its own purposes reassigned men from the Brigades 
to party functions elsewhere. One reason was the impossibility of 
replacing the men who would leave ifgiven the opportunity. Indeed, 
it was impossible even to replace casualties except with Spanish re-
cruits. 40 The Communists wanted the Brigades to retain their interna-
tional character to the greatest extent possible; only in that way would 
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the Brigades remain a stronghold of Comintern military and political 
power in Spain and would the propaganda value of the Brigades as 
the most vivid example of the international and Popular Front nature 
of the Spanish war be maintained. Alvah Bessie, a devout Communist 
himself and a late volunteer to the Brigades, said as much in his book 
on his experiences in Spain, Men in Battle. Writing of the disastrous 
demoralization of the American battalion and the small number of 
Americans who were still among its effectives after the Aragon retreat 
in 1938, he said: "But for the benefit of the folks back home the 
Lincoln Battalion was always intact, and the constant figure of thirty-
two hundred Americans were fighting in Spain. We understood why 
this was necessary, but it did not prevent us from becoming cyni-
cal."41 Another reason why the Brigade directorate objected to the 
repatriation of men was the fear, quite justifiable under the circum-
stances, that a certain number of them would make public some of the 
more unsavory aspects of Communist operations in Spain. That 
would have further curtailed the value of the Brigades as a propa-
ganda vehicle and would also have damaged the image of respectabil-
ity that the Communists were trying to maintain in the western 
nations.42 
On the question of granting leaves outside Spain, the Brigade direc-
torate saw the same objections. Quite realistically they recognized that 
once safely out of Spain, few men would ever return. Longo claimed 
that the Brigade commissariat wanted to allow Brigade men to go on 
leaves outside Spain in the period after the Jarama battle but that the 
Spanish government refused. 43 That was extremely doubtful for sev-
eral reasons, the most obvious being that men were moved in and out 
of Spain freely whenever it suited the Communists to do so. Second, 
it was highly unlikely that Largo Caballero, Prieto, or the Spanish 
military staff, none of whom had any great love of the Internationals 
anyway, would have stood in the way of allowing them to leave. 
Third, even if the Spaniards had objected, the Comintern certainly 
had sufficient political leverage to accomplish it had they so desired. 
The facts were quite the opposite. As numerous statements and 
examples showed, it was the Brigade commissariat which adamantly 
opposed allowing men to leave and which, through the Communist 
apparatus in Spain, made certain no such policy would be adopted. 44 
The attitude of the Brigade directorate toward this matter was clearly 
shown by their position on the contention of Pacciardi and numerous 
of the Italian volunteers who were affected by the original contract 
drawn up by the Italian committee in Paris. That document specifi-
cally mentioned six months service. The Communist chiefs took the 
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attitude, however, that the contract was no longer pertinent to the 
case; that when the Italian unit became part of the International 
Brigades it became subject solely to Brigade authority. Thus, they 
held, the contractual document had no further validity. 
That it was the Brigade directorate and not the Loyalist govern-
ment which insisted on service for the duration was specifically stated 
to an American volunteer who had been told that he was signing up 
for six months. When he was not allowed to leave at the end of that 
period he went directly to the Spanish Ministry of Defense. In answer 
to his question as to whether it was true that the Loyalist government 
required the Internationals to remain in Spain, the answer was: "No, 
that is entirely up to the Brigade command." He, along with a number 
of other Americans who were attempting to leave Spain, was subse-
quently arrested in Barcelona and taken to the front under armed 
guard. The XIV Brigade officer Gillain claimed that following the 
battle of Brunete the Spanish authorities proposed to allow a certain 
percentage of the troops in the Brigades to go on leave outside Spain 
but that the Brigade directorate at Albacete successfully foiled the 
move. The anger of the troops, who heard of the government's plan, 
was responsible for even more numerous attempts at desertions. 45 
The actual attitude of the Spanish authorities on this question 
seemed to be ambiguous and vacillating. In March 1937 the United 
States consul in Valencia reported to the State Department that six 
American Brigade men were at the consulate asking for protection 
and repatriation. He said that one of these men had been turned in 
by the Spanish authorities themselves. He also reported that the 
French consul had told him that he, the French consul, had evacuated 
400 French deserters aboard a French naval vessel with the acqui-
escence of the Spanish authorities. He added, however, that the Span-
ish government had since changed its attitude. The United States 
secretary of state directed the consul to inquire officially as to the 
attitude of the Spanish authorities toward evacuating American de-
serters on United States warships. On March 19 the consul at Va-
lencia informed the State Department that the attitude of the Spanish 
authorities had been to allow foreigners, who so desired, to leave the 
country; but, as of March 3, that had changed, and since that date the 
policy was to treat them as deserters. According to the French consul, 
he continued, many arrests were being made among Frenchmen who 
were attempting to leave the International Brigades and Spain. The 
United States consul reported on March 16, however, that if he had 
authorization to put American deserters on United States warships he 
could probably obtain approval from the Spanish authorities. Later, 
Dissidence, Desertion, & the Terror 171 
in July 1937, the United States consul at Barcelona reported that a 
group of American deserters from the International Brigades had 
been arrested while trying to make their way to the frontier. Most of 
them said their passports had been taken from them at Albacete. The 
Spanish authorities, he continued, were willing to tum the men over 
to the United States consulate for evacuation before formal charges 
were brought against them. 46 
If the attitude of the Spanish government was ambiguous, that of 
the Brigade commissariat was clear enough. In June 1937 Auguste 
Lecouer, at that time political commissar in the XIII Brigade, re-
ceived orders to report to Marty at Albacete. Marty told Lecouer that 
he had a particularly delicate job for him. There was a veritable 
underground railway in operation for smuggling French deserters 
from the Brigade out of Spain. The focal point of the network was the 
French consulate in Valencia where the deserters could secure food 
and protection before leaving the country. Marty ordered Lecouer to 
uncover the channels through which the men got to the consulate by 
posing as a deserter himself. Once inside he was to index the names 
of all whom he saw. Lecouer succeeded in doing this and, once inside, 
attempted to talk the deserters into returning to the Brigades. They 
said that if they returned they would be put in prison or shot. Lecouer 
promised them that if they would return they would not be punished 
but that if they did not their names would be sent to the leftist political 
organizations in France and they would be labeled deserters there. His 
promise of no punishment was backed up by the word of Prosper 
Moquet, a Communist member of the French Chamber of Deputies 
who happened to be in Valencia at the time. Most of the deserters 
decided to accept the opportunity to return to duty rather than face 
ostracism at home. The French consulate in Valencia continued to 
offer protection and repatriation to those Brigade men (at least the 
French and Belgian ones) who turned themselves in. The Belgian 
officer Gillain, fearing for his life, found refuge there and was eventu-
ally gotten out of Spain on a French naval vessel in 1938.47 
Even those men who made good their escape from the Brigades and 
Spain were not free from the wrath of the Communists. Frenchmen 
who deserted were the object of slanderous stories spread among the 
leftist element of the population in their homeland. The mere threat 
of that had been enough to dissuade one group of Frenchmen, who 
were as good as free, from proceeding to France. If anyone had the 
nerve to denounce publicly the Communist role in Spain or the Bri-
gade leadership once out of Spain, he was subjected to public humilia-
tion by the posting of leaflets in his home area on which his name was 
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prominently displayed along with the most violent denunciations and 
accusations. 48 Some were hounded by party thugs and beaten up. 49 
The party also persecuted men it considered deserters by using its 
influence in various labor unions to pressure employers into refusing 
to hire them. The party did that not only with men who had actually 
deserted from the Brigades in Spain but to some who deserted from 
the party upon their return home. 50 
Most of the victims of the harsh disciplinary and political police 
regime of the Brigades simply vanished with no record of their fate. 
There were, after all, numerous ways of getting rid of dissident ele-
ments and troublemakers. One of the easiest and least provable was 
to send men who had been arrested or otherwise designated to the 
front lines and keep them there. For especially difficult cases there was 
always the possibility of a bullet in the back and a "killed in action" 
explanation. Haldane had reason to suspect that such a fate had 
befallen the British commissar Wally Tapsall, who had constant dis-
agreements with the Brigade commissariat's policies. He was, said 
she, "killed in obscure circumstances." She gathered also that this 
same method of doing away with troublesome elements in the Bri-
gades befell an American Communist who had originally been as-
signed to recruitment work in France. After being sent to Spain he 
apparently had difficulties with the Brigade leadership and was or-
dered to the front, not with the American battalion but with a Spanish 
unit. He was soon reported "killed in action." When Haldane tried 
to find out the facts of his death from British commissar Rust, he told 
her, "He was sold down the river by his own Party."51 
While many men simply disappeared in mysterious and unrecorded 
ways in Spain there were some who, through the knowledge and 
testimony of others, were remembered. One of these was Hans 
Krause. The German Communist Jan Valtin received word that 
Krause, an old friend and Communist party colleague, had been 
arrested by the Cheka in Spain. Krause, a veteran of the Profintern, 
had conducted arms shipments from Marseilles to Valencia and then 
volunteered for the International Brigades. While he was in the hospi-
tal recuperating from wounds received in action Cheka agents seized 
him and put him in prison. The accusation was the usual one of 
Trotskyism and espionage. The charge, said Valtin, was absurd. 
Krause's wife, in Antwerp, showed Valtin a letter from Krause which 
had been smuggled out of jail, "a bitter heart-breaking letter."52 
Another case of a German International Brigade man's being killed 
by the Communists in Spain was that of Mark Rein. Rein's disappear-
ance from a Barcelona hotel room was inquired into by his friend and 
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fellow Socialist Willy Brandt, who, a political exile himself, was in 
Spain as a correspondent for a Scandinavian newspaper. Brandt pur-
sued his investigation of Rein's fate into the very top echelons of the 
German Communist party in Spain but was unable to get any satisfac-
tory explanation of what had happened to his friend. Brandt found 
out later that Rein had been arrested, imprisoned, and eventually 
liquidated by the Cheka. Typical also of the type of politically moti-
vated terror that permeated the Communist apparatus in Spain con-
cerned the German Socialist Kurt Landau. While not specifically a 
Brigade affair, the individuals involved in Landau's murder were 
intimately associated with the Brigades and the techniques and ratio-
nalizations for his liquidation were essentially the same as those deal-
ing with the Brigade men. Landau was arrested and murdered by 
German Cheka operatives in Barcelona. This was done at the orders 
of Walter Ulbricht and Andre Marty. 53 
While the political terror in the Brigades undoubtedly bore down 
most heavily on the Germans and East Europeans, there were a 
number of Americans, English, and French among its victims. One 
of them was Paul White. White, a Communist party member, was 
shot "presumably for political dissidence" since he "had not commit-
ted any offense ... that deserved punishment by death on military 
grounds." Another case was that of Albert Wallach. Arrested and put 
in the International Brigade prison at Castel de Fells, Wallach was 
later summarily shot on suspicion of being a spy. 54 A fellow American 
volunteer, while himself imprisoned at Castel de Fells, shared a cell 
with Wallach. He said that Wallach was taken out one night and was 
never seen again. While in Barcelona, he had left the International 
Brigade and taken a commission in a CNT unit. While at the CNT 
offices in Barcelona he was arrested by Cheka agents. Wallach's chief 
accuser and interrogator was Tony DeMaio, an American who oper-
ated as a Cheka agent in the International Brigades. 55 Marvin Stem, 
a party member who made the mistake of expressing open criticism 
of the Brigade leadership also fell victim to the fatal charge of political 
dissidence. He was arrested, assigned to a penal battalion, and subse-
quently disappeared. Later, when an American party delegation was 
touring Spain, an American Brigade man, a friend of Stem's, asked 
one of the party delegation about what had become of Stem. The 
answer he received was: "Party discipline is higher than all friendship, 
and if I were you, I would not discuss this matter any further." 56 
A similar occurrence took place in regard to the disappearance of 
the American volunteer Harry Perchuk. When a friend inquired 
about Perchuk from the political commissar of the XV Brigade John 
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Gates, he was told that Perchuk had been executed for criticizing the 
party. Asked how he could have been involved in such a thing when 
he knew him well, Gates replied: "You have to be a Bolshevik, and 
a Bolshevik would take care of his own mother. You have to introduce 
discipline. " 57 
The use of terror as an instrument of discipline became even more 
pronounced as the war continued with disasters and defeats for Loyal-
ist forces. Gillain referred to the mass executions of Brigade men 
during the fighting at Cuesta de la Reina in the fall of 1937 and, of 
the retreat in Aragon in 1938, Sandor Voros wrote: "The Kremlin 
leaders ... base their main reliance on terror. Officers and men are 
ruthlessly executed on their orders. The toll is particularly high 
among the Poles, Slavs, Germans and Hungarians, especially those 
who came to Spain from Moscow. These are summary executions, 
carried out in most cases secretly by the S.I.M."58 
Andre Marty was himself a particularly virulent example of the 
general paranoia that affiicted the Comintern hierarchy in those years. 
"To Marty," wrote one of the French party men who worked directly 
for him on occasion in Spain, "the enemy was more inside the Interna-
tional Brigades and Loyalist territory than on the other side of the 
lines." Gustav Regier, appointed political commissar in the XII Bri-
gade in November 1936 by Marty, wrote that Marty emphasized 
pointedly to him that Regier had full powers to deal with any difficul-
ties. Later, in the aftermath of the bloody battle of Jarama, the rem-
nants of the Franco-Belgian battalion of the XII Brigade were 
overindulging themselves on the wine found in a deserted cellar. 
Hearing of it through his spies, Marty ordered Regier to tie the men 
to trees to sweat it out in the sun and to "shoot a few in the presence 
of the others" if he had any trouble. Regier's final experience with 
Marty took place near the end of the war as the remnants of the 
International Brigades were crossing the French frontier just ahead 
of the advancing Nationalist forces. Marty and a number of his hard-
core followers were attempting to liquidate a group of German Inter-
nationals before they could leave Spain and possibly reveal the things 
they knew of him and his activities in Spain to the bourgeois press. 
International Brigade men who were caught attempting, or openly 
threatening, to communicate any of the unsavory facts, especially of 
Cheka operations and the killing of Brigade men by the Cheka, were 
invariably shot. 59 
Marty's obsession with spies, Trotskyists, and a wide assortment of 
other dissident elements whose offenses ranged from criticism of the 
party or the Brigade directorate to desertion from the Brigades or 
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merely routine breaches of discipline and his penchant for dealing 
with all problems by simply having the offenders shot became a scan-
dal even among many Communists. In fact, his reputation as "Le 
Boucher d' Albacete" became so well known that the French party 
recalled Marty from Spain to explain his actions. In his report to the 
party, Marty freely admitted to the execution of some 500 from the 
ranks of the International Brigades. "These bandits," he said, "have 
committed all sorts of crimes: rape, robberies, murders, kidnappings 
of persons, and not satisfied with this, they have rebelled against the 
authorities of Valencia and undertaken espionage in favor of Franco 
... they even killed the guards of the concentration camps where it 
became necessary to imprison them."60 The Comintern, and thus all 
"good" Communists, however, continued to support Marty as a pro-
letarian hero. He remained not only in high esteem and position in 
the French party but continued to be looked upon as the grand master 
of the veterans of the International Brigades organization. 61 
An interesting sequel to the "Boucher d' Albacete" affair was the 
furor raised in Communist circles by the unkind treatment dealt out 
to Marty by Ernest Hemingway in his For Whom the Bell Tolls. 
Hemingway was completely pro-Loyalist in sympathy and had been 
practically an honorary member of the Brigades among whose mem-
bers he had many friends. He had allowed himself to be used, will-
ingly, by the Communists to further their own causes and to add 
lustre to their image. They were totally chagrined, however, at He-
mingway's brutally truthful account of some of the more unsavory 
aspects of the Spanish imbroglio and, most especially, at his stinging 
characterization of Marty. Calling Marty by name and identifying 
him as the "chief commissar of the International Brigades," Heming-
way discussed Marty at length. "He is crazy as a bedbug. He has a 
mania for shooting people ... that old one kills more than the bubonic 
plague ... but he doesn't kill fascists as we do ... not in a joke ... 
he kills rare things, Trotskyites, Divagationers [sic]. Any rare type of 
beasts .... He purifies more than Solvarson."62 
As a result of that characterization, which was all quite accurate, 
Alvah Bessie, an American Communist who joined the Brigade in 
1938 and who was on the editorial board of the party publication New 
Masses in 1939, wrote a review in that journal attacking Hemingway 
and the book. The Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade orga-
nization then adopted a resolution condemning Hemingway's book, 
and the Communist party in the United States and its affiliated 
organizations launched a concerted attack on Hemingway and his 
novel.63 
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The final act ofthe farce was played out in 1952 when the Veterans 
of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade published an anthology called The 
Heart of Spain, which included the works of a large number of people 
who had written from a pro-Loyalist point of view about the war. The 
editors scheduled several selections from Hemingway's works to be 
included. News of that intention raised a furor from the French 
Communist party and the French Brigade veterans organization. A 
number of letters passed back and forth between the American and 
French groups, and the veterans organizations in other countries 
entered the fray on the side of Marty. As a result, The Heart of Spain 
included no Hemingway selections. 64 The work of several other au-
thors who had subsequently either left the party or adopted an openly 
anti-Communist position were also excluded. Among them were An-dre Malreaux, Gustav Regler, Arthur Koestler, and Tom Wintring-
ham. 
Marty, however, was but the instrument, though indeed a particu-
larly crude one, of the policy of his masters in the Comintem hierar-
chy and in Moscow. The hypersuspiciousness, narrow sectarianism, 
and totalitarian mentality that he epitomized only reflected the system 
of which he was a part. 
Conclusion 
On September 21, 1938, Prime Minister Negrin announced 
in a speech to the League of Nations that his government had decided 
upon the complete withdrawal of all non-Spanish combatants from its 
armed forces. He asked that the League create a commission to over-
see the demobilization and repatriation process. 
The League complied with Negrin's request and its commission 
arrived in Spain on October 14. This signaled the official demise of the 
International Brigades as participants in the Spanish Civil War and 
their passing into history. But their historical image has been a partic-
ularly fuzzy one. This has been true, in part, because of the nature of 
the sources and, in part, because of the continuing emotional and 
ideological associations of the Spanish Civil War. 
The greatly oversimplified view of that war as a clear-cut struggle 
between "democracy" and "fascism" has exhibited amazing staying 
power despite the work of many historians pointing out the complexi-
ties of that struggle. The widespread sympathy for the Loyalist side 
and the identification of that side with "democracy" have made it 
difficult for many to accept or acknowledge the key role played by the 
Comintern in the Loyalist regime. These same emotional attachments 
have made it difficult for many to accept a sharp focus on the Interna-
tional Brigades as a Comintern-controlled military and political en-
tity. And yet that is what the record shows. 
Certainly there were non-Communists in the Brigades. Certainly 
there were many who joined the Brigades to fight for "democracy" 
or against "fascism." Neither of these truisms alters the fact that the 
Brigades were, from beginning to end, a Comintern army. 
The Brigades would never have existed but for the Soviet-Comin-
tern decision to call them into being. That this was done resulted from 
both the general Popular Front strategy of the period and the specific 
Soviet decision to sponsor, through the apparatus of the Comintern, 
an international army for use in Spain. Some non-Spanish volunteers 
did fight with Spanish militia units before the organization of the 
International Brigades, but they never numbered more than a few 
hundred. Only with the decision of the Comintern to raise an army 
to fight in Spain did the number of foreigners become significant. And 
only through the use of the existing Comintern organization and the 
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strenuous efforts of its various branches were these men recruited and 
transported into Spain. 
While the Comintern apparatus provided the machinery through 
which the Brigades were recruited and transported into Spain, Com-
intern functionaries provided direction and control. Working in con-
junction with the Soviet-Comintern apparatus in Spain, including the 
Spanish Communist party, they obtained the necessary cooperation 
from the Loyalist government authorities to quarter, equip, and train 
the incoming recruits. And, in conjunction with the same elements, 
the Brigades entered the battles for Madrid. 
Militarily the Brigades were considered to be crack units and were 
often referred to as "shock troops." Certainly they deserved such 
esteem, at least by the standards of the Spanish Civil War. The Bri-
gades played a crucial role in all the battles for Madrid in the winter 
of 1936-1937. While unprovable, it seems clear that the Internationals 
made the difference between survival and defeat for the Loyalist side 
during the defense ofthe capital from November 1936 through Janu-
ary 1937 and, perhaps even more decisively, during the Jarama 
fighting in February 1937. 
The military efficiency of the Internationals resulted from several 
factors. A great many of the men in the Brigades had had previous 
military training and even combat experience. Also, the Brigades were 
strictly disciplined units. The Communist military and political hier-
archy of the Brigades emphasized, in conformance with general party 
policy, the absolute necessity of firm and unquestioning discipline. 
Military discipline was heavily reinforced by the strict political disci-
pline demanded of all Communist party members. 
The Brigades' efficiency could also be accounted for, in part, by the 
nature of their military command. They had the advantage of being 
commanded, for the most part, by professional officers rather than 
amateurs. Kleber, Walter, Gall, and Lukacs were Red army officers 
with long training and experience. Kahle, Renn, and Pacciardi also 
had significant military experience as did numerous other Brigade 
officers. Further, the Internationals operated from the beginning un-
der the tutelage of professional Soviet advisers attached to each Bri-
gade. Finally, the Brigades received the best of the weapons and 
equipment available within Loyalist Spain. 
But far more important than the stress on military discipline was 
the political discipline imposed on the Brigades by the Comintern 
stalwarts who dominated them. While the Brigades operated 
militarily within the organizational structure of the People's Army 
(once that army had been created), they remained throughout their 
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sojourn in Spain an essentially autonomous organization so far as 
their internal affairs were concerned. Military and political commissar 
appointments were filled at the discretion of the Brigades' Political 
Commissariat and all matters of internal discipline and control came 
under that same authority. Party cadres from various countries were 
moved in and out of the Brigades freely at the volition of the Commis-
sariat (which was itself staffed entirely by individuals sent by and 
representing the various Communist parties). Thus, from beginning 
to end, the Brigades' command structure, both military and political, 
was overwhelmingly Communist and the Political Commissariat, the 
highest authority within the Brigades, was made up completely of 
seasoned and disciplined party cadres. 
The Political Commissariat maintained its control over the Bri-
gades chiefly through a political commissar system. The political 
commissar structure existed at all levels of command throughout the 
Brigades. It was staffed almost exclusively with seasoned and reliable 
party cadres and exercised ultimate authority (in the name of the 
Commissariat) within the Brigades. The political commissars were 
chiefly responsible for the maintainence of both military and political 
discipline within the Brigades as well as morale and political indoctri-
nation of the troops. The Brigade Commissariat also controlled the 
press, the police, the hospitals, the prisons, and the officer and com-
missar training schools of the Brigades. Thus the Brigades were, for 
all practical purposes, an autonomous Comintern army. 
After the Jarama and Guadalajara campaign in February-March 
1937, the military significance of the Brigades began to wane as the 
Loyalists built a mass People's Army. But despite their relative de-
cline in military significance, the Brigades continued to be a highly 
important component in the Comintern's overall operations regarding 
the Spanish Civil War and the Popular Front strategy in general. This 
was true especially in the propaganda sphere. The Brigades were held 
up as the most concrete and heroic example of the Popular Front and 
antifascism in action. Nothing served better than the Brigades in 
keeping alive the interest and sympathy of large segments of the 
population in many countries of the world. The Brigades were also 
seen by the Comintern as a highly significant school for party cadres, 
a school in which important lessons for future struggles would be 
learned and from which steel-hardened party leaders would be 
created. 
The Comintern proved determined to maintain the Brigades as an 
essentially autonomous organization (and thereby to maintain them 
as a Comintern-controlled force) even after the growth of the People's 
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Army had reduced the military significance of the Brigades. They did 
so in the face of attempts on the part of the Loyalist authorities to 
incorporate and assimilate the Brigades into their army in a meaning-
ful way. The Comintem's success in this meant that the International 
Brigades remained to the end what they had been from the beginning, 
an integral part of the Comintem's interlocking directorate in Spain. 
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1937); Theodor Balk, ed., La Quatorzieme (Madrid, 1931); Le Livre de Ia 15eme 
Brigade Internationa/e (Madrid, 1937) and its English language equivalent The Book 
of the XV Brigade (Madrid, 1938); Garibaldini in Spagna (Madrid, 1937); Alfred 
Kantorowicz, Tschapaiev: Dos Bataillon de 21 Nationen (Madrid, 1938); and Nuestros 
Espanoles (Madrid, 1937). All of these are naturally highly slanted to show the Bri-
gades in the most favorable light and follow the standard Communist and Popular 
Front line. Their chief value for the historian is in the many names and the biographical 
information they provide on individuals in the various units, and in the many details 
on at least some of the activities and attitudes prevalent among those in charge of the 
Brigades. 
A second category would be the semi-official works written by party functionaries 
and activists and published under party auspices. These include L' Amicale des Anciens 
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Volontaires Fran~ en Espagne Republicaine, L 'Epopee d'Espagne: Brigades Interna-
tionales 1936-1938 (Paris, 1956); Alfred Kantorowicz, Spanisches Tagebiich (Berlin, 
1948); Steve Nelson, The Volunteers (New York, 1953); Joe North, Men in the Ranks 
(New York, 1939); Marcel Acier, ed., From Spanish Trenches (New York, 1937); 
William Rust, Britons in Spain: The History of the XV International Brigade (London, 
1939); Gustav Szinda, Die XI Brigade (Berlin, 1956); and Max Wullschleger, Schweizer 
Kampfen in Spanien (Zurich, 1939). These adhere to basically the same standards as 
the first group and are of value in about the same way. 
A third category includes those books written by participants in the Brigades as 
individuals rather than under party control. These vary greatly as to approach, range 
of view, and knowledgeability of the writers. By far the single most important primary 
source book written on the entire subject of the political side of the Brigades is Luigi 
Longo, Le Brigate Internazionali in Spagna (Rome, 1956). Although Longo adheres 
strictly to the party line, it is the party line from a particularly authoritative source. 
Longo's position and role in the Comintern, in the Brigades, and later (at the time his 
book was published, for example), the Communist party of Italy all make him a key 
witness. His book covers the entire picture of the Spanish war and of the International 
Brigades from begiuning to end. It deals with virtually all the political issues and 
questions involved. Thus it offers the historian a prime source for an authoritative 
statement of the Commuuist position on all these matters. Another source from the 
Italian contingent is Giacomo Calandrone, Spagna Brucia (Rome, 1962). This account 
by a party member and close collaborator of Longo's while in Spain basically echos 
Longo's book but is valuable in furnishing details and also as an example of the 
Communist position on many of the controversial issues within the XII Brigade. Two 
other essential sources from the Italians are Randolfo Pacciardi, /1 Battaglione Gari-
baldi (Lugano, 1938); and Carlo Penchienati, Brigate Internazionali in Spagna: Delitti 
della "Ceka" Communista (Milan, 1950). Pacciardi's book is somewhat disappointing 
in its lack of discussion on the political issues in the Brigade. Published while the war 
in Spain was still in progress, Pacciardi presumably did not wish to do or say anything 
that might weaken or embarrass the Loyalist camp: thus his silence on matters of 
importance. Still his book offers the best source for his own attitudes toward what he 
thought he (and the other Italians) were, or should be, doing in Spain. Penchienati's 
book is quite a different matter. Written long after the event by a nonpolitical who 
served in the Brigades from begiuning to end, and who was a top-ranking officer in the 
Garibaldi uuit, Penchienati's book is a thorough expose of the political machinations 
of the Communist hierarchy of the Brigades, of their vendetta against Pacciardi, and 
of the operations of the political police apparatus in the Brigades. It is also a valuable 
source for the identification and background of many of the Italians in Spain. 
Among the American contributions are Alvah Bessie, Men in Battle (New York, 
1939). Bessie, an American party member and writer, was a late arrival in Spain. His 
book rellects in general the party line on Spain and the Brigades, but there are a few 
places where he sheds light on some of the less positive aspects of things. The book, 
like many of the more personal accounts, deals heavily with the combat experience. 
Another of this same type is Edwin Rolfe, The Lincoln Battalion (New York, 1939) 
by the onetime editor ofthe Volunteer for Liberty in Spain. From a somewhat different 
perspective but still completely favorable to the Brigades is John Gates, The Story of 
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an American Communist (New York, 1958). Written long after the Spanish war by one 
who rose to become XV Brigade commissar and who, much later, left the party and 
seeks to explain it all in this book, Gates's comments on his experience in the Brigades 
are strangely reticent. He still felt, even after losing faith in the party, that his Brigade 
experience was the high point in his life. It seems he was still unwilling, or unable, to 
disturb that memory with a very searching analysis. Sandor Voros, American Commis-
sar (Philadelphia, 1961) on the other hand is a thoroughgoing critique ofthe Commu-
nist policy in Spain and of the Brigades themselves. Voros, who was a party activist 
at the time of his tour in Spain, offers a good many insights into the working of the 
American party toward the Spanish war and the Brigades and, from the political side, 
is quite a valuable source. 
Nick Gi1lain, Le Mercenaire (Paris, 1938), written by a nonpolitical who served as 
an officer in the XIV Brigade, takes a critical view of the Communists' role but is mainly 
a personal memoir. It provides numerous interesting details about individuals and 
events. Auguste Lecouer, Le Partisan (Paris, 1963) is a much more valuable source on 
the political side of things. He was an activist in the French party and was sent to Spain 
to serve as a politically reliable cadre in the Brigades. He was given several political 
assignments by Marty and, in general, was a knowledgeable insider. He wrote this book 
after leaving the party. 
The fullest account from a German who was in a position to know much of what 
was going on is Ludwig Renn, Der Spanische Krieg (Berlin, 1955). Renn deals mainly 
with the military campaigns of the Brigades but offers insights into numerous other 
matters. Gustav Regier, Owl of Minerva (New York, 1960) is much more valuable from 
the political side. Regier, a member of the German party, sometime political commissar. 
of the XII Brigade, and an articulate spokesman for the Communists in Spain, wrote 
this book after leaving the party. Its view of the Brigades is interesting when compared 
with his earlier fictionalized account in the novel The Great Crusade (New York, 1940). 
From the English participants John Sommerfeld, Volunteer in Spain (London, 1937), 
Keith Scott Watson, Single to Spain (London, 1937), and Esmond Romilly, Boadil/a 
(London, 1937) are personal accounts of the experiences of rank and filers in the 
Brigades. Thomas Wintringham, English Captain (London, 1939) is by a more highly 
placed and knowledgeable participant. Wintringham, a party member and writer, 
commanded the British battalion in its opening combat experience. While uncritical 
and mainly concerned with the military side, much factual information is included on 
the early development of the Brigades. More valuable from the political point of view 
is Fred Copeman, Reason in Revolt (London, 1948). Copeman served in the British 
battalion throughout and rose to command it. He later left the party and his book 
reflects his disillusionment with the Communists. Jef Last, The Spanish Tragedy (Lon-
don, 1937) is by a Dutch Communist who served in both the Spanish militia and the 
Brigades. He later left the party and offers a critical view of its operations in Spain. 
The only scholarly secondary work on the Brigades as a whole is the interesting but 
slim book by Verle Johnson, Legions of Babel (University Park, 1967). Popular treat-
ments are Vincent Brome, The International Brigades: Spain 1936--1939 (New York, 
1960); Jacque de Bayac, Les Brigades Internationales (Paris, 1968); and Adolfo Liz6n 
Gadea, Las Brigadas Internacionales en Espana (Madrid, 1940). The most massive 
secondary work on the American contingent is Arthur Landis, The Abraham Lincoln 
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Brigade (New York, 1967). It, unfortunately, is basically a rerun of the standard party 
line in every respect and is badly tlawed by errors of both commission and omission. 
Robert A. Rosenstone, Crusade on the Left: The Lincoln Battalion in the Spanish CiPil 
War (New York, 1969) focuses chiefty on the motivation of the American participants. 
By far the best and most penetrating study of the American battalion is Cecil Eby, 
Between the Bullet and the Lie (New York, 1969). 
Perhaps the best, most complete, and most authoritative source for the Communist 
position on the Popular Front, the war in Spain, the International Brigades, and other 
concerns is the official party press. The most useful are the official Comintern organs, 
the Communist International and International Press Correspondence (lmpf"f!C()r). 
Also useful are the party newspapers, Mundo Obrero and Frente Rojo in Spain, the 
Daily Worker in Britain and the United States, and L 'Humanite in France. 
For the position of the Brigade leadership the best source is the Brigade press. I found 
the Volunteer for Liberty, Le Soldat de Ia Republique, Nuestro Combate, Reconquista, 
and the Boletfn de Informaci6n de las Brigadas Internacionales especially valuable. 
The volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1954, 1955, 1956) for the years of the Spanish Civil War offer occasional 
worthwhile insights into certain events in Spain, especially the efforts of American 
Brigade men to get out of the country. The testimony of certain witnesses before the 
United States Congress, House Committee on Un-American Activities, regarding the 
experience of American participants in the International Brigades is also a valuable 
source for certain aspects of the story which would otherwise be lacking. A source of 
even more value to the study of the Brigades is the hearings of the United States 
Subversive Activities Control Board on the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade 
organization. Numerous men who had served in the Brigades gave testimony at these 
hearings that ran to twelve volumes and many thousands of pages that compose the 
Stenographic Record of the hearings. A synopsis of the testimony and the findings of 
the board were printed in U.S. Subversive Activities Control Board, Docket no. 
108-153, Herbert Brownell Jr., Attorney General of the United States, Petitioner 
v. The Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, Respondent, Recommended 
Decision (Washington, D.C., 1955). A second, and even more condensed, synopsis of 
the findings was printed as the Report and Order of the Board (Washington, D.C., 
1955). 
The Marty Archives are disappointingly scant and sketchy. They contain a collection 
of largely irrelevant or redundant material so far as the Brigades, or Marty's role in 
them, is concerned. The one item of signifi.cant value in them is a copy of the instructors' 
manual used in the International Brigade school for political commissars. This docu-
ment is one of the best firsthand sources for the programs and policies of the Brigade 
political hierarchy and of the thoroughgoing Communist orientation provided for 
fledgling political commissars in the Brigades. 
The Orlov Memo comprises the answers given by Alexander Orlov, the chief Soviet 
NKVD man in Spain, to a set of questions posed to him by Stanley Payne. Orlov had 
by that time defected from the USSR and was thus free to speak the truth. There is 
little or nothing in this about the Brigades themselves, but it is firsthand evidence of 
some of the operations of the NKVD in Spain. A copy of this document was kindly 
furnished to me by Professor Payne. 
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A major bibliographical source for the entire Spanish Civil War is R. de Ia Cierva 
y colaboradores, Bibliografia sobre Ia guerra de Espana (1936-1919) y sus antecedentes 
(Madrid, 1968). The most thorough and easily available bibliography in English is in 
Burnett Bolloten, The Spanish Revolution (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979). Others are in 
Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York, 1961, 1977); Stanley Payne, The 
Spanish Revolution (New York, 1970); and, specifically on the Brigades, Verle B. 
Johnson, Legions of Babel (University Park, Pa., 1967). 
The fullest available collection of the Brigade newspapers is in the Hemeroteca 
Municipal in Madrid. Other major sources on the Spanish Civil war in Spain are to 
be found at the Unidad de Estudios sobre Ia Guerra de Espana, the Biblioteca Nacional, 
and the army's Servicio Hist6rico Militar. All of these are located in Madrid. In the 
United States the largest collections of material on the Spanish war are at the Hoover 
Institution at Stanford University (Bolloten collection), the University of California 
(Southworth collection), and the Library of Congress. There is also the David McKelvy 
White collection at the New York city public library which contains a very complete 
file of the Bo/etfn de Informacion published by the Brigade commissariat. The Marty 
Archives are held by the Widener Library at Harvard University. 
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